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The Unconstitutionality of Slavery*
Lysander Spooner
We will . . . attempt to show, specifically from its provisions, that the
constitution of the United States, not only does not recognize or sanction slavery, as
a legal institution, but that, on the contrary, it presumes all men to be free; that it
positively denies the right of property in man; and that it, of itself, makes it
impossible for slavery to have a legal existence in any of the United States.
In the first place-although the assertion is constantly made and rarely denied,
yet it is palpably a mere begging of the whole question in favor of slavery, to say that
the constitution intended to sanction it; for if it intended to sanction it, it did thereby
necessarily sanction it, (that is, if slavery then had any constitutional existence to be
sanctioned.) The intentions of the constitution are the only means whereby it
sanctions anything. And its intentions necessarily sanction everything to which they
apply, and which, in the nature of things, they are competent to sanction. To say,
therefore, that the constitution intended to sanction slavery, is the same as to say that
it did sanction it; which is begging the whole question, and substituting mere
assertion for proof.
Why, then, do not men say distinctly, that the constitution did sanction slavery,
instead of saying that it intended to sanction it? We are not accustomed to use the
word "intention," when speaking of the other grants and sanctions of the constitution.
We do not say, for example, that the constitution intended to authorize congress "to
coin money," but that it did authorize them to coin it. Nor do we say that it intended
to authorize them "to declare war;" but that it did authorize them to declare it. It
would be silly and childish to say merely that it intended to authorize them "to coin
money," and "to declare war," when the language authorizing them to do so, is full,
explicit and positive. Why, then, in the case of slavery, do men say merely that the
constitution intended to sanction it, instead of saying distinctly, as we do in the other
cases, that it did sanction it? The reason is obvious. If they were to say unequivocally
that it did sanction it, they would lay themselves under the necessity of pointing to
the words that sanction it; and they are aware that the words alone of the constitution
do not come up to that point. They, therefore, assert simply that the constitution
* [Editors note: This excerpt from The Unconstitutionality of Slavery is taken from the revised edition
published in 1860, which consisted of Part I (originally published in 1845), Part II (originally published in 1847),
and additional appendices and notes added in various subsequent editions. This excerpt comprises a little more than
a third of the original. The selections that follow emphasize Spooner's interpretive method. Perhaps the most
important portions omitted from this excerpt are Spooner's discussions of natural law, the contractarian basis of
government, and the nature of written constitutions that appear at the beginning of Parts I and II. Some passages
from omitted chapters have been inserted elsewhere in the text where indicated. All omissions, other than footnotes,
are indicated by ellipses. Added subject headings and section numbering are indicated by brackets.-Randy E.
Barnett]
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intended to sanction it; and they then attempt to support the assertion by quoting
certain words and phrases, which they say are capable of covering, or rather of
concealing such an intention; and then by the aid of exterior, circumstantial and
historical evidence, they attempt to enforce upon the mind the conclusion that, as
matter of fact, such was the intention of those who drafted the constitution; and
thence they finally infer that such was the intention of the constitution itself.
The error and fraud of this whole procedure-and it is one purely of error and
fraud-consists in this-that it artfully substitutes the supposed intentions of those
who drafted the constitution, for the intentions of the constitution itself; and,
secondly, it personifies the constitution as a crafty individual; capable of both open
and secret intentions; capable of legally participating in, and giving effect to all the
subtleties and double dealings of knavish men; and as actually intending to secure
slavery, while openly professing to "secure and establish liberty and justice." It per-
sonifies the constitution as an individual capable of having private and criminal
intentions, which it dare not distinctly avow, but only darkly hint at, by the use of
words of an indefinite, uncertain and double meaning, whose application is to be
gathered from external circumstances.
The falsehood of all these imaginings is apparent, the moment it is considered
that the constitution is not a person, of whom an "intention," not legally expressed,
can be asserted; that it has none of the various and selfish passions and motives of
action, which sometimes prompt men to the practice of duplicity and disguise; that
it is merely a written legal instrument; that, as such, it must have a fixed, and not a
double meaning; that it is made up entirely of intelligible words; and that it has, and
can have, no soul, no "intentions," no motives, no being, no personality, except what
'those words alone express or imply. Its "intentions" are nothing more nor less than
the legal meaning of its words. Its intentions are no guide to its legal meaning-as
the advocates of slavery all assume; but its legal meaning is the sole guide to its
intentions. This distinction is all important to be observed; for if we can gratuitously
assume the intentions of a legal instrument to be what we may wish them to be, and
can then strain or pervert the ordinary meaning of its words, in order to make them
utter those intentions, we can make anything we choose of any legal instrument
whatever. The legal meaning of the words of an instrument is, therefore, necessarily
our only guide to its intentions.
[I. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST UNJUST INTERPRETATIONS]
In ascertaining the legal meaning of the words of the constitution, these rules of
law, (the reasons of which will be more fully explained hereafter,) are vital to be
borne constantly in mind, viz.: 1st, that no intention, in violation of natural justice
and natural right, (like that to sanction slavery,) can be ascribed to the constitution,
unless that intention be expressed in terms that are legally competent to express such
an intention; and, 2d, that no terms, except those that are plenary, express, explicit,
distinct, unequivocal, and to which no other meaning can be given, are legally
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competent to authorize or sanction anything contrary to natural right. The rule of law
is materially different as to the terms necessary to legalize and sanction anything
contrary to natural right, and those necessary to legalize things that are consistent
with natural right. The latter may be sanctioned by natural implication and inference;
the former only by inevitable implication, or by language that is full, definite,
express, explicit, unequivocal, and whose unavoidable import is to sanction the
specific wrong intended.
To assert, therefore, that the constitution intended to sanction slavery, is, in
reality, equivalent to asserting that the necessary meaning, the unavoidable import
of the words alone of the constitution, come fully up to the point of a clear, definite,
distinct, express, explicit, unequivocal, necessary and peremptory sanction of the
specific thing, human slavery, property in man. If the necessary import of its words
alone do but fall an iota short of this point, the instrument gives, and, legally
speaking, intended to give, no legal sanction to slavery. Now, who can, in good faith,
say that the words alone of the constitution come up to this point? No one, who
knows anything of law, and the meaning of words. Not even the name of the thing,
alleged to be sanctioned, is given. The constitution itself contains no designation,
description, or necessary admission of the existence of such a thing as slavery,
servitude, or the right of property in man. We are obliged to go out of the instrument,
and grope among the records of oppression lawlessness and crime-records
unmentioned, and of course unsanctioned by the constitution-tofind the thing, to
which it is said that the words of the constitution apply. And when we have found
this thing, which the constitution dare not name, we find that the constitution has
sanctioned it (if at all) only by enigmatical words, by unnecessary implication and
inference, by innuendo and double entendre, and under a name that entirely fails of
describing the thing. Everybody must admit that the constitution itself contains no
language, from which alone any court, that were either strangers to the prior
existence of slavery, or that did not assume its prior existence to be legal, could
legally decide that the constitution sanctioned it. And this is the true test for
determining whether the constitution does, or does not, sanction slavery, viz. whether
a court of law, strangers to the prior existence of slavery or not assuming its prior
existence to be legal-looking only at the naked language of the instrument -- could,
consistently with legal rules, judicially determine that it sanctioned slavery. Every
lawyer, who at all deserves that name, knows that the claim for slavery could stand
no such test. The fact is palpable, that the constitution contains no such legal
sanction; that it is only by unnecessary implication and inference, by innuendo and
double-entendre, by the aid of exterior evidence, the assumption of the prior legality
of slavery, and the gratuitous imputation of criminal intentions that are not avowed
in legal terms, that any sanction of slavery, (as a legal institution,) can be extorted
from it.
But legal rules of interpretation entirely forbid and disallow all such implications,
inferences, innuendos and double-entendre, all aid of exterior evidence, all
assumptions of the prior legality of slavery, and all gratuitous imputations of criminal
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unexpressed intentions; and consequently compel us to come back to the letter of the
instrument, and find there a distinct, clear, necessary, peremptory sanction for
slavery, or to surrender the point.
To the unprofessional reader these rules of interpretation will appear stringent,
and perhaps unreasonable and unsound. For his benefit, therefore, the reasons on
which they are founded, will be given. And he is requested to fix both the reasons
and the rules fully in his mind, inasmuch as the whole legal meaning of the constitu-
tion, in regard to slavery, may perhaps be found to turn upon the construction which
these rules fix upon its language.
But before giving the reasons of this rule, let us offer a few remarks in regard to
legal rules of interpretation in general. Many persons appear to have the idea that
these rules have no foundation in reason, justice or necessity; that they are little else
than whimsical and absurd conceits, arbitrarily adopted by the courts. No idea can
be more erroneous than this. The rules are absolutely indispensable to the
administration of the justice arising out of any class of legal instruments whatever-
whether the instruments be simple contracts between man and man, or statutes
enacted by legislatures, or fundamental compacts or constitutions of government
agreed upon by the people at large. In regard to all these instruments, the law fixes,
and necessarily must fix their meaning; and for the obvious reason, that otherwise
their meaning could not be fixed at all. The parties to the simplest contract may dis-
agree, or pretend to disagree as to its meaning, and of course as to their respective
rights under it. The different members of a legislative body, who vote for a particular
statute, may have different intentions in voting for it, and may therefore differ, or
pretend to differ, as to its meaning. The people of a nation may establish a compact
of government. The motives of one portion may be to establish liberty, equality and
justice; and they may think, or pretend to think, that the words used in the instrument
convey that idea. The motives of another portion may be to establish the slavery or
subordination of one part of the people, and the superiority or arbitrary power of the
other part; and they may think, or pretend to think, that the language agreed upon by
the whole authorizes such a government. In all these cases, unless there were some
rules of law, applicable alike to all instruments, and competent to settle their
meaning, their meaning could not be settled; and individuals would of necessity lose
their rights under them. The law, therefore, fixes their meaning; and the rules by
which it does so, are founded in the same justice, reason, necessity and truth, as are
other legal principles, and are for that reason as inflexible as any other legal
principles whatever. They are also simple, intelligible, natural, obvious. Everybody
are presumed to know them, as they are presumed to know any other legal principles.
No one is allowed to plead ignorance of them, any more than of any other principle
of law. All persons and people are presumed to have framed their contracts, statutes
and constitutions with reference to them. And if they have not done so-if they have
said black when they meant white, and one thing when they meant another, they must
abide the consequences. The law will presume that they meant what they said. No
one, in a court of justice, can claim any rights founded on a construction different
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from that which these rules would give to the contract, statute, or constitution, under
which he claims. The judiciary cannot depart from these rules, for two reasons. First,
because the rules embody in themselves principles of justice, reason and truth; and
are therefore as necessarily law as any other principles of justice, reason and truth;
and, secondly, because if they could lawfully depart from them in one case, they
might in another, at their own caprice. Courts could thus at pleasure become
despotic; all certainty as to the legal meaning of instruments would be destroyed; and
the administration of justice, according to the true meaning of contracts, statutes and
constitutions, would be rendered impossible.
[A. Introduction to the Rules of Interpretation]
What, then, are some of these rules of interpretation?
One of them, ... is, that where words are susceptible of two meanings, one
consistent, and the other inconsistent, with justice and natural right, that meaning and
only that meaning, which is consistent with right, shall be attributed to them-unless
other parts of the instrument overrule that interpretation.
Another rule, (if indeed it be not the same,) is, that no language except that which
is peremptory, and no implication, except one that is inevitable, shall be held to
authorize or sanction anything contrary to natural right.
Another rule is, that no extraneous or historical evidence shall be admitted to fix
upon a statute an unjust or immoral meaning, when the words themselves of the act
are susceptible of an innocent one.
One of the reasons of these stringent and inflexible rules, doubtless is, that judges
have always known, that, in point of fact, natural justice was itself law, and that
nothing inconsistent with it could be made law, even by the most explicit and
peremptory language that legislatures could employ. But judges have always, in this
country and in England, been dependent upon the executive and the legislature for
their appointments and salaries, and been amenable to the legislature by impeach-
ment. And as the executive and legislature have always enacted more or less statutes,
and had more or less purposes to accomplish, that were inconsistent with natural
right, judges have seen that it would be impossible for them to retain their offices,
and at the same time maintain the integrity of the law against the will of those in
whose power they were. It is natural also that the executive should appoint, and that
the legislature should approve the appointment of no one for the office of judge,
whose integrity they should suppose would stand in the way of their purposes. The
consequence has been that all judges, (probably without exception,) though they have
not dared deny, have yet in practice yielded the vital principle of law; and have
succumbed to the arbitrary mandates of the other departments of the government, so
far as to carry out their enactments, though inconsistent with natural right. But, as if
sensible of the degradation and criminality of so doing, they have made a stand at the
first point at which they could make it, without bringing themselves in direct col-
lision with those on whom they were dependent. And that point is, that they will
1019
1997/The Unconstitutionality of Slavery
administer, as law, no statute, that is contrary to natural right, unless its language be
so explicit and peremptory, that there is no way of evading its authority, but by flatly
denying the authority of those who enacted it. They (the court) will themselves add
nothing to the language of the statute, to help out its supposed meaning. They will
imply nothing, infer nothing, and assume nothing, except what is inevitable; they will
not go out of the letter of the statute in search of any historical evidence as to the
meaning of the legislature, to enable them to effectuate any unjust intentions not fully
expressed by the statute itself. Wherever a statute is supposed to have in view the
accomplishment of any unjust end, they will apply the most stringent principles of
construction to prevent that object being effected. They will not go a hair's breadth
beyond the literal or inevitable import of the words of the statute, even though they
should be conscious, all the while, that the real intentions of the makers of it would
be entirely defeated by their refusal. The rule... is laid down by the Supreme Court
of the United States in these words:
"Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown,
where the general system of the laws is departed from, the legislative intention must
be expressed with irresistible clearness, to induce a court of justice to suppose a
design to effect such objects."-- (United States vs. Fisher et al., 2 Cranch, 390.)'
Such has become the settled doctrine of courts. And although it does not come
up to the true standard of law, yet it is good in itself, so far as it goes, and ought to
be unflinchingly adhered to, not merely for its own sake, but also as a scaffolding,
from which to erect that higher standard of law, to wit, that no language or authority
whatever can legalize anything inconsistent with natural justice.2
Another reason for the rules before given, against all constructions, implications
and inferences-except inevitable ones-in favor of injustice, is, that but for them
we should have no guaranty that our honest contracts, or honest laws would be
honestly administered by the judiciary. It would be nearly or quite impossible for
men, in framing their contracts or laws, to use language so as to exclude every
possible implication in favor of wrong, if courts were allowed to resort to such
implications. The law therefore excludes them; that is, the ends of justice-the
security of men's rights under their honest contracts, and under honest legislative
enactments-make it imperative upon courts of justice to ascribe an innocent and
honest meaning to all language that will possibly bear an innocent and honest
meaning. If courts of justice could depart from this rule for the purpose of upholding
1. This language of the Supreme Court contains an admission of the truth of the charge just made against
judges, viz., that rather than lose their offices, they will violate what they know to be law, in subserviency to the
legislatures on whom they depend; for it admits, I st, that the preservation of men's rights is the vital principle of
law, and, 2d, that courts (and the Supreme Court of the United States in particular) will trample upon that principle
at the bidding of the legislature, when the mandate comes in the shape of a statute of such "irresistible clearness,"
that its meaning cannot be evaded.
2. "Laws are construed strictly to save a right."-- Whitney et aL vs. Enunett et al., I Baldwin, C. C R. 316,
"No law will make a construction to do wrong; and there are some things which the law favors, and some it
dislikes; it favoreth those things that come from the order of nature."-Jacob's Law Dictionary, title Law.
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what was contrary to natural right, and should employ their ingenuity in spying out
some implied or inferred authority, for sanctioning what was in itself dishonest or
unjust, when such was not the necessary meaning of the language used, there could
be no security whatever for the honest administration of honest laws, or the honest
fulfilment of men's honest contracts. Nearly all language, on the meaning of which
courts adjudicate, would be liable, at the caprice of the court, to be perverted from
the furtherance of honest, to the support of dishonest purposes. Judges could construe
statutes and contracts in favor of justice or injustice, as their own pleasure might
dictate.
Another reason of the rules, is, that as governments have, and can have no
legitimate objects or powers opposed to justice and natural right, it would be treason
to all the legitimate purposes of government, for the judiciary to give any other than
an honest and innocent meaning to any language, that would bear such a
construction.
The same reasons that forbid the allowance of any unnecessary implication or
inference in favor of a wrong, in the construction of a statute, forbids also the intro-
duction of any extraneous or historical evidence to prove that the intentions of the
legislature were to sanction or authorize a wrong.
The same rules of construction, that apply to statutes, apply also to all those
private contracts between man and man, which courts actually enforce. But as it is
both the right and the duty of courts to invalidate altogether such private contracts
as are inconsistent with justice, they will admit evidence exterior to their words, if
offered by a defendant for the purpose of invalidating them. At the same time, a
plaintiff, or party that wishes to set up a contract, or that claims its fulfilment, will
not be allowed to offer any evidence exterior to its words, to prove that the contract
is contrary to justice-because, if his evidence were admitted, it would not make his
unjust claim a legal one; only invalidate it altogether. But as courts do not claim the
right of invalidating statutes and constitutions, they will not admit evidence, exterior
to their language, to give them such a meaning, that they ought to be invalidated.
I think no one-no lawyer, certainly-will now deny that it is a legal rule of
interpretation-that must be applied to all statutes, and also to all private contracts
that are to be enforced-that an innocent meaning, and nothing beyond an innocent
meaning, must be given to all language that will possibly bear such a meaning. All
will probably admit that the rule, as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States, is correct, to wit, that "where rights are infringed, where fundamental
principles are overthrown, where the general system of the laws is departed from, the
legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness, to induce a court
of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects."
But perhaps it will be said that these rules, which apply to all statutes, and to all
private contracts that are to be enforced, do not apply to the constitution. And why
do they not? No reason whatever can be given. A constitution is nothing but a con-
tract, entered into by the mass of the people, instead of a few individuals. This
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contract of the people at large becomes a law unto the judiciary that administer it, just
as private contracts, (so far as they are consistent with natural right,) are laws unto
the tribunals that adjudicate upon them. All the essential principles that enter into the
question of obligation, in the case of a private contract, or a legislative enactment,
enter equally into the question of the obligation of a contract agreed to by the whole
mass of the people. This is too self-evident to need illustration.
Besides, is it not as important to the safety and rights of all interested, that a
constitution or compact of government, established by a whole people, should be so
construed as to promote the ends of justice, as it is that a private contract or a
legislative enactment should be thus construed? Is it not as necessary that some check
should be imposed upon the judiciary to prevent them from perverting, at pleasure,
the whole purpose and character of the government, as it is that they should be
restrained from perverting the meaning of a private contract, or a legislative
enactment? Obviously written compacts of government could not be upheld for a
day, if it were understood by the mass of the people that the judiciary were at liberty
to interpret them according to their own pleasure, instead of their being restrained by
such rules as have now been laid down.
Let us now look at some of the provisions of the constitution, and see what
crimes might be held to be authorized by them, if their meaning were not to be
ascertained and restricted by such rules of interpretation as apply to all other legal
instruments.
The second amendment to the constitution declares that "the right of the people
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."
This right "to keep and bear arms," implies the right to use them-as much as
a provision securing to the people the right to buy and keep food, would imply their
right also to eat it. But this implied right to use arms, is only a right to use them in
a manner consistent with natural rights-as, for example, in defense of life, liberty,
chastity, &c. Here is an innocent and just meaning, of which the words are sus-
ceptible; and such is therefore the extent of their legal meaning. If the courts could
go beyond the innocent and necessary meaning of the words, and imply or infer from
them an authority for anything contrary to natural right, they could imply a
constitutional authority in the people to use arms, not merely for the just and innocent
purposes of defense, but also for the criminal purposes of aggression-for purposes
of murder, robbery, or any other acts of wrong to which arms are capable of being
applied. The mere verbal implication would as much authorize the people to use
arms for unjust, as for just, purposes. But the legal implication gives only an
authority for their innocent use. And why? Simply because justice is the end of all
law-the legitimate end of all compacts of government. It is itself law; and there is
no right or power among men to destroy its obligation.
Take another case. The constitution declares that "Congress shall have power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes."
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This power has been held by the Supreme Court to be an exclusive one in the
general government-and one that cannot be controlled by the States. Yet it gives
Congress no constitutional authority to legalize any commerce inconsistent with
natural justice between man and man; although the mere verbal import of the words,
if stretched to their utmost tension in favor of the wrong, would authorize Congress
to legalize a commerce in poisons and deadly weapons, for the express purpose of
having them used in a manner inconsistent with natural right-as for the purposes
of murder.
At natural law, and on principles of natural right, a person who should sell to
another a weapon or a poison, knowing that it would, or intending that it should be
used for the purpose of murder, would be legally an accessary to the murder that
should be committed with it. And if the grant to Congress of a "power to regulate
commerce," can be stretched beyond the innocent meaning of the words-beyond
the power of regulating and authorizing a commerce that is consistent with natural
justice-and be made to cover everything, intrinsically criminal, that can be
perpetrated under the name of commerce-then Congress have the authority of the
constitution for granting to individuals the liberty of bringing weapons and poisons
from "foreign nations" into this, and from one State into another, and selling them
openly for the express purposes of murder, without any liability to legal restraint or
punishment.
Can any stronger cases than these be required to prove the necessity, the sound-
ness, and the inflexibility of that rule of law, which requires the judiciary to ascribe
an innocent meaning to all language that will possibly bear an innocent meaning? and
to ascribe only an innocent meaning to language whose mere verbal import might be
susceptible of both an innocent and criminal meaning? If this rule of interpretation
could be departed from, there is hardly a power granted to Congress, that might not
lawfully be perverted into an authority for legalizing crimes of the highest grade....
[B. The Intentions of the Convention]
The intentions of the framers of the constitution, (if we could have, as we cannot,
any legal knowledge of them, except from the words of the constitution,) have
nothing to do with fixing the legal meaning of the constitution. That convention were
not delegated to adopt or establish a constitution; but only to consult, devise and
recommend. The instrument, when it came from their hands, was a mere proposal,
having no legal force or authority. It finally derived all its validity and obligation, as
a frame of government, from its adoption by the people at large? Of course the
intentions of the people at large are the only ones, that are of any importance to be
3. The Supreme Court say, "The instrument, when it came from their hands, (that is, the hands of the
convention,) was a mere proposal, without obligation or pretension to it." "The people were at perfect liberty to
accept or reject it; and their act was final."-M'Cullock vs. Maryland, -4 Wheaton 403-4.
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regarded in determining, the legal meaning of the instrument. And their intentions
are to be gathered entirely from the words, which they adopted to express them. And
their intentions must be presumed to be just what, and only what the words of the
instrument legally express. In adopting the constitution, the people acted as legis-
lators, in the highest sense in which that word can be applied to human lawgivers.
They were establishing a law that was to govern both themselves and their govern-
ment. And their intentions, like those of other legislators, are to be gathered from the
words of their enactments. Such is the dictate of both law and common sense.4 The
instrument had been reported by their committee, the convention. But the people did
not ask this committee what was the legal meaning of the instrument reported. They
adopted it, judging for themselves of its legal meaning, as any other legislative body
would have done. The people at large had not even an opportunity of consultation
with the members of the convention, to ascertain their opinions. And even if they had
consulted them, they would not have been bound at all by their opinions. But being
unable to consult them, they were compelled to adopt or reject the instrument, on
their own judgment of its meaning, without any reference to the opinions of the con-
vention. The instrument, therefore, is now to be regarded as expressing the intentions
of the people at large; and not the intentions of the convention, if the convention had
any intentions differing from the meaning which the law gives to the words of the
instrument.
But why do the partisans of slavery resort to the debates of the convention for
evidence that the constitution sanctions slavery? Plainly for no other reason than
because the words of the instrument do not sanction it. But can the intentions of that
convention, attested only by a mere skeleton of its debates, and not by any impress
upon the instrument itself, add anything to the words, or to the legal meaning of the
words of the constitution? Plainly not. Their intentions are of no more consequence,
in a legal point of view than the intentions of any other equal number of the then
voters of the country. Besides, as members of the convention, they were not even
parties to the instrument; and no evidence of their intentions, at that time, is
applicable to the case. They became parties to it only by joining with the rest of the
people in its subsequent adoption; and they themselves, equally with the rest of the
people, must then be presumed to have adopted its legal meaning, and that
alone-notwithstanding anything they may have previously said. What absurdity
then is it to set up the opinions expressed in the convention, and by a few only of its
4. The Supreme Court of the United States say:
"The intention of the instrument must prevail: this intention must be collected from its words. "-Ogden vs.
Saunders,-12 Wheaton, 332.
"The intention of the legislature is to be searched for in the words which the legislature has employed to
convey it."-Schr. Paulina's Cargo vs. United States, -7 Cranch, 60.... If the intentions of legislatures, who are
invested with the actual authority of prescribing laws, are of no consequence otherwise than as they are expressed
in the language of their statutes, of how much less consequence are any unexpressed intentions of the framers of
the constitution, who had no authority to establish a constitution, but only to draft one to be offered to the people
for their voluntary adoption or rejection.
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members, in opposition to the opinions expressed by the whole people of the country,
in the constitution itself.
But notwithstanding the opinions expressed in the convention by some of the
members, we are bound, as a matter of law, to presume that the convention itself, in
the aggregate, had no intention of sanctioning slavery-and why? Because, after all
their debates, they agreed upon an instrument that did not sanction it. This was con-
fessedly the result in which all their debates terminated. This instrument is also the
only authentic evidence of their intentions. It is subsequent in its date to all the other
evidence. It comes to us, also, as none of the other evidence does, signed with their
own hands. And is this to be set aside, and the constitution itself to be impeached and
destroyed, and free government overturned, on the authority of a few meagre
snatches of argument, intent or opinion, uttered by a few only of the members; jotted
down by one of them, (Mr. Madison,) merely for his own convenience, or from the
suggestions of his own mind; and only reported to us fifty years afterwards by a
posthumous publication of his papers? If anything could excite the utter contempt of
the people of this nation for the miserable subterfuges, to which the advocates of
slavery resort, it would seem that their offering such evidence as this in support of
their cause, must do it. And yet these, and such as these mere fragments of evidence,
all utterly inadmissible and worthless in their kind, for any legal purpose, constitute
the warp and the woof, the very sine qua non of the whole argument for slavery.
Did Mr. Madison, when he took his oath of office, as President of the United
States, swear to support these scraps of debate, which he had filed away among his
private papers?-Or did he swear to support that written instrument, which the
people of the country had agreed to, and which was known to them, and to all the
world, as the constitution of the United States?
5. "Elliot's Debates," so often referred to, are, if possible, a more miserable authority than Mr. Madison's
notes. He seems to have picked up the most of them from the newspapers of the day, in which they were reported
by nobody now probably knows whom. In his preface to his first volume, containing the debates in the
Massachusetts and New York conventions, he says:
"In the compilation of this volume, care has been taken to search into contemporary publications, in order to
make the work as perfect as possible; still, however, the editor is sensible, from the daily experience of newspaper
reports of the present time, that the sentiments they contain may, in some instances, have been in accurately taken
down, and in others, probably too faintly sketched, fully to gratify the inquisitive politician." He also speaks of them
as "rescued from the ephemeral prints of that day, and now, for the first time, presented in a uniform and durable
form."
In the preface to his second volume, which is devoted to the Virginia convention, he says the debates were
reported by an able stenographer, David Robertson; and then quotes the following from Mr. Wirt, in a note to the
Life of Patrick Henry:
"From the skill and ability of the reporter, there can be no doubt that the substance of the debates, as well as
their general course, are accurately preserved.'
In his preface to the third volume, embracing the North Carolina and Pennsylvania conventions, he says:
"Thefirst of the two North Carolina conventions is contained in this volume; the second convention, it is
believed, was neither systematically reported nor printed." The debates in the Pennsylvania convention, that have
been preserved, it appears, are on one side only; a search into the contemporary publications of the day, has been
unsuccessful to furnish us with the other side of the question."
In his preface to the fourth volume, he says:
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But even if the unexpressed intentions, which these notes of debate ascribed to
certain members, had been participated in by the whole convention, we should have
had no right to hold the people of the country at large responsible for them. This
convention sat with closed doors, and it was not until near fifty years after the people
had adopted the constitution itself, that these private intentions of the framers authen-
tically transpired. And even now all the evidence disclosed implicates, directly and
absolutely, but few of the members-not even all from the slaveholding states. The
intentions of all the rest, we have a right to presume, concurred with their votes and
the words of the instrument; and they had therefore no occasion to express contrary
ones in debate.
But suppose that all the members of the convention had participated in these
intentions-what then? Any forty or fifty men, like those who framed the consti-
tution, may now secretly concoct another, that is honest in its terms, and yet in secret
conclave confess to each other the criminal objects they intended to accomplish by
it, if its honest character should enable them to secure for it the adoption of the
people.-But if the people should adopt such constitution, would they thereby adopt
any of the criminal and secret purposes of its authors? Or if the guilty confessions of
these conspirators should be revealed fifty years afterwards, would judicial tribunals
look to them as giving the government any authority for violating the legal meaning
of the words of such constitution, and for so construing them as to subserve the crim-
inal and shameless purpose of its originators?
The members of the convention, as such, were the mere scriveners of the consti-
tution; and their individual purposes, opinions or expressions, then uttered in secret
cabal, though now revealed, can no more be evidence of the intentions of the people
who adopted the constitution, than the secret opinions or expressions of the
scriveners of any other contract can be offered to prove the intentions of the true
parties to such contract. As framers of the constitution, the members of the con-
vention gave to it no validity, meaning, or legal force. They simply drafted it, and
offered it, such as it legally might be, to the people for their adoption or rejection.
The people, therefore, in adopting it, had no reference whatever to the opinions of
the convention. They had no authentic evidence of what those opinions were. They
looked simply at the instrument. And they adopted even its legal meaning by a bare
majority. If the instrument had contained any tangible sanction of slavery, the people,
in some parts of the country certainly, would sooner have had it burned by the hands
of the common hangman, than they would have adopted it, and thus sold themselves
"In compiling the opinions, on constitutional questions, delivered in Congress, by some of the most
enlightened senators and representatives, the files of the New York and Philadelphia newspapers, from 1789 to
1800, had to be relied on; from the latter period io the present, the National Intelligencer is the authority consulted
for the desired information."
It is from such stuff as this. collected and published thirty-five and forty years after the constitution was
adopted-stuff very suitable for constitutional dreams to be made of-that our courts and people now make their
constitutional law, in preference to adopting the law of the constitution itself. In this way they manufacture law
strong enough to bind three millions of men in slavery.
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as pimps to slavery, covered as they were with the scars they had received in fighting
the battles of freedom. And the members of the convention knew that such was the
feeling of a large portion of the people; and for that reason, if for no other, they dared
insert in the instrument no legal sanction of slavery. They chose rather to trust to
their craft and influence to corrupt the government, (of which they themselves
expected to be important members,) after the constitution should have been adopted,
rather than ask the necessary authority directly from the people. And the success they
have had in corrupting the government, proves that they judged rightly in presuming
that the government would be more flexible than the people.
For other reasons, too, the people should not be charged with designing to
sanction any of the secret intentions of the convention. When the States sent
delegates to the convention, no avowal was made of any intention to give any
national sanction to slavery. The articles of confederation had given none; the then
existing State constitutions gave none; and it could not have been reasonably
anticipated by the people that any would have been either asked for or granted in the
new constitution.6 If such a purpose had been avowed by those who were at the
bottom of tho movement, the convention would doubtless never have-been held. The
avowed objects of the convention were of a totally different character. Commercial,
industrial and defensive motives were the prominent ones avowed. When, then the
constitution came from the hands of such a convention, unstained with any legal or
tangible sanction of slavery, were the people-who, from the nature of the case,
could not assemble to draft one for themselves-bound either to discard it, or hold
themselves responsible for all the secret intentions of those who had drafted it? Had
they no power to adopt its legal meaning, and that alone? Unquestionably they had
the power; and, as a matter of law, as well as fact, it is equally unquestionable that
they exercised it. Nothing else than the constitution, as a legal instrument, was
offered to' them for their adoption. Nothing else was legally before them that they
could adopt. Nothing else, therefore, did they adopt.
This alleged design, on the part of the convention, to sanction slavery, is
obviously of no consequence whatever, unless it can be transferred to the people who
adopted the constitution. Has any such transfer ever been shown? Nothing of the
kind. It may have been known among politicians, and may have found its way into
some of the State conventions. But there probably is not a tittle of evidence in
existence, that it was generally known among the mass of the people. And, in the
nature of things, it was nearly impossible that it should have been known by them.
The national convention had sat with closed doors. Nothing was known of their dis-
cussions, except what was personally reported by the members. Even the discussions
in the State conventions could not have been known to the people at large; certainly
not until after the constitution had been ratified by those conventions. The ratification
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of the instrument, by those conventions, followed close on the heels of their
discussions.-The population meanwhile was thinly scattered over the country. The
public papers were few, and small, and far between. They could not even make such
reports of the discussions of public bodies, as newspapers now do. The consequence
must have been that the people at large knew nothing of the intentions of the framers
of the constitution, but from its words, until after it was adopted. Nevertheless, it is
to be constantly borne in mind, that even if the people had been fully cognizant of
those intentions, they would not therefore have adopted them, or become at all
responsible for them, so long as the intentions themselves were not incorporated in
the instrument. Many selfish, ambitious and criminal purposes, not expressed in the
constitution, were undoubtedly intended to be accomplished by one and another of
the thousands of unprincipled politicians, that would naturally swarm around the
birth-place and assist at the nativity of a new and splendid government. But the
people are not therefore responsible for those purposes; nor are those purposes,
therefore, a part of the constitution; nor is its language to be construed with any view
to aid their accomplishment.
But even if the people intended to sanction slavery by adopting the intentions of
the convention, it is obvious that they, like the convention, intended to use no
language that should legally convey that meaning, or that should necessarily convict
them of that intention in the eyes of the world.-They, at least, had enough of
virtuous shame to induce them to conceal this intention under the cover of language,
whose legal meaning would enable them always to aver,
"Thou canst not say I did it."
The intention, therefore, that the judiciary should construe certain language into an
authority for slavery, when such is not the legal meaning of the language itself,
cannot be ascribed to the people, except upon the supposition that the people
presumed their judicial tribunals would have so much less of shame than they
themselves, as to volunteer to carry out these their secret wishes, by going beyond
the words of the constitution they should be sworn to support, and violating all legal
rules of construction, and all the free principles of the instrument. It is true that the
judiciary, (whether the people intended it or not,) have proved themselves to be thus
much, at least, more shameless than the people, or the convention. Yet that is not
what ought to have been expected of judicial tribunals. And whether such were really
the intention of the convention, or the people, is, at best a matter of conjecture and
history, and not of law, nor of any evidence cognizable by any judicial tribunal.
Why should we search at all for the intentions, either of the convention, or of the
people, beyond the words which both the convention and the people have agreed
upon to express them? What is the object of written constitutions, and written
statutes, and written contracts? Is it not that the meaning of those who make them
may be known with the most absolute precision of which language is capable? Is it
not to get rid of all the fraud, and uncertainty, and disagreements of oral testimony?
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Where would be our constitution, if, instead of its being a written instrument, it had
been merely agreed upon orally by the members of the convention? And by them
only orally reported to the people? And only this oral report of it had been adopted
by the people? And all our evidence of what it really was, had rested upon reports of
what Mr. A. and B., members of the convention, had been heard to say? Or upon Mr.
Madison's notes of the debates of the convention? Or upon the oral reports made by
the several members to their respective constituents, or to the respective State con-
ventions? Or upon flying reports of the opinions which a few individuals, out of the
whole body of the people, had formed of it when they adopted it? No two of the
members of the convention would probably have agreed in their representations of
what the constitution really was. No two of the people would have agreed in their
understanding of the constitution when they adopted it. And the consequence would
have been that we should really have had no constitution at all. Yet there is as much
ground, both in reason and in law, for thus throwing aside the whole of the written
instrument, and trusting entirely to these other sources for evidence of what any part
of the constitution really is, as there is for throwing aside those particular portions
of the written instrument, which bear on slavery, and attempting to supply their place
from such evidence as these other sources may chance to furnish. And yet, to throw
aside the written instrument, so far as its provisions are prohibitory of slavery, and
make a new constitution on that point, out of other testimony, is the only means, con-
fessedly the only means, by which slavery can be made constitutional.
[ Nothing can well be more absurd than the attempt to set up the real or pretended
intentions of a few individuals, in opposition to the legal meaning of the instrument
the whole people have adopted, and the presumed intentions of every individual who
was a party to it. Probably no two men, framers, adopters, or any others, ever had the
same intentions as to the whole instrument; and probably no two ever will. If, then,
one man's actual intentions are of any avail against the legal meaning of the
instrument, and against his presumed intentions, any and every other man's actual
intentions are of equal importance; and consequently, in order to sustain this theory
of carrying into effect men's actual intentions, we must make as many different
constitutions out of this one instrument, as there were, are, or may be, different
individuals who were, are, or may be, parties to it.
But this is not all. It is probable that, as matter of fact, four fifths, and, not
unlikely, nine tenths, of all those who were legally parties to the constitution, never
even read the instrument, or had any definite idea or intention at all in regard to the
relation it was to bear, either to slavery, or to any other subject. Every inhabitant of
the country, man, woman, and child, was legally a party to the constitution, else they
would not have been bound by it. Yet how few of them read it, or formed any
definite idea of its character, or had any definite intentions about it. Nevertheless,
they are all presumed to have read it, understood it, agreed to it, and to have intended
just what the instrument legally means, as well in regard to slavery as in regard to all
other matters. And this presumed intention of each individual, who had no actual
intention at all, is of as much weight in law, as the actual intention of any of those
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individuals, whose real or pretended intentions have been so much trumpeted to the
world. Indeed the former is of altogether more importance than the latter, if the latter
were contrary to the legal meaning of the instrument itself.
The whole matter of the adoption of the constitution is mainly a matter of
assumption and theory, rather than of actual fact. Those who voted against it, are just
as much presumed to have agreed to it, as those who voted for it. And those who
were not allowed to vote at all, are presumed to have agreed to it equally with the
others. So that the whole matter of the assent and intention of the people, is, in
reality, a thing of assumption, rather than of reality. Nevertheless, this assumption
must be taken for fact, as long as the constitution is acknowledged to be law; because
the constitution asserts it as a fact, that the people ordained and established it; and if
that assertion be denied, the constitution itself is denied, and its authority
consequently invalidated, and the government itself abolished.
Probably not one half, even, of the male adults ever so much as read the
constitution, before it was adopted. Yet they are all presumed to have read it, to have
understood the legal rules of interpreting it, to have understood the true meaning of
the instrument, legally interpreted, and to have agreed to it in that sense, and that
only. And this presumed intention of persons who never actually read the instrument,
is just as good as the actual intention of those who studied it the most profoundly;
and better, if the latter were erroneous.
The sailor, who started on a voyage before the constitution was framed, and did
not return until after it was adopted, and knew nothing of the matter until it was all
over, is, in law, as much a party to the constitution as any other person. He is
presumed to have read it, to have understood its legal meaning, and to have agreed
to that meaning, and that alone; and his presumed intention is of as much importance
as the actual intention of George Washington, who presided over the convention that
framed it, and took the first presidential oath to support it. It is of altogether more
consequence than the intention of Washington, if Washington intended anything
different from what the instrument, legally interpreted, expresses; for, in that case,
his intention would be of no legal consequence at all.
Men's presumed intentions were all uniform, all certainly right, and all valid,
because they corresponded precisely with what they said by the instrument itself;
whereas their actual intentions were almost infinitely various, conflicting with each
other, conflicting with what they said by the instrument, and therefore of no legal
consequence or validity whatever.
It is not the intentions men actually had, but the intentions they constitutionally
expressed, that make up the constitution. And the instrument must stand, as expres-
sing the intentions of the people, (whether it express them truly or not,) until the
people either alter its language, or abolish the instrument. If "the people of the United
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States" do not like the constitution, they must alter, or abolish, instead of asking their
courts to pervert it, else the constitution itself is no law!]
And what is the object of resorting to these flying reports for evidence, on which
to change the meaning of the constitution? Is it to change the instrument from a
dishonest to an honest one? from an unjust to a just one? No. But directly the
reverse-and solely that dishonesty and injustice may be carried into effect. A
purpose, for which no evidence of any kind whatever could be admitted in a court of
justice.
Again. If the principle be admitted, that the meaning of the constitution can be
changed, on proof being made that the scriveners or framers of it had secret and
knavish intentions, which do not appear on the face of the instrument, then perfect
license is given to the scriveners of constitutions to contrive any secret scheme of
villany they may please, and impose it upon the people as a system of government,
under cover of a written instrument that is so plainly honest and just in its terms, that
the people readily agree to it. Is such a principle to be admitted in a country where
the people claim the prerogative of establishing their own government, and deny the
right of anybody to impose a government upon them, either by force, or fraud, or
against their will?
Finally. The constitution is a contract; a written contract, consisting of a certain
number of precise words, to which, and to which only, all the parties to it have, in
theory, agreed. Manifestly neither this contract, nor the meaning of its words, can be
changed, without the consent of all the parties to it. Nor can it be changed on a
representation, to be made by any number of them less than the whole, that they
intended anything different from what they have said. To change it, on the
representation of a part, without the consent of the rest, would be a breach of contract
as to all the rest. And to change its legal meaning, without their consent, would be
as much a breach of the contract, as to change its words. If there were a single honest
man in the nation, who assented, in good faith, to the honest and legal meaning of the
constitution, it would be unjust and unlawful towards him to change the meaning of
the instrument so as to sanction slavery, even though every other man in the nation
should testify that, in agreeing to the constitution, he intended that slavery should be
sanctioned. If there were not a single honest man in the nation, who adopted the
constitution in good faith, and with the intent that its legal meaning should be carried
into effect, its legal meaning would nevertheless remain the same; for no judicial
tribunal could lawfully allow the parties to it to come into court and allege their
dishonest intentions, and claim that they be substituted for the legal meaning of the
words of the instrument.
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[C. The Practice of the Government]
THE practice of the government, under the constitution, has not altered the legal
meaning of the instrument. It means now what it did before it was ratified, when it
was first offered to the people for their adoption or rejection. One of the advantages
of a written constitution is, that it enables the people to see what its character is
before they adopt it; and another is, that it enables them to see after they have
adopted it, whether the government adheres to it, or departs from it. Both these
advantages, each of which is indispensable to liberty, would be entirely forfeited, if
the legal meaning of a written constitution were one thing when the instrument was
offered to the people for their adoption, and could then be made another thing by the
government after the people had adopted it.
It is of no consequence, therefore, what meaning the government have placed
upon the instrument; but only what meaning they were bound to place upon it from
the beginning.
The only question, then, to be decided, is, what was the meaning of the
constitution, as a legal instrument, when it was first drawn up, and presented to the
people, and before it was adopted by them?
To this question there certainly can be but one answer. There is not room for a
doubt or an argument, on that point, in favor of slavery. The instrument itself is
palpably a free one throughout, in its language, its principles, and all its provisions.
As a legal instrument, there is no trace of slavery in it. It not only does not sanction
slavery, but it does not even recognize its existence. More than this, it is palpably and
wholly incompatible with slavery. It is also the supreme law of the land, in contempt
of any State constitution or law that should attempt to establish slavery.
Such was the character of the constitution when it was offered to the people, and
before it was adopted. And if such was its character then, such is its character still.
It cannot have been changed by all the errors and perversions, intentional or
unintentional, of which the government may have since been guilty.
[D.] The Understanding of the People
ALTHOUGH the inquiry may be of no legal importance, it may nevertheless be
one pertinent to the subject, whether it be matter of history even-to say nothing of
legal proof-that the people of the country did really understand or believe that the
constitution sanctioned slavery? Those who make the assertion are bound to prove
it. The presumption is against them. Where is their contrary history?
They will say that a part of the people were actually slaveholders, and that it is
unreasonable to suppose they would have agreed to the constitution, if they had
understood it to be a free one.
The answer to this argument is, that the actual slaveholders were few in number
compared with the whole people; comprising probably not more than one eighth or
one sixth of the voters, and one fortieth or one thirtieth of the whole population. They
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were so few as to be manifestly incapable of maintaining any separate political
organization; or even of holding their slave property, except under the sufferance,
toleration and protection of the non-slaveholders. They were compelled, therefore,
to agree to any political organization, which the non-slaveholders should determine
on. This was at that time the case even in the strongest of the slaveholding States
themselves. In all of them, without exception, the slaveholders were either obliged
to live, or from choice did live, under free constitutions. They, of course, held their
slave property in defiance of their constitutions. They were enabled to do this
through the corrupting influence of their wealth and union. Controlling a large pro-
portion of the wealth of their States, their social and political influence was entirely
disproportionate to their numbers. They could act in concert. They could purchase
talent by honors, offices and money. Being always united, while the non-slaveholders
were divided, they could turn the scale in elections, and fill most of the offices with
slaveholders. Many of the non-slaveholders doubtless were poor, dependent and
subservient, (as large portions of the non-slaveholders are now in the slaveholding
States,) and lent themselves to the support of slavery almost from necessity. By
these, and probably by many other influences that we cannot now understand, they
were enabled to maintain their hold upon their slave property in defiance of their
constitutions. It is even possible that the slaveholders themselves did not choose to
have the subject of slavery mentioned in their constitutions; that they were so fully
conscious of their power to corrupt and control their governments, that they did not
regard any constitutional provision necessary for their security; and that out of mere
shame at the criminality of the thing, and its inconsistency with all the principles the
country had been fighting for and proclaiming, they did not wish it to be named....
There very probably may have been a general belief among the people, that
slavery would for a while live on, on sufferance; that the government, until the nation
should have become attached to the constitution, and cemented and consolidated by
the habit of union, would be too weak, and too easily corrupted by the innumerable
and powerful appliances of slaveholders, to wrestle with and strangle slavery. But to
suppose that the nation at large did not look upon the constitution as destined to
destroy slavery, whenever its principles should be carried into full effect, is obvi-
ously to suppose an intellectual impossibility; for the instrument was plain, and the
people had common sense; and those two facts cannot stand together consistently
with the idea that there was any general, or even any considerable misunderstanding
of its meaning....
[11.] RULES OF INTERPRETATION
... The whole question of the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of slavery,
is one of construction. And the real question is only whether the rules, applicable to
the interpretation of statutes, and all other legal instruments, that are enforced by
courts as obligatory, shall be applied also to the interpretation of the constitution? or
whether these rules are to be discarded, and the worst possible meaning of which the
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words are capable put upon the instrument arbitrarily, and for no purpose but to
sustain slavery? This is the question, and the whole of it.
The validity of the rule, quoted from the supreme court,' has not, so far as I am
aware, been denied. But some of the explanations given of the rule, in the prior argu-
ment, have been called in question. As the whole question at issue, in regard to the
constitutionality of slavery, is one solely of interpretation, it becomes important to
sustain, not only the explanations given of this rule, but also some of the other rules
laid down in that argument. And hence the necessity of going more fully into the
question of interpretation.
[A.] First Rule
The first rule, in the interpretation of the constitution, as of all other laws and
contracts, is, "that the intention of the instrument must prevail. "
The reason of this rule is apparent; for unless the intention of the instrument
prevail, wherefore was the instrument formed? or established as law? If any other
intention is to prevail over the instrument, the instrument is not the law, but a mere
nullity.
The intentions of a statute or constitution are always either declared, or
presumed.
The declared intentions of a statute or constitution are the intentions that are
clearly expressed in terms in the statute or constitution itself.
Where the intentions of statutes and constitutions are not clearly expressed in the
instruments themselves, the law always presumes them. And it always presumes the
most just and beneficial intentions, which the words of the instruments, taken as a
whole, can fairly be made to express, or imply.
Statutes and constitutions, in which no intentions were declared, and of which
no reasonable intentions could be presumed, would be of no legal validity. No
intentions that might be attributed to them by mere force of conjecture, and exterior
history, could be legally ascribed to them, or enforced as law.
The intentions, which individuals, in discussions, conversations, and newspapers,
may attribute to statutes and constitutions, are no part of the instruments themselves.
And they are not of the slightest importance as evidence of their intentions, especially
if they are in opposition, either to the declared, or the presumed, intentions of the
instruments. If the intentions of statutes and constitutions were to be gathered from
the talk of the street, there would be no use in writing them in terms. The talk of the
street, and not the written instruments, would constitute the laws. And the same
instrument would be as various and contradictory in its meanings, as the various
conjectures, or assertions, that might be heard from the mouths of individuals; for
8. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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one man's conjecture or assertion would be of as much legal value as another's; and
effect would therefore have to be given to all, if to any.
Those who argue for slavery, hold that "the intentions of the people" must
prevail, instead of "the intentions of the instrument;" thus falsely assuming that there
is a legal distinction between the intentions of the instrument and the intentions of
the people. Whereas the only object of the instrument is to express the intentions of
the people. That is the only motive that can be attributed to the people, for its
adoption. The people established the constitution solely to give written and certain
evidence of their intentions. Having their written instrument, we have their own
testimony, their own declaration of what their intentions are. The intentions of the
instrument, then, and the intentions of the people, are identical. And it is legally a
matter of indifference which form of expression is used; for both legally express the
same idea.
But the same class of persons, who assume a distinction between the intentions
of the instrument and the intentions of the people, labor to prove, by evidence
extraneous to the instrument, that the intentions of the people were different from
those the instrument expresses; and then they infer that the instrument must be
warped and twisted, and made-to correspond to these unexpressed intentions of the
people.
The answer to all this chicanery is this. The people, assuming that they have the
right to establish their will as law, have, in theory, agreed upon an instrument to
express their will, or their intentions. They have thus said that the intentions
expressed in that instrument are their intentions. Also that their intentions, as
expressed in the instrument, shall be the supreme law of the land.
"The people," by thus agreeing that the intentions, expressed by their joint
instrument, shall be the supreme law of the land, have virtually and legally contracted
with each-other, that, for the sake of having these, their written intentions, carried
into effect, they will severally forego all other intentions, of every name and nature
whatsoever, that conflict with the written ones, in which they are all agreed.
Now this written instrument, which is, in theory, the voluntary contract of each
and every individual with each and every other, is the highest legal evidence of their
intentions. It is the specific evidence that is required of all the parties to it. It is the
only evidence that is required, or accepted, of any. It is equally valid and sufficient,
in favor of all, and against all. It is the only evidence that is common to all. The
intentions it expresses must, therefore, stand as the intentions of all, and be carried
into effect as law, in preference to any contrary intentions, that may have been
separately, individually, and informally expressed by any one or all the parties on
other occasions; else the contract is broken.
As long as the parties acknowledge the instrument as being their contract, they
are each and all estopped by it from saying that they have any intentions adverse to
it. Its intentions and their intentions are identical, else the parties individually
1035
19971 The Unconstitutionality of Slavery
contradict themselves. To acknowledge the contract, and yet disavow its intentions,
is perfect self-contradiction.
If the parties wish to repudiate the intentions of the instrument, they must
repudiate or abolish the instrument itself. If they wish to change the intentions of the
instrument, in any one or more particulars, they must change its language in those
particulars, so as to make it express the intentions they desire. But no change can be
wrought by exterior evidence; because the written instrument, to which, and to which
only, all have, in theory, agreed, must always be the highest evidence that the courts
can have of the intentions of the whole people.
If, therefore, the fact were historically well authenticated, that every man in the
nation had publicly asserted, within one hour after the adoption of the constitution,
(that is, within one hour after he had, in theory, agreed to it,) that he did not agree to
it intending that any or all of the principles expressed by the instrument should be
established as law, all those assertions would not be of the least legal consequence
in the world; and for the very sufficient reason, that what they have said in the
instrument is the law; and what they have said out of it is no part of it, and has no
legal bearing upon it.
Such assertions, if admitted to be true, would only prove that the parties had lied
when they agreed to the instrument; and if they lied then they may be lying now. If
we cannot believe their first and formal assertion of their intentions, we cannot
believe their second and informal one.
The parties cannot claim that they did not understand the language of the instru-
ment; for if they did not understand the language then, when they agreed to it, how
can we know that they understand it now, when they dissent from it? Or how can we
know that they so much as understand the very language they are now using in
making their denial? or in expressing their contrary intentions?
They cannot claim that they did not understand the rules, by which their
language, used in the instrument, would be interpreted, for if they did not understand
them then, how can we know that they understand them now? Or how do we know
that they understand the rules, by which their present declarations of their intentions
will be interpreted?
The consequence is, that every man must be presumed to understand a contract
to which he agrees, whether he actually does understand it or not. He must be
presumed to understand the meaning of its words; the rules by which its words will
be interpreted; and the intentions, which its words, thus interpreted, express.
Otherwise men can never make contracts that will be binding upon them; for a man
cannot bind himself by a contract which he is not presumed to understand; and it can
seldom, or never, be proved whether a man actually does understand his contract, or
not. If, therefore, at any time, through ignorance, carelessness, mental reservations,
or fraudulent designs, men agree to instruments that express intentions different from
their own, they must abide the consequences. The instrument must stand, as
expressing their intentions, and their adverse intentions must fail of effect.
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Every one, therefore, when he agrees to a contract, judges for himself, and takes
his own risk, whether he understands the instrument to which he gives his assent. It
is plainly impossible to have constitutions established by contract of the people with
each other on any other principle than this; for, on any other principle, it could never
be known what the people, as a whole, had agreed to. If every individual, after he had
agreed to a constitution, could set up his own intentions, his own understandings of
the instrument, or his own mental reservations, in opposition to the intentions
expressed by the instrument itself, the constitution would be liable to have as many
different meanings as there were different individuals who had agreed to it. And the
consequence would be, that it would have no obligation at all, as a mutual and
binding contract, for, very likely, no two of the whole would have understood the
instrument alike in every particular, and therefore no two would have agreed to the
same thing.
Each man, therefore, before he agrees to an instrument, must judge for himself,
taking his own risk whether he understands it.
After he has agreed to it, he is estopped, by his own instrument, from denying
that his intentions were identical with the intentions expressed by the instrument.
The constitution of the United States, therefore, until its language is altered, or
the instrument itself abolished, by the people of the United States, must be taken to
express the intentions of the whole people of the United States, whether it really do
express their intentions or not. It is the highest evidence of their intentions. It is the
only evidence which they have all agreed to furnish of their intentions. All other
adverse evidence is, therefore, legally worthless and inadmissible. The intentions of
the instrument then, must prevail, as being the intentions of the people, or the
constitution itself is at an end.
[ But further. The intentions of all parties, slaves, slaveholders, and non-
slaveholders, throughout the country, must be presumed to have been precisely alike,
because, in theory, they all agreed to the same instrument. There were, then, thirty,
forty, or fifty, who must be presumed to have intended liberty, where there was but
one that intended slavery. If, then, the intentions, principles, and interests, of
overwhelming majorities of "the people," who "ordained and established the
constitution," are to have any weight in settling ambiguities in it, the decision must
be in favor of liberty.9
9. There is one short and decisive answer to all the pretence that the slaveholders cannot be presumed to
have agreed to the constitution, if it be inconsistent with slavery; and that is, that if the slaveholders cannot be
presumed to have agreed to it, then they, and not the slaves, must be presumed to have been no parties to it, and
must therefore be excluded from all rights in it. The slaves can certainly be presumed to have agreed to it, if it gives
them liberty. And the instrument must be presumed to have been made by and for those who could reasonably agree
to it. If, therefore, any body can be excluded from all rights in it, on the ground that they cannot be presumed to
have agreed to such an instrument as it really is. it must be the slaveholders themselves. Independently of this
presumption, there is just as much authority, in the constitution itself, for excluding slaveholders, as for excluding
the slaves, from all rights in it. And as the slaves are some ten or fifteen times more numerous than the slaveholders,
it is ten or fifteen times more important, on legal principles, that they be included among the parties to the
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But it will be said that, in opposition to this current of testimony, furnished by
the laws and known principles of the nation at large, we have direct historical
evidence of the intentions of particular individuals, as expressed by themselves at or
about the time.
One answer to this argument is, that we have no legal evidence whatever of any
such intentions having been expressed by a single individual in the whole nation.
Another answer is, that we have no authentic historical evidence of such inten-
tions having been expressed by so many asfive hundred individuals. If there be such
evidence, where is it? and who were the individuals? Probably not even one hundred
such can be named. And yet this is all the evidence that is to be offset against the
intentions of the whole "people of the United States," as expressed in the constitution
itself, and in the general current of their then existing laws.
It is the constant effort of the advocates of slavery, to make the constitutionality
of slavery a historical question, instead of a legal one. In pursuance of this design,
they are continually citing the opinions, or intentions, of Mr. A, Mr. B, and Mr. C,
as handed down to us by some history or other; as if the opinions and intentions of
these men were to be taken as the opinions and intentions of the whole people of the
United States; and as if the irresponsible statements of historians were to be sub-
stituted for the constitution. If the people of this country have ever declared that these
fugitive and irresponsible histories of the intentions and sayings of single individuals
here and there, shall constitute the constitutional law of the country, be it so; but let
us be consistent, burn the constitution, and depend entirely upon history. It is nothing
but folly, and fraud, and perjury, to pretend to maintain, and swear to support, the
constitution, and at the same time get our constitutional law from these irresponsible
sources.
If every man in the country, at the time the constitution was adopted, had
expressed the intention to legalize slavery, and that fact were historically well
authenticated, it would be of no legal importance whatever-and why? Simply
because such external expressions would be no part of the instrument itself.
Suppose a man sign a note for the payment of money, but at the time of signing
it declare that it is not his intention to pay it, that he does not sign the note with such
an intention, and that he never will pay it. Do all these declarations alter the legal
character of the note itself, or his legal obligation to pay? Not at all-and why?
Because these declarations are no part of that particular promise which he has ex-
pressed by signing the note. So if every man, woman, and child in the Union, at the
time of adopting the constitution, had declared that it was their intention to sanction
slavery, such declarations would all have been but idle wind-and why? Because
they are no part of that particular instrument, which they have said shall be the
supreme law of the land. If they wish to legalize slavery, they must say so in the
constitution, than that the slaveholders should be.
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constitution, instead of saying so out of it. By adopting the constitution, they say just
what, and only what, the constitution itself expresses.'0]
[B.] Second Rule
The second rule of interpretation is, that "the intention of the constitution must
be collected from its words."' "1
This rule is, in reality, nearly synonymous with the preceding one; and its reason,
like that of the other, is apparent; for why are words used in writing a law, unless it
is to be taken for granted that when written they contain the law? If more was meant,
why was not more said? If less was meant, why was so much said? If the contrary
was meant, why was this said, instead of the contrary?
To go beyond the words of a law, (including their necessary or reasonable
implications,) in any case, is equivalent to saying that the written law is incomplete;
that it, in reality, is not a law, but only a part of one; and that the remainder was left
to be guessed at, or rather to be made, by the courts.
It is, therefore, a violation of legal rules, to go beyond the words of a law,
(including their necessary or reasonable implications,) in any case whatever.
2
To go contrary to the words of a law, is to abolish the law itself, by declaring its
words to be false.
But it happens that the same words have such various and opposite meanings in
common use, that there would be no certainty as to the meaning of the laws them-
10. [The section in brackets has been moved here from an omitted portion of the original work.-RB.]
I1. The Supreme Court of the United States say: -The intention of the instrument must prevail; this intention
must be collected from its words. "-12 Wheaton, 332.
"The intention of the legislature is to be searched for in the words which the legislature has employed to
convey it."--7 Cranch, 60.
Story says, "We must take it to be true, that the legislature intend precisely what they say."--2 Story's Circuit
Court Rep., 653.
Rutherforth says, "A promise, or a contract, or a will, gives us a right to whatever the promiser, the contractor,
or the testator, designed or intended to make ours. But his design or intention, if it is considered merely as an act
of his mind, cannot be known to any one besides himself. When, therefore, we speak of his design or intention as
the measure of our claim, we must necessarily be understood to mean the design or intention which he has made
known or expressed by some outward mark; because, a design or intention which does not appear, can have no more
effect, or can no more produce a claim, than a design or intention which does not exist.
"In like manner, the obligations that are produced by the civil laws of our country arise from the intention of
the legislator, not merely as this intention is an act of the mind, but as it is declared or expressed by some outward
sign or mark, which makes it known to us. For the intention of the legislator, whilst he keeps it to himself, produces
no effect, and is of no more account, than if he had no such intention. Where we have no knowledge, we can be
under no obligation. We cannot, therefore, be obliged to comply with his will, where we do not know what his will
is. And we can no otherwise know what his will is, than by means of some outward sign or mark, by which this will
is expressed or declared."-Rutherforth, B. 2, chap. 7, p. 307-8.
12. This rule, that forbids us to go beyond the words of the law, must not be understood as conflicting with
the one that allows us, in certain cases, to go out of an instrument tofind the meaning of the words used in the
instrument. We may, in certain cases, (not in all,) and under certain limitations, as will hereafter be explained, go
out of an instrument tofind the meaning of its words; but we can never go beyond their meaning, when found.
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selves, unless there were some rules for determining which one of a word's various
meanings was to be attached to it, when the word was found in a particular con-
nection. Hence the necessity of rules of interpretation. Their office is to determine
the legal meaning of a word, or, rather, to select the legal meaning of word, out of
all the various meanings which the word bears in common use. Unless this selection
were made, a word might have two or more different and contradictory meanings in
the same place. Thus the law would be mere jargon, instead of being a certain and
precise rule of action.
These rules of interpretation have never been specially enacted by statute, or
constitutions, for even a statute or constitution enacting them would be unintelligible
or uncertain, until interpreted by them. They have, therefore, originated in the
necessity of the case; in the inability of words to express single, definite, and clear
ideas, such as are indispensable to certainty in the law, unless some one of their
several meanings be selected as the legal one.
Men of sense and honesty, who have never heard of these rules as legal ones, but
who, nevertheless, assume that written laws and contracts are made for just and
reasonable ends, and then judge of their meaning accordingly, unconsciously act
upon these rules in so doing. Their perception of the fact, that unless the meaning of
words were judged of in this manner, words themselves could not be used for writing
laws and contracts, without being liable to be perverted to subserve all manner of
injustice, and to defeat the honest intentions of the parties, forces upon them the
conviction, that the legal meaning of the words must be such, and only such, as (it
will hereafter be seen) these rules place upon them. The rules, then, are but the
dictates of common sense and common honesty, applied to determining the meaning
of laws and contracts. And common sense and common honesty are all that is neces-
sary to enable one to judge of the necessity and soundness of the rules.
Rules of interpretation, then, are as old as the use of words, in prescribing laws,
and making contracts. They are as necessary for defining the words as the words are
for describing the laws and contracts. The words would be unavailable for writing
laws and contracts, without the aid of the rules for interpreting them. The rules, then,
are as much a part of the language of laws and contracts as are the words themselves.
Their application to the words of laws and contracts is as much presumed to be
understood, by all the parties concerned, as is the meaning of the words themselves.
And courts have no more right to depart from, or violate, these rules, than to depart
from, or contradict, the words themselves.
The people must always be presumed to understand these rules, and to have
framed all their constitutions, contracts, &c., with reference to them, as much as they
must be presumed to understand the common meanings of the words they use, and
to have framed their constitutions and contracts with reference to them. And why?
Because men's contracts and constitutions would be no contracts at all, unless there
were some rules of interpretation understood, or agreed upon, for determining which
was the legal meaning of the words employed in forming them. The received rules
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of interpretation have been acted upon for ages;" indeed, they must have been acted
upon through all time, since men first attempted to make honest contracts with each
other. As no other rules than these received ones can be presumed against the parties,
and as these are the only ones that can secure men's honest rights, under their honest
contracts; and, as everybody is bound to know that courts must be governed by fixed
rules, applying the same to all contracts whatsoever, it must always be presumed, in
each particular case, that the parties intended their instruments should be construed
by the same rules by which the courts construe all others.
Another reason why the people must be presumed to know these rules, at least
in their application to cases where a question of right and wrong is involved, is, that
the rules are but a transcript of a common principle of morality, to wit, the principle
which requires us to attribute good motives and good designs to all the words and
actions of our fellow-men, that can reasonably bear such a construction. This is a rule
by which every man claims that his own words and actions should be judged. It is
also a principle of law, as well as of morals, and one, too, of which every man who
is tried for an offence claims the benefit. And the law accords it to him. So long as
there be so much as "a reasonable doubt" whether his words or actions evince a
criminal intent, the law presumes a good intent, and gives him the benefit of it. Why
should not the same rule be observed, in inferring the intent of the whole community,
from the language of their laws and constitutions, which is observed in inferring the
intent of each individual of that community from his language and conduct? It should
clearly require as strong proof to convict the whole community of a crime, (and an
unjust law or constitution is one of the highest of all possible crimes,) as it does to
convict a single individual. The principle, then, is the same in both cases; and the
practice of those who infer a bad intent from the language of the constitution, so long
as the language itself admits of a reasonable doubt whether such be its intent, goes
the length of overthrowing an universally recognized principle of law, on which the
security of every accused person is liable to depend.'4
For these, and perhaps other reasons, the people are presumed to understand the
reason and justice of these rules, and therefore, to understand that their contracts will
be construed by them. If, therefore, men ever frame constitutions or contracts with
the intention that they shall be construed contrarily to these rules, their intention must
be defeated; and for the same reason that they would have to be defeated if they had
13. Kent says, these rules "have been accumulated by the experience, and ratified by the approbation, of
ages."--l Kent, 461.
14. Vattel says, "he interpretation of every act, and of every treaty, ought to be made according to certain
rules proper to determine the sense of them, such as the parties concerned must naturally have understood when
the act was prepared and accepted.
"As these rules are founded on right reason, and are consequently approved and prescribed by the law of
nature, every man, every sovereign, is obliged to admit and follow them. If princes were to acknowledge no rules
that determined the sense in which the expressions ought to be taken, treaties would be only empty words; nothing
could be agreed upon with security, and it would be almost ridiculous to place any dependence on the effect of
conventions."---VatteI; B. 2, chap, 17, sec. 268.
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used words in directly opposite sense to the common ones, such, for example, as
using white when they meant black, or black when they meant white.
For the sake of having a case for the rules to apply to, we will take the repre-
sentative clause, embracing the word "free," (Art. 1, sec. 2,) which is the first and the
strongest of all the clauses in the constitution that have been claimed as recognizing
and sanctioning slavery. Indeed, unless this clause do recognize and sanction it,
nobody would pretend that either of the other clauses do so. The same rules, if any,
that prevent the representative clause and the word "free" from having any legal
reference to slavery, will also have the same effect upon the other clauses. If,
therefore, the argument for slavery, based upon the word "free," falls to the ground,
the arguments based upon the words "importation of persons," "service and labor,"
&c., must also fall; for they can stand, if at all, only by means of the support they
obtain from the argument drawn from the word "free."
[C.] Third Rule
A third rule is, that we are always, if possible, to give a word some meaning
appropriate to the subject matter of the instrument itself. 5
This rule is indispensable, to prevent an instrument from degenerating into
absurdity and nonsense.
In conformity with this rule, words which purport to describe certain classes of
persons existing under the constitution, must be taken in a sense that will aptly
describe such persons as were actually to exist under it, and not in a sense that will
only describe those who were to have no existence under it.
It would, for instance, be absurd for the constitution to provide that, in every ten
years, there should be "added to the whole number of free persons three fifths of all
other persons," if there were really to be no other persons than the free.
If, therefore, a sense correlative with slavery were given to the word free, it
would make the word inappropriate to the subject matter of the constitution, unless
there were really to be slaves under the constitution.
It is, therefore, inadmissible to say that the wordfree is used in the constitution
as the correlative of slaves, until it befirst proved that there were to be slaves under
the constitution.
We must find out what classes of persons were to exist under the constitution,
before we can know what classes of persons the terms used in the constitution apply
to.
If the wordfree had but one meaning, we might infer, from the word itself, that
such persons as that word would necessarily describe were to exist under the
15. Blackstone says, "As to the subject matter, words are always to be understood as having regard
thereto."--I Blackstone, 60.
"We ought always to give to expressions the sense most suitable to the subject, or to the matter, to which they
relate."--Vattel, B. 2., chap. 17, sec. 280....
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constitution. But since the word has various meanings, we can draw no certain
inferencefrom it alone, as to the class of persons to whom it is applied. We must,
therefore, fix its meaning in the constitution, by ascertaining, from otherparts of the
instrument, what kind of "free persons," and also what kind of "other persons," were
really to exist under the constitution. Until this is done, we cannot know the meaning
of the wordfree, as it is used in the constitution.
Those who say that the word free is used, in the constitution, in a sense
correlative with slavery, assume the very point in dispute; viz., that there were to be
slaves under the constitution. This is the point to be proved, and cannot be assumed.
And until it be proved, it is making nonsense of the constitution, to say that the word
free is used as the correlative of slavery.
There is no language in the constitution, that expressly declares, or necessarily
implies, that slavery was to exist under the constitution. To say, therefore, that the
word free was used as the correlative of slaves, is begging the question that there
were to be slaves; it is assuming the whole ground in dispute. Those who argue for
slavery, must first prove, by language that can mean nothing less, that slavery was
to be permitted under the constitution. Then they may be allowed to infer that the
wordfree is used as its correlative. But until then, a different meaning must be given
to the word, else the clause before cited is converted into nonsense.
On the other hand, in giving the wordfree the sense common at that day, to wit,
a sense correlative with persons not naturalized and not possessed of equal political
privileges with others, 16 we assume the existence of no class of persons except those
whom the constitution itself especially recognizes, to wit, those possessing full
political rights, as citizens, or members of the state, and those unnaturalized persons
who will not possess full political rights. The constitution explicitly recognizes these
two classes, because it makes a distinction between them in the matter of eligibility
to certain offices, and it also explicitly authorizes Congress to pass laws for the
naturalization of those who do not possess full rights us citizens.
If, then, we take the word free in the sense correlative with unnaturalized
persons, the word has a meaning that is already appropriate to the subject matter of
the instrument, and requires no illegal assumptions to make it so.
On the other hand, if we use the word in the sense correlative with slaves, we
either make nonsense of the language of the constitution, or else we assume the very
point in dispute, viz., that there were to be slaves under the constitution; neither of
which have we any right to do.
This argument is sufficient, of itself, to overthrow all the arguments that were
ever made in favor of the constitutionality of slavery.
Substantially the whole argument of the advocates of slavery is founded on the
assumption of the very fact in dispute, viz., that there was to be slavery under the
constitution. Not being able to prove, by the words of the constitution, that there was
16. [See infra at Part III.]
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to be any slavery under it, they assume that there was to be slavery, and then use that
assumption to prove the meaning of the constitution itself. In other words, not being
able to prove slavery by the constitution, they attempt to prove the meaning of the
constitution by slavery. Their whole reasoning on this point is fallacious, simply
because the legality of slavery, under the constitution, is itself a thing to be proved,
and cannot be assumed.
The advocates of slavery cannot avoid this dilemma, by saying that slavery
existed at the time the constitution was adopted; for many things existed at the time,
such as theft, robbery, piracy, &c., which were not therefore to be legalized by the
constitution. And slavery had no better constitutional or legal existence than either
of these crimes.
Besides, even if slavery had been legalized (as it was not) by any. of the then
existing state constitutions, its case would have been no better; for the United States
constitution was to be the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. The constitution being the supreme
law, operating directly upon the people, and securing to them certain rights, it
necessarily annulled everything that might be found in the state constitutions that was
inconsistent with the freedom of the people to enjoy those rights. It of course would
have annulled the legality of slavery, if slavery had then had any legal existence;
because a slave cannot enjoy the rights secured by the United States constitution
Further. The constitution is a political instrument, treating of men's political
rights and privileges. Its terms must therefore be taken in their political sense, in
order to be appropriate to the subject matter of the instrument. The wordfree, in its
political sense, appropriately describes men's political rank as free and equal
members of the state, entitled, of right, to the protection of the laws. On the other
hand, the wordfree, in the sense correlative with slavery, has no appropriateness to
the subject matter of such an instrument-and why? Because slavery is not, of itself
a political relation, or a political institution; although political institutions may, and
sometimes do, recognize and legalize it. But, of itself, it is a merely private relation
between one man and another, created by individual force, and not by political
authority. Thus a strong man beats a weaker one, until the latter will obey him. This
is slavery, and the whole of it; unless it be specially legalized. The United States
constitution does not specially legalize it; and therefore slavery is no part of the
subject matter of that instrument. The wordfree, therefore, in the constitution, cannot
be said to be used as the correlative of slavery; because that sense would be entirely
inappropriate to anything that is the subject matter of the instrument. It would be a
sense which no other part of the constitution gives any occasion or authority for.
[D.] Fourth Rule
A fourth rule is, that where technical words are used, a technical meaning is to
be attributed to them.
1044
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 28
This rule is commonly laid down in the above general terms. It is, however,
subject to these exceptions, viz., that where the technical sense would be inconsistent
with, or less favorable to, justice, or not consonant to the context, or not appropriate
to the nature of the subject, some other meaning may be adopted. Subject to these
exceptions, the rule is of great authority, for reasons that will hereafter appear.
Thus, in commercial contracts, the terms and phrases used in them are to be
taken in the technical or professional sense common among merchants, if that sense
be consonant to the context, and appropriate to the nature of the contracts.
In political contracts, the terms and phrases used in them are to be taken in the
political and technical sense common in such instruments, if that sense be consonant
to the context, and appropriate to the subject matter of the contracts.
Terms common and proper to express political rights, relations, and duties, are
of course to be taken in the technical sense natural and appropriate to those rights,
relations, and duties.
Thus, in political papers, such terms, as liberty, allegiance, representation,
citizenship, citizens, denizens, freemen, free subjects, freeborn subjects, inhabitants,
residents, people, aliens, allies, enemies, are all to be understood in the technical
sense appropriate to the subject matter of the instrument, unless there be something
else, in the instrument itself, that shows that some other meaning is intended.
Terms which, by common usage, are properly descriptive of the parties to, or
members of, the compact, as distinguished from others, are to be taken in the tech-
nical sense, which describes them, as distinguished from others, unless there be, in
the instrument itself, some unequivocal evidence that they are to be taken in a
different sense.
The authority of this rule is so well founded in nature, reason, and usage, that it
is almost strange that it should be questioned. It is a rule which everybody, by their
common practice, admit to be correct; for everybody more naturally understands a
word in its technical sense than in any other, unless that sense be inconsistent with
the context.
Nevertheless, an attempt has been made by some persons to deny the rule, and
to lay down a contrary one, to wit, that where a word has what they choose to call a
common or popular meaning, and also a technical one, the former is to be preferred,
unless there be something, in other parts of the instrument, that indicates that the
technical one should be adopted.
The argument for slavery virtually claims, not only that this so called common
and popular meaning of a word, (and especially of the word "free,") is to be preferred
to the technical one, but also that this simple preference is of sufficient consequence
to outweigh all considerations of justice and injustice, and indeed all, or nearly all,
the other considerations on which legal rules of interpretation are founded. Never-
theless I am not aware that the advocates of slavery have ever had the good fortune
to find a single instance where a court has laid it down, as a rule, that any other
meaning is, of itself, preferable to the technical one; much less that that preference
was sufficient, in cases where right and wrong were involved, to turn the scale in
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favor of the wrong. And if a court were to lay down such a rule, every one is at
liberty to judge for himself of its soundness.
But inasmuch as this pretended rule is one of the main pillars, if not the main
pillar, in support of the constitutionality of slavery, it is entitled to particular con-
sideration.
The falsehood of this pretended rule will be evident when it is considered that
it assumes that the technical meaning of a word is not the common and popular one;
whereas it is the very commonness, approaching to uniformity, with which a word
is used in a particular sense, in relation to particular things, that makes it
technical 
17
A technical word is a word, which in one profession, art, or trade, or in reference
to particular subjects, is generally, or uniformly, used in a particular sense, and that
sense a somewhat different one from those in which it is generally used out of that
profession, art, or trade, or in reference to other subjects.
There probably is not a trade that has not its technical words. Even the cobbler
has his. His ends are generally quite different things from the ends of other people.
If we hear a cobbler speak of his ends, we naturally suppose he means the ends of his
threads, because he has such frequent occasion to speak of and use them. If we hear
other people speak of their ends, we naturally suppose that they mean the objects
they have in view. With the cobbler, then, ends is a technical word, because he
frequently or generally uses the word in a different sense from that in which it is used
by other people.
Mechanics have very many technical words, as, for instance, to describe
particular machines, parts of machines, particular processes of labor, and particular
articles of manufacture. And when we hear a mechanic use one of these words, we
naturally suppose that he uses it in a technical sense-that is, with reference to his
particular employment, machinery, or production. And why do we suppose this?
Simply because it is more common for him to use the word in that sense than in any
ether, especially if he is talking of anything in regard to which that sense would be
appropriate. If, however, his talk is about some other subject, in relation to which the
technical sense of the word would not be appropriate, then we conclude that he uses
it, not in the technical sense appropriate to his art, but in some other sense more
appropriate to the subject on which he is speaking.
So, if we were to hear a banker speak of "the days of grace having expired," we
should naturally attach a very different meaning to the words from what we should
if we were to hear them from the pulpit. We should suppose, of course, that he used
them in the technical sense appropriate to his business, and that he had reference only
to a promissory note that had not been paid when due'
17. It was, for example, the commonness, or rather the uniformity, with which the word "free" had been
used-up to the time the constitution was adopted-to describe persons possessed of political and other legal
franchises, as distinguished from persons not possessed of the same franchises, that made the word "free" a
technical one in the law.
1046
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 28
If we were to hear a banker speak of a check, we should suppose he used the
word in a technical sense, and intended only an order for money, and not a stop,
hindrance, or restraint.
So, if one farmer were to say to another, He is a good husband, we should
naturally infer that he used the word husband in the technical sense appropriate to his
occupation, meaning that he cultivated an managed his farm judiciously. On the other
hand, if we were to hear lawyers, legislators, or judges, talking of husbands, we
should infer that the word was used only in reference to the men's legal relations to
their wives. The word would be used in a technical sense in both cases.
So, if we were to hear a man called a Catholic priest, we should naturally infer
that the word Catholic was used in its technical sense, that is, to describe a priest of
the Catholic persuasion, and not a priest of a catholic, liberal and tolerant spirit.
These examples might be multiplied indefinitely. But it will be seen from those
already given that, so far from the technical sense and the common sense of words
being opposed to each other, the technical sense is itself the common sense in which
a word is used with reference to particular subjects.
These examples also show how perfectly natural, instead of unnatural, it is for
us to attribute the technical meaning to a word whenever we are talking of a subject
in relation to which that meaning is appropriate.
Almost every word of substantive importance, that is of frequent use in the law,
is used in a technical sense-that is, in a sense having some special relation either to
natural justice, or to men's rights or privileges under the laws.
The word liberty, for instance, has a technical meaning in the law. It means, not
freedom from all restraint, or obligation; not a liberty to trespass with impunity upon
other men's rights; but only that degree of liberty which, of natural right, belongs to
a man; in other words, the greatest degree of liberty that he can exercise; without
invading or immediately endangering the rights of others.
Unless nearly all words had a technical meaning in the law, it would be impos-
sible to describe laws by words; because words have a great variety of meanings in
common use; whereas the law demands certainty and precision. We must know the
precise meaning of a word, before we can know what the law is. And the technical
meaning of a word is nothing more than a precise meaning, that is appropriate, and
commonly applied, to a particular subject, or class of subjects.
How would it be possible, for instance, to have laws against murder, unless the
word murder, or some other word, were understood, in a technical sense, to describe
that particular mode of killing which the law wishes to prohibit, and which is morally
and legally distinguishable from all other modes of killing?
So indispensable are precision and certainty, as to the meaning of words used in
laws, that where a word has not a technical meaning already known, the legislature
frequently define the meaning they intend it shall bear in particular laws. Where this
is not done, the courts have to give it a precise and definite meaning, before the law
can be administered; and this precise meaning they have to conjecture, by reference
to the context, and to the presumed object of all laws, justice.
1047
1997/The Unconstitutionality of Slavery
What perfect chaos would be introduced into all our existing laws and contracts,
if the technical meanings of all the words used in them were obliterated from our
minds. A very large portion of the laws and contracts themselves would be sub-
stantially abolished, because all certainty as to their meaning would be extinguished.
Suppose, for instance, the technical meanings of liberty, trial by jury, habeas corpus,
grand jury, petit jury, murder, rape, arson, theft, indictment, trial, oath, testimony,
witness, court, verdict, judgment, execution, debt, dollar, bushel, yard, foot, cord,
acre, rod, pound, check, draft, order, administrator, executor, guardian, apprentice,
copartner, company, husband, wife, marriage, lands, goods, real estate, personal
estate, highway, citizen, alien, subject, and an almost indefinite number of other
words, as they now stand in our laws and contracts, were at once erased from our
minds, and the legal meanings of the same words could only be conjectured by the
courts and people from the context, and such other circumstances as might afford
grounds for conjecture. Suppose all this, and where would be our existing laws and
contracts, and the rights dependent upon them? We might nearly as well throw our
statute-books, and all our deeds, notes, and other contracts, into the fire, as to strike
out the technical meanings of the words in which they are written. Yet for the courts
to disregard these technical meanings, is the same thing as to strike them out of
existence.
If all our constitutions, state and national, were to be annulled at a blow, with all
the statutes passed in pursuance of them, it would hardly create greater confusion as
to men's rights, than would be created by striking out from men's minds all know-
ledge of the technical meanings of the words now used in writing laws and contracts.
And the reconstruction of the governments, after such an abolition of them, would
be a much less labor than the reconstruction of a legal language, in which laws and
contracts could be written with the same conciseness and certainty as now. The
former would be the work of years, the latter of centuries.
The foregoing considerations show in what ignorance and folly are founded the
objections to the technical meanings of words used in the laws.
The real difference between the technical meaning of a word, and any other
meaning, is just the difference between a meaning that is common, certain, and pre-
cise, and one that is, at best, less common, less certain, and less precise, and perhaps
neither common, certain, nor precise....
The authorities in favor of the technical meaning, are given in the note, and are
worthy of particular attention."
18. "Terms of art, or technical terms, must be taken according to the acceptation of the learned in each art,
trade, and science."--1 Blackstone, 59.
"When technical words are used, they are to be understood in their technical sense and meaning, unless the
contrary clearly appears. "--9 Pickering, 514.
"The words of a statute are to be taken in their natural and ordinary signification and import; and if technical
words are used, they are to be taken in a technical sense."-l Kent, 461. ... [Many additional authorities
omitted-RB.]
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The argument, and the whole argument, so far as I know, in favor of what is
called the common or popular meaning, is, that that meaning is supposed to be better
known by the people, and therefore it is more probable they would use it, than the
other.
But this argument, if not wholly false, is very shallow and frivolous; for
everybody is presumed to know the laws, and therefore they are presumed to be
familiar with the technical meanings of all the technical words that are of frequent
use in writing the laws. And this presumption of law corresponds with the general
fact. The mass of the people, who are not learned in the law, but who nevertheless
have general ideas of legal matters, naturally understand the words of the laws in
their legal senses, and attach their legal senses to them without being aware that the
legal sense is a technical one. They have been in the habit of thinking that the tech-
nical meaning of words was something dark and recondite, (simply because some
few technical terms are in another language than the English,) when in reality they
themselves are continually using a great variety of words, indeed, almost all impor-
tant words, in a technical or legal sense, whenever they are talking of legal matters.
But whether the advocates of slavery can, or cannot, reconcile themselves to the
technical meaning of the word "free," they cannot, on their own construction of the
constitution, avoid giving the word a precise and technical sense, to wit, as the
correlative of slavery, as distinguished from all other forms of restraint and servitude.
The word slaves, if it had been used in the constitution, (instead of the words "all
other persons,") would have itself been held to be used in a technical sense, to wit,
to designate those persons who were held as chattels, as distinguished from serfs,
villains, apprentices, servants for years, persons under twenty-one years of age,
prisoners of war, prisoners for debt, prisoners for crime, soldiers, sailors, &c., &c.
The word slaves, then, being technical, the word free must necessarily have been
taken in a technical sense, to wit, as the precise correlative of chattel slaves, and not
as the correlative of persons held under any of these other forms of restraint or servi-
tude. So that on the score of technicality, (even if that were an objection,) nothing
would be gained by adopting the sense correlative with slaves.
But it is a wholly erroneous assumption that the use of the word 'free," in a
sense correlative with slaves, was either a common or popular use of the word. It
was neither common nor popular, if we may judge of that time by the present; for
now such a use of it is seldom or never heard, unless made with special reference to
the classification which it is assumed that the constitution has established on that
point.
The common and popular classification of the people of this country, with
reference to slavery, is by the terms, white, free colored, and slaves. We do not
describe anybody as free, except thefree colored. The term white carries with it the
idea of liberty; and it is nearly or quite universally used in describing the white
people of the South, as distinguished from the slaves.
But it will be said by the advocates of slavery, that the term white was not used
in the constitution, because it would not include all the free; that the term free was
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used in order to include both white and free colored. But this assertion is but another
wholly gratuitous assumption of the facts, that there were to be slaves under the
constitution, and that representation and taxation were to be based on the distinction
between the slaves and the free; both of which points are to be proved, not assumed.
If there were to be slaves under the constitution, and if representation and
taxation were to be based upon the distinction between the slaves and the free, then
the constitution undoubtedly used the wordfree, instead of white, in order to include
both the white and free colored in the class of units. But if, as we are bound to pre-
sume until the contrary is proved, there were to be no slaves under the constitution,
or if representation and taxation were not founded on the distinction between them
and the free, then the constitution did not use the wordfree for such a purpose. The
burden is upon the advocates of slavery to prove, first, that there were to be slaves
under the constitution, and, secondly, that representation and taxation were to be
based on the distinction between them and the free, before they can say that the word
free was used for the purpose of including the white and free colored.
Now the whole argument, or rather assertion, which the advocates of slavery can
offer in support of these points, which they are necessitated to prove, is, that the word
free is commonly and popularly used as the correlative of slaves. That argument, or
assertion, is answered by the fact that the wordfree is not commonly or popularly
used as the correlative of slaves; that the terms white andfree colored are the com-
mon terns of distinction between the free and the slaves. Now these last named facts,
and the argument resulting from them, are not met at all, by saying that if there were
to be slaves, and if representation and taxation were to be based on the distinction
between them and the free, the wordfree would then have been used, in preference
to any other, in order to include the free colored in the same class with the whites.
It must first be proved that there were to be slaves under the constitution, and
that representation and taxation were to be based on the distinction between them and
the free, before it can be said that the word free was used in order to include both
white and free colored. Those points not being proved, the allegation, founded on the
assumption of them, is good for nothing.
The use of the wordfree, then, in a sense correlative with slavery, not being the
common and popular use of the word at the time the constitution was adopted, all the
argument, founded on that assumption, falls to the ground.
On the other hand, the use of the word free, in a political sense, as correlative
either with aliens, or with persons not possessed of equal political privileges with
others, was the universal meaning of the word, in all documents of a fundamental
and constitutional character, up to the time when the constitution of the United States
was adopted-(that is, when it was used, as it is in the United States constitution, to
describe one person, as distinguished from another living under the same govern-
ment.) Such was the meaning of the word in the colonial charters, in several of the
State constitutions existing in 1789, and in the articles of confederation. Furthermore,
it was a term that had very recently been in common use in political discussions, and
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had thus been made perfectly familiar to the people. For example, the discussions
immediately preceding the revolution, had all, or nearly all, turned upon the rights
of the colonists, as "free British subjects." In fact, the political meaning of the word
free was probably as familiar to the people of that day as the meaning of the word
citizen is now; perhaps, indeed, more so, for there is some controversy as to the legal
meaning of the word citizen. So that all the argument against the technical sense of
the term, on the ground of its not being the common sense, is founded in sheer
ignorance or fraud.' 9
Finally; unless the wordfree be taken in the technical sense common at that day,
it is wholly an unsettled matter what sense should be given to it, in the constitution.
The advocates of slavery take it for granted that, if it be not taken in its common and
technical sense, it must be taken in the sense correlative with slavery. But that is all
gratuitous. There are many kinds of freedom besides freedom from chattel slavery;
and many kinds of restraint besides chattel slavery; restraints, too, more legitimate
in their nature, and better legitimated under the laws then existing, than slavery. And
it may require a great deal more argument than some persons imagine, to settle the
meaning of the word free, as used in the constitution, if its technical meaning be
discarded.
I repeat, it is a wholly gratuitous assumption that, if the technical meaning of the
wordfree be discarded, the sense correlative with slavery must be adopted. The word
"free, " in its common and popular sense, does not at all imply, as its correlative,
either property in man, or even involuntary service or labor. It, therefore, does not
imply slavery. It implies, as its correlative, simply restraint. It is, of itself, wholly
indefinite as to the kind of restraint implied. It is used as the correlative of all kinds
of restraint, imprisonment, compulsion, and disability, to which mankind are liable.
Nothing, therefore, can be inferred from the word alone, as to the particular kind of
restraint implied, in any case. It is indispensable to know the subject matter, about
which the word is used, in order to know the kind of restraint implied. And if the
word had had no technical meaning appropriate to the subject matter of the consti-
tution, and if no other part of the constitution had given us any light as to the sense
of the word in the representative clause, we should have been obliged to conjecture
its correlative. And slavery is one of the last correlatives that we should have been
at liberty to adopt. In fact, we should have been obliged to let the implication remain
inoperative for ambiguity, and to have counted all men as "free," (for reasons given
under rule seventh,) rather than have adopted slavery as its correlative.
19. Vattel says, "Languages vary incessantly, and the signification and force of words change with time.
When an ancient act is to be interpreted, we should know the common use of the terms at the time when it was
written."--B. 2, ch. 17, sec. 272.
He also says, "In the interpretation of treaties, pacts, and promises, we ought not to deviate from the common
use of language, at least, if we have not very strong reasons for it."-Same sec.
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[E.] Fifth Rule
A fifth rule of interpretation is, that the sense of every word, that is ambiguous
in itself, must, if possible, be determined by reference to the rest of the instrument.
The importance of this rule will be seen, when it is considered that the only
alternatives to it are, that we must go out of the instrument, and resort to conjecture,
for the meaning of ambiguous words.
The rule is an universal one among courts, and the reasons of it are as follows:-
Vattel says, "If he who has expressed himself in an obscure or equivocal manner,
has spoken elsewhere more clearly on the same subject, he is the best interpreter of
himself. We ought to interpret his obscure and vague expressions, in such a manner,
that they may agree with those terms that are clear and without ambiguity, which he
has used elsewhere, either in the same treaty, or in some other of the like kind. In
fact, while we have no proof that a man has changed his mind, or manner of thinking,
it is presumed that his thoughts have been the same on the same occasions; so that
if he has anywhere clearly shown his intention, with respect to anything, we ought
to give the same sense to what he has elsewhere said obscurely on the same
affair."--B. 2, ch. 17, sec. 284....
The Sup. Court of Mass. says, "When the meaning of any particular section or
clause of a statute is questioned, it is proper to look into the other parts of the statute;
otherwise, the different sections of the same statute might be so construed as to be
repugnant."- Pickering, 250.
Coke says, "It is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute to construe
one part of the statute by another part of the same statute."--Co. Lit., 381, b.
The foregoing citations indicate the absolute necessity of the rule, to preserve
any kind of coherence or congruity between the different parts of an instrument.
If we were to go out of an instrument, instead of going to other parts of it, to find
the meaning of every ambiguous word, we should be liable to involve the whole
instrument in all manner of incongruities, contradictions, and absurdities. There are
hardly three consecutive lines, of any legal instrument whatever, the sense of which
can be understood without reference to other parts of the instrument.
To go out of an instrument, instead of going to other parts of it, to find the sense
of an ambiguous word, is also equivalent to saying that the instrument itself is
incomplete.
Apply this rule, then, to the word 'free" and the words "all, other persons. " The
sense of these words being ambiguous in themselves, the rest of the instrument must
be examined to find the persons who may properly be denominated "'free persons,"
and "all other persons." In making this examination, we shall find no classes men-
tioned answering to these descriptions, but the native and naturalized persons on the
one hand, and those not naturalized on the other.
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[F.] Sixth Rule
A sixth rule of interpretation, and a very important, inflexible, and universal one,
applicable to contracts, is, that a contract must never, if it be possible to avoid it, be
so construed, as that any one of the parties to it, assuming him to understand his
rights, and to be of competent mental capacity to make bbligatory0 contracts, may
not reasonably be presumed to have consented to it.
If, for instance, two men were to form a copartnership in business, their contract,
if its language will admit of any other possible construction, must not be so construed
as to make it an agreement that one of the partners shall be the slave of the other;
because such a contract would be unnatural, unreasonable, and would imply that the
party who agreed to be a slave was incompetent to make a reasonable, and therefore
obligatory, contrac2
This principle applies to the constitution of the United States, and to all other
constitutions that purport to be established by "the people;" for such constitutions
are, in theory, but contracts of the people with each other, entered into by them
severally for their individual security and benefit. It also applies equally to all statutes
made in pursuance of such constitutions, because the statutes derive their authority
from the constitutional consent or contract of the people that such statutes may be
enacted and enforced. The authority of the statutes, therefore, as much rests on
contract, as does the authority of the constitutions themselves. To deny that constitu-
tions and statutes derive their authority from contract, is to found the government on
arbitrary power.'
By the rule laid down, these statutes and constitutions, therefore, must not be
construed, (unless such construction be unavoidable,) so as to authorize anything
whatever to which every single individual of "the people" may not, as competent
men, knowing their rights, reasonably be presumed to have freely and voluntarily
assented.
Now the parties to the contract expressed in the constitution of the United States,
are "the people of the United States," that is, the whole people of the United States.
The description given of the parties to the constitution, as much includes those
"people of the United States" who were at the time treated as slaves, as those who
were not. The adoption of the constitution was not, in theory, the exercise of a right
granted to the people by the State legislatures, but of the natural original right of the
people themselves, as individuals. (This is the doctrine of the supreme court, as will
presently appear.) The slaves had the same natural competency and right to establish,
20. Contracts made by persons mentally incompetent to make reasonable contracts, are not "obligatory."
21. Although the greatest discretion that is within the limits of reason, is allowed to parties in making
contracts, yet contracts manifestly unreasonable are not held obligatory. And all contracts are unreasonable that
purport to surrender one's natural rights. Also, all contracts that purport to surrender any valuable acquired rights,
as property, for example, without any equivalent, or reasonable motive.
22. [Spooner discusses this claim at greater length in omitted portions of the text.]
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or consent to, government, that others had; and they must be presumed to have
consented to it equally with others, if the language of the constitution implies it. We
certainly cannot go out of the constitution to find the parties to it. And the
constitution affords no legal ground whatever for separating the then "people of the
United States" into two classes, and saying that one class were parties to the constitu-
tional contract, and that the other class were not. There would be just as much reason
in saying that the terms "the people" used in the constitutions of Massachusetts,
Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, to describe the parties to those constitutions,
do not include all "the people" of these States, as there is for saying that all "the
people of the United States" are not included in the constitutional description of
them, and are not, therefore, parties to the constitution of the United States.
We are obliged to take this term, "the people," in its broadest sense, unless the
instrument itself have clearly and palpably imposed some restriction upon it.
It is a universal rule of courts, that where justice will be promoted by taking a
word in the most comprehensive sense in which it can be taken consistently with the
rest of the instrument, it must be taken in that sense, in order that as much justice as
possible may be accomplished. On the other hand, where a word is unfavorable to
justice, it must be taken in its most restricted sense, in order that as little injustice as
possible may be accomplished.3
In conformity with this rule, the words, "the people of the United States," would
have to be taken in their most extensive sense, even though they stood but on an
equal ground with other words in the instrument. But, in fact, they stand on
privileged ground. Their meaning is to be determined before we proceed to the
interpretation of the rest of the instrument. The first thing to be ascertained in regard
to an instrument, always is, who are the parties to it; for upon that fact may depend
very many important things in the construction of the rest of the instrument. In short,
the body of the instrument is to be interpreted with reference to, the parties, and not
the parties conjectured by reference to the body of the instrument. We must first take
the instrument's own declaration as to who the parties are; and then, if possible,
make the body of the instrument express such, and only such, intentions, as all the
parties named may reasonably be presumed to have agreed to.
Assuming, then, that all "the people of the United States" are parties to the
constitutional contract, it is manifest, that it cannot reasonably be presumed that any,
23. Vattel says, "When the subject relates to things favorable"-(in sec. 302, he defines "things favorable"
to be things "useful and salutary to human society,")- "we ought to give the terms all the extent they are capable
of in common use; and if a term has many significations, the most extensive ought to be preferred."- B. 2, ch. 17,
sec. 307.
"In relation to things favorable, the most extensive signification of the terms is more agreeable to equity than
their confined signification."-Same.
"We should, in relation to things odious,"-- (in sec. 302, he defines "as odious, everything that, in its own
nature, is rather hurtful than of use to the human race,")--"take the terms in the most confined sense, and even, to
a certain degree, may admit the figurative, to remove the burdensome consequences of the proper and literal sense,
or what it contains that is odious." -Same, sec. 308.
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even the smallest, portion of them, knowing their natural rights, and being competent
to make a reasonable contract of government, would consent to a constitution that
should either make them slaves, or assist in keeping them in slavery. Such a con-
struction, therefore, must not be put upon the contract, if the language admits of any
other. This rule alone, then, is sufficient to forbid a construction sanctioning slavery.
It may, perhaps, be argued that the slaves were not parties to the constitution,
inasmuch as they never, in fact, consented to it. But this reasoning would dis-
franchise half the population; for there is not a single constitution in the country-
state, or national-to which one half of the people who are, in theory, parties to it,
ever, in fact and inform, agreed. Voting for and under a constitution, are almost the
only acts that can, with any reason at all, be considered a formal assent to a
constitution. Yet a bare majority of the adult males, or about one tenth of the whole
people; is the largest number of "the people" that has ever been considered necessary,
in this country, to establish a constitution. And after it is established, only about one
fifth of the people are allowed to vote under it, even where suffrage is most extended.
So that no formal assent to a constitution is ever given by the people at large. Yet the
constitutions themselves assume, and virtually assert, that all "the people" have
agreed to them. They must, therefore, be construed on the theory that all have agreed
to them, else the instruments themselves are at once denied, and, of course,
invalidated altogether. No one, then, who upholds the validity of the constitution, can
deny its own assertion, that all "the people" are parties to it. Besides, no one, unless
it be the particular individuals who have not consented, can take advantage of the fact
that they have not consented.
And, in practice, we do not allow even such individuals to take advantage of the
fact of their non-consent, to avoid the burdens imposed by the instrument; and not
allowing the individuals themselves to take advantage of it for that purpose, no other
person, certainly, can be allowed to take advantage of it to shut them out from its
protection and benefits.
The consent, then, of "the people" at large is presumed, whether they ever have
really consented, or not. Their consent is presumed only on the assumption that the
rights of citizenship are valuable and beneficial to them, and that if they understood
that fact, they would willingly give their consent in form. Now, the slaves, if they
understood that the legal effect of their consenting to the constitution would be "to
secure the blessings of liberty for themselves and their posterity," would doubtless
all be as ready to give their actual assent to it, as any other portion of "the people"
can be. Inasmuch, then, as such would be the legal effect of their consent, there is no
other class of "the people of the United States," whose consent to the constitution
may, with so much reason, be presumed; because no other class have so much to gain
by consenting to it. And since the consent of all is presumed, solely on the ground
that the instrument is beneficial to them, regardless of their actual assent, there is no
ground for excluding, or for not presuming, the consent of those, whose consent, on
account of its beneficial operation upon their interests and rights, can be most rea-
sonably and safely presumed.
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But it may, perhaps, be said that it cannot reasonably be presumed that the
slaveholders would agree to a constitution, which would destroy their right to their
slave property.
One answer to this argument is, that the slaveholders had, at the time, no legal
or constitutional right to their slaves, under their State constitutions, as has already
been proved; and they must be presumed to have known that such was the fact, for
every one is presumed to know the law.
'A second answer is, that it is, in law, considered reasonable-as it is, in fact, one
of the highest evidences of reason-for a man voluntarily to do justice, against his
apparent pecuniary interests.
Is a man considered non compos mentis for restoring stolen property to its
rightful owner, when he might have retained it with impunity? Or are all the men,
who have voluntarily emancipated their slaves, presumed to have been fools? incom-
petent to make reasonable contracts? or even to have had less reason than those who
refuse to emancipate? Yet this is the whole argument of those, who say that it cannot
be supposed that the slaveholders would agree to a free constitution. The argument
would have been good for nothing, even if the then existing State constitutions had
authorized slavery.
There would be just as much reason in saying that it cannot be supposed that
thieves, robbers, pirates, or criminals of any kind, would consent to the establishment
of governments that should have authority to suppress their business, as there is in
saying that slaveholders cannot be supposed to consent to a government that should
have power to suppress slaveholding. If this argument were good for anything, we
should have to apply it to the state constitutions, and construe them, if possible, so
as to sanction all kinds of crimes which men commit, on the ground that the crimi-
nals themselves could not be supposed to have consented to any government that did
not sanction them.
The truth is, that however great a criminal a man may have been, it is considered
a very reasonable act for him to agree to do justice in future; and therefore, when
communities establish governments for the purpose of maintaining justice and right,
the assent of all the thieves, robbers, pirates, and slaveholders, is as much presumed,
as is the assent of the most honest portion of community. Governments for the main-
tenance of justice and liberty could not be established by the consent of the whole
people on any other ground.
It would be a delectable doctrine, indeed, for courts to act upon, in construing a
constitution, to presume that it was intended to subserve the criminal purposes of a
few of the greatest villains in community; and then to force all its honest words to
yield to that presumption, on the ground that otherwise these villains could not be
presumed to have agreed to it. Yet this is the doctrine practised upon by all who
uphold the constitutionality of slavery. They know that the whole people, honest and
dishonest, slaveholders and non-slaveholders alike, must be presumed to have agreed
either to an honest or a dishonest constitution; and they think it more reasonable to
presume that all the honest people agreed to turn knaves, than that all the knaves
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agreed to become honest. This presumption is the polar star of all their reasonings
in favor of the constitutionality of slavery. If this presumption be a true guide in the
interpretation of all other constitutions, laws, and contracts, it is, of course, a correct
one for interpreting the constitution of the United States; otherwise not.
The doctrine, that an instrument, capable of an honest meaning, is to be con-
strued into a dishonest one, merely because one in forty of the parties to it has been
a dishonest man up to the time of making the agreement, (and probably not more
than one in forty of "the people of the United States" were slaveholders,) would not
only put it nearly or quite out of the power of dishonest men to make contracts with
each other that would be held honest in the sight of the law, but it would even put it
nearly or quite out of the power of honest men to make contracts with dishonest ones,
that would be held honest in the sight of the law. All their contracts, susceptible of
a dishonest meaning, would have to be so construed; and what contract is ever
entered into by honest with dishonest men, that is not susceptible of such a con-
struction, especially if we may go out of the contract, and inquire into the habits,
character, and business of each of the parties, in order to find that one of them is a
man who may be suspected of a dishonest motive, and this suspected motive of the
one may then be attributed to the others as their true motive.
Such a principle of law would virtually cut off dishonest men from all right to
make even honest contracts with their fellow-men, and would be a far greater
calamity to themselves than the doctrine that holds all their contracts to be honest,
that are susceptible of an honest construction; because it is indispensable to a dis-
honest man's success and well-being in life that a large portion of his contracts
should be held honest and valid.
Under a principle of law, that presumes everybody dishonest, and construes their
constitutions, laws, and contracts accordingly, pandemonium would be established
at once, in which dishonest men would stand no better chance than others; and would
therefore have no more motive than others for sustaining the government.
In short, it is obvious that government would not, and could not, be upheld for
an instant, by any portion of society, honest or dishonest, if such a presumption were
to be adopted by the courts as a general rule for construing either constitutions, laws,
or private contracts. Yet, let it be repeated, and never forgotten, that this presumption
is indispensable to such a construction of the constitution as makes slavery con-
stitutional. It is the sine qua non to the whole fabric of the slaveholding argument.
There is, then, no legal ground whatever for not presuming the consent of slaves,
slaveholders, and non-slaveholders to the constitution of the United States, on the
supposition that it prohibits slavery. Consequently, there is no legal ground for
denying that the terms "the people of the United States," included the whole of the
then people of the United States. And if the whole of the people are parties to it, it
must, if possible be so construed as to make it such a contract as each and every
individual might reasonably agree to. In short, it must, if possible, be so construed
as not to make any of the parties consent to their own enslavement. Such a con-
struction is possible, and being possible, is necessarily the true construction.
1057
1997/The Unconstitutionality of Slavery
The constitution of the United States, therefore, would have abolished slavery,
by making the slaves parties to it, even though the state constitutions had previously
supported it.24
[G.] Seventh Rule
The seventh rule of interpretation is the one that has been repeatedly cited from
the supreme court of the United States, to wit:
"Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown,
where the general system of the laws is departed from, the legislative intention must
be expressed with irresistible clearness, to induce a court of justice to suppose a
design to effect such objects."
The pith of this rule is, that any unjust intention must be "expressed with
irresistible clearness," to induce a court to give a law an unjust meaning.
The word "expressed" is a very important one, in this rule. It is necessary,
therefore, for the benefit of the unprofessional reader, to define it.
In law, a thing is said to be "expressed," only when it is uttered, or written out,
embodied in distinct words, in contradistinction to its being inferred, implied, or
gathered from evidence exterior to the words of the law.
The amount of the rule, then, is, that the court will never, through inference, nor
implication, attribute an unjust intention to a law; nor seek for such an intention in
any evidence exterior to the words of the law. They will attribute such an intention
to the law, only when such intention is written out in actual terms; and in terms, too,
of "irresistible clearness."
24. Story says, "Who, then, are the parties to this contract? *** Let the instrument answer for itself. The
people of the United States are the parties to the constitution."--l Story's Comm. on Const., p. 355.
The supreme court of the United States says, "The government (of the U. S.) proceeds directly from the
people; is 'ordained and established' in the name of the people."--4 Wheaton, 403.
"The government of the Union is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people; and in form and in
substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for
their benefit"- 4 Wheaton, 404, 405.
"The constitution of the United States was ordained and established, not by the United States in their
sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the constitution declares, by the people of the United
States,"--l Wheaton, 324.
Story, commenting upon the words "We the people of the United States," says, "We have the strongest
assurances that this preamble was not adopted as a mere formulary; but as a solemn promulgation of a fundamental
fact, vital to the character and operations of the government. The obvious object was to substitute a government
of the people for a confederacy of states." -l Comm., p. 446...
If the constitution were not established by "the people," there is no information given by the constitution, as
to whom it was established by. We must, of necessity, therefore, accept its own declaration, that it was established
by the people. And if we accept its declaration that it was established by "the people," we must also accept its
virtual declaration that it was established by the whole people, for it gives no information of its being established
by one portion of the people, any more than by another. No separation can therefore be made between different
portions of the people.
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The rule, it will be observed, does not forbid a resort to inference, implication,
or exterior evidence, to help out the supposed meaning of, or to solve any
ambiguities in, a law that is consistent with justice. It only forbids a resort to such
means to help out the supposed meaning of, or to solve any ambiguities in, an unjust
law. It virtually says that if an ambiguous law can possibly be interpreted favorably
to justice, it shall be thus interpreted. But if it cannot be thus interpreted, it shall be
suffered to remain inoperative-void for its ambiguity-rather than the court will
help out its supposed meaning by inference, implication, or exterior evidence.
Is this rule a sound one? It is; and for the following reasons:
Certainty is one of the vital principles of law. Properly speaking, nothing is law
that is uncertain. A written law is only what is written. It is not certain, any further
than it is written. If, then, we go out of the written law, we necessarily go into the
region of uncertainty. It must, also, generally be presumed, that the legislature intend
nothing more than they have chosen to communicate. It is therefore straining matters,
and going beyond strict legal principles, to go out of the words of a law, to find its
meaning, in any case whatever, whether for a good purpose, or a bad one.
It will be asked, then, "Why resort to inference, implication, and exterior
evidence, to solve the ambiguities in a just law?" The answer is this: Such is the
variety of senses in which language is used by different persons, and such the want
of skill in many of those who use it, that laws are very frequently left in some
ambiguity.. Men, nevertheless, act upon them, assuming to understand them. Their
rights thus become involved in the efficacy of the law, and will be sacrificed unless
the law be carried into effect. To save these rights, and for no other purpose, the
courts will venture to seek the meaning of the law in exterior evidence, when the
intent of the law is good, and the apparent ambiguity not great. Strictly speaking,
however, even this proceeding is illegal. Nothing but the necessity of saving men's
rights, affords any justification for it. But where a law is ambiguous and unjust, there
is no such necessity for going out of its words to settle its probable meaning, because
men's rights will not be saved, but only sacrificed, by having its uncertainty settled,
and the law executed. It is, therefore, better that the law should perish, be suffered
to remain inoperative for its uncertainty, than that its uncertainty should be removed,
(or, rather, attempted to be removed, for it cannot be removed absolutely, by exterior
evidence,) and the law carried into effect for the destruction of men's rights.
Assuming, then, the rule of the court to be sound, are the rules laid down
[above]25 ... that have since been somewhat questioned, 26embraced in it? Those
rules are as follows:
1. "One of them is, that where words are susceptible of two meanings, one
consistent, and the other inconsistent, with justice and natural right, that meaning,
25. See supra part LA.
26. By Wendell Phillips [Spooner is referring here to Phillips' critique of Part I of The Unconstitutionality
of Slavery. See WENDELL PHILLPS, REVIEW oF LYSANDER SPOONER'S ARTICLE ON THE UNCONsTITUmoNALITY OF
SLAVERY (1847) (reprint ed. 1969).]
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and only that meaning, which is consistent with right, shall be attributed to them,
unless other parts of the instrument overrule that interpretation."
This rule is clearly embraced in the rule of the court; for the rule of the court
requires the unjust meaning to be "expressed with irresistible clearness," before it can
be adopted; and an unjust meaning certainly cannot be said to be "expressed with
irresistible clearness," when it is expressed only by words, which, consistently with
the laws of language, and the rest of the instrument, are susceptible of an entirely
different-that is, a perfectly innocent-meaning.
2. "Another rule, (if, indeed, it be not the same,) is, that no language except that
which is peremptory, and no implication, except one that is inevitable, shall be held
to authorize or sanction anything contrary to natural right."
This rule is also clearly embraced in the rule of the court; for the rule of the court
requires that the unjust intention be "expressed," that is, uttered; written out in terms,
as distinguished from being inferred, or implied. The requirement, also, that it be
"expressed with irresistible clearness," is equivalent to the requirement that the
language be "peremptory."
3. "Another rule is, that no extraneous or historical evidence shall be admitted
to fix upon a statute an unjust or immoral meaning, when the words themselves of
the act are susceptible of an innocent one."
This rule is also clearly embraced in the rule of the court; for the rule of the court
requires, not only that the unjust intention be "expressed," written out, embodied in
words, as distinct from being inferred, implied, or sought in exterior historical
evidence, but also that it be embodied in words of "irresistible clearness." Now,
words that express their intention with "irresistible clearness," can of course leave
no necessity for going out of the words, to "extraneous or historical evidence," to
find their intention.
But it is said that these rules are in conflict with the general rule, that where a law
is ambiguous, the probable intent of the legislature may be ascertained by extraneous
testimony.
It is not an universal rule, as has already been shown, that even where a law, as
a whole, is ambiguous, the intentions of the legislature may be sought in exterior
evidence. It is only where a just law is ambiguous, that we may go out of its words
to find its probable intent. We may never do it to find the probable intent of an unjust
one that is ambiguous; for it is better that an unjust law should perish for uncertainty,
than that its uncertainty should be solved by exterior evidence, and the law then be
executed for the destruction of men's rights.
Where only single words or phrases in a law are ambiguous, as is the case with
the constitution of the United States, the rule is somewhat different from what it is
where the law, as a whole, is ambiguous. In the case of single words and phrases that
are ambiguous, all the rules applicable to ambiguous words and phrases must be
exhausted in vain, before resort can be had to evidence exterior to the law, or the
words and phrases be set down as sanctioning injustice. For example; to settle the
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meaning of an ambiguous word or phrase, we must, before going out of the instru-
ment, refer to all the other parts of the instrument itself, to its preamble, its general
spirit and object, its subject matter, and, in the case of the constitution, to "the
general system of the laws" authorized and established by it. And the ambiguous
word or phrase must be construed in conformity with these, if possible, especially
when these are favorable to justice. And it is only when all these sources of light
have failed to suggest a just, reasonable, and consistent meaning, that we can go out
of the instrument to find the probable meaning.
If, when a single word or phrase were ambiguous, we could at once go out of the
instrument, (before going to other parts of it,) to find the probable intent of that
single word or phrase, and could determine its intent, independently of its relation to
the rest of the instrument, we should be liable to give it a meaning irrelevant to the
rest of the instrument, and thus involve the whole instrument in absurdity,
contradiction, and incongruity.
There are only four or five single words and phrases in the constitution, that are
claimed to be ambiguous in regard to slavery. All the other parts of the instrument,
its preamble, its prevailing spirit and principles, its subject matter, "the general
system of the laws" authorized by it, all repel the idea of its sanctioning slavery. If,
then, the ambiguous words and phrases be construed with reference to the rest of the
instrument, there is no occasion to go out of the instrument to find their meaning.
But, in point of fact, the words of a law never are ambiguous, legally speaking,
where the alternative is only between a meaning that is consistent, and one that is
inconsistent, with natural right; for the rule that requires the right to be preferred to
the wrong, is imperative and universal in all such cases; thus making the legal
meaning of the word precisely as certain, as though it could, in no case, have any
other meaning. It thus prevents the ambiguity, which, but for the rule, might have
existed.
This rule, that a just, in preference to an unjust, meaning must be given to a
word, wherever it is possible, consistently with the rest of the instrument, obviously
takes precedence of the rule that permits a resort to exterior evidence; and for the
following reasons: -
1. Otherwise, the rule in favor of the just meaning could seldom or never be
applied at all, because when we have gone out of the words of the law, we have gone
away from those things to which the rule applies. The exterior evidence which we
should find, would not necessarily furnish any opportunity for the application of the
rule. This rule, therefore, of preferring the just to the unjust meaning of a word, could
hardly have had an existence, except upon the supposition that it was to be applied
to the words given in the law itself. And if applied to the words given in the law
itself, it of course settles the meaning, and there is then no longer any occasion to go
out of the law to find its meaning.
2. Nothing would be gained by going out of a law to find evidence of the
meaning of one of its words, when a good meaning could be found in the law itself.
Nothing better than a good meaning could be expected to be found by going out of
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the law. As nothing could be gained, then, by going out of the law, the only object
of going out of it would be to find an unjust meaning; but that, surely, is no sufficient
reason for going out of it. To go out of a law to find an unjust meaning for its words,
when a just meaning could be found in the law itself, would be acting on the
principle of subverting all justice, if possible.
3. It would hardly be possible to have written laws, unless the legal meaning of
a word were considered certain, instead of ambiguous, in such cases as this; because
there is hardly any word used in writing laws, which has not more than one meaning,
and which might not therefore be held ambiguous, if we were ever to lose sight of
the fact, or abandon the presumption, that justice is the design of the law. To depart
from this principle would be introducing universal ambiguity, and opening the door
to universal injustice.
4. Certainty and right are the two most vital principles of the law. Yet certainty
is always sacrificed by going out of the words of the law; and right is qlways liable
to be sacrificed, if we go out of the words, with liberty to choose a bad meaning,
when a good meaning can be found in the words themselves; while both certainty
and right are secured by adhering uniformly to the rule of preferring the just to the
unjust meaning of a word, wherever the two come in collision. Need anything more
be said to prove the soundness of the rule?
The words of a law, then, are never ambiguous, legally speaking, when the only
alternative is between a just and an unjust meaning. They are ambiguous only when
both meanings are consistent with right, or both inconsistent with it.
In the first of these two cases, viz., where both meanings are consistent with
right, it is allowable, for the sake of saving the rights dependent on the efficacy of the
law, to go to extraneous history to settle the probable intention of the legislature. But
in the latter case, viz., where both meanings are inconsistent with right, it is not
allowable to go out of the words of the law itself, to ascertain the legislative inten-
tion. The law must rather be suffered to remain inoperative for its uncertainty.
The rule, quoted from the supreme court, comes fully up to these principles; for
that rule requires, in order that an unjust law may be carried into effect, that the
unjust intent be "expressed," as distinguished from being inferred, implied, or sought
in exterior evidence. It must also be "expressed with irresistible clearness." If it be
left in an uncertainty, the law will be construed in favor of the right, if possible; if
not, it will be suffered to perish for its ambiguity.
Apply, then, this rule of the court, in all its parts, to the word "free," and the
matter will stand thus.
1. A sense correlative with aliens, makes the constitution consistent with natural
right. A sense correlative with slaves, makes the constitution inconsistent with
natural right. The choice must therefore be made of the former sense.
2. A sense correlative with aliens, is consistent with "the general system of the
laws" established by the constitution. A sense correlative with slavery, is inconsistent
with that system. The former sense then must be adopted.
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3. If a sense correlative with aliens be adopted, the constitution itself designates
the individuals to whom the word "free," and the words "all other persons" apply. If
a sense correlative with slaves be adopted, the constitution itself has not designated
the individuals to whom either of these descriptions apply, and we should have to go
out of the constitution and laws of the United States to find them. This settles the
choice in favor of the former sense.
4. Even if it were admitted that the word "free" was used as the correlative of
slaves, still, inasmuch as the constitution itself has not designated the individuals
who may, and who may not, be held as slaves, and as we cannot go out of the
instrument to settle any ambiguity in favor of injustice, the provision must remain
inoperative for its uncertainty; and all persons must be presumed free, simply
because the constitution itself has not told us who may be slaves.
Apply the rule further to the words "importation of persons," and "service and
labor," and those words wholly fail to recognize slavery.
Apply the rule only to the word "free," and slavery is unconstitutional; for the
words "importation of persons," and "service and labor," can have no claims to be
considered recognitions or sanctions of slavery, unless such a signification befirst
given to the word "free."
[H.] Eighth Rule
An eighth rule of interpretation is, that where the prevailing principles and
provisions of a law are favorable to justice, and general in their nature and terms, no
unnecessary exception to them, or to their operation, is to be allowed.
It is a dictate of law, as of common sense-or rather of law, because of common
sense-that an exception to a rule cannot be established, unless it be stated with at
least as much distinctness and certainty as the rules itself, to which it is an exception;
because otherwise the authority of the rule will be more clear and certain, and
consequently more imperative, than that of the exception, and will therefore
outweigh and overbear it. This principle may justly be considered a strictly
mathematical one. It is founded simply on the necessary preponderance of a greater
quantity over a less. On this principle, an exception to a general law cannot be estab-
lished, unless it be expressed with at least as much distinctness as the law itself.
In conformity with this principle, it is the ordinary practice, in the enactment of
laws, to state the exceptions with the greatest distinctness. They are usually stated in
a separate sentence from the rest of the law, and in the form of a proviso, or
exception, commencing with the words "Provided, nevertheless, " "Excepting,
however," or words of that kind. And the language of the proviso is generally even
more emphatic than that of the law, as it, in reality, ought to be, to preponderate
against it.
This practice of stating exceptions has been further justified, and apparently
induced, by that knowledge of human nature which forbids us to understand a man
as contradicting, in one sentence what he has said in another, unless his language be
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incapable of any other meaning. For the same reason, a law, (which is but the expres-
sion of men's intentions,) should not be held to contradict, in one sentence, what it
has said in another, except the terms be perfectly clear and positive.
The practice of stating exceptions in this formal and emphatic manner, shows
also that legislators have usually, perhaps unconsciously, recognized, and virtually
admitted, the soundness of the rule of interpretation, that requires an exception to be
stated with at least as much clearness as the law to which it is an exception.
This practice of stating exceptions in a clear and formal manner, is common even
where no violation of justice is involved in the exception; and where an exception
therefore involves less violation of reason and probability.
This rule of interpretation, in regard to exceptions, corresponds with what is
common and habitual, if not universal, in common life, and in ordinary conversation.
If, for instance, a man make the exception to a general remark, he is naturally careful
to express the exception with peculiar distinctness; thus tacitly recognizing the right
of the other party not to notice the exception, and the probability that he will not
notice it, unless it be stated with perfect distinctness.
Finally. Although an exception is not, in law, a contradiction, it nevertheless
partakes so strongly of the nature of a contradiction-especially where there is no
legitimate or rightful reason for it-that it is plainly absurd to admit such an
exception, except upon substantially the same terms that we admit a contradiction,
viz., irresistible clearness of expression.
The question now is, whether there is, in the constitution, a contradiction, any
compliance with these principles, in making exceptions in favor of slavery?
Manifestly there is none. There is not even an approach to such a compliance. There
are no words of exception; no words of proviso; no words necessarily implying the
existence or sanction of anything in conflict with the general principles of the
instrument.
Yet the argument for slavery, (I mean that founded on the representative clause,)
makes two exceptions-not one merely, but two-and both of the most flagitious and
odious character-without the constitution's having used any words of proviso or
exception; without its having devoted any separate sentence to the exception; and
without its having used any words which, even if used in a separate sentence, and
.also preceded by a "Provided, nevertheless, " would have necessarily implied any
such exceptions as are claimed. The exceptions are claimed as having been
established merely incidentally and casually, in describing the manner of counting
the people for purposes of representation and taxation; when, what is worse, the
words used, if not the most common and proper that could have been used, are
certainly both common and proper for describing the people, where no exception to
"the general system of the laws" established by the constitution is intended.
It is by this process, and this alone, that the argument for slavery makes two
exceptions to the constitution; and both, as has already been said, of the most
flagitious and odious character.
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One of these exceptions is an exception of principle, substituting injustice and
slavery, for "justice and liberty."
The other is an exception of persons; excepting a part of "the people of the
United States" from the rights and benefits, which the instrument professes to secure
to the whole; and exposing them to wrongs, from which the people generally are
exempt.
An exception of principle would be less odious, if the injustice were of a kind
that bore equally on all, or applied equally to all. But these two exceptions involve
not only injustice in principle, but partiality in its operation. This double exception
is doubly odious, and doubly inadmissible.
Another insuperable objection to the allowance of these exceptions, is, that they
are indefinite-especially the latter one. The persons who may be made slaves are not
designated. The persons allowed to be made slaves being left in uncertainty, the
exception must fail for uncertainty, if for no other reason. We cannot, for the reasons
given under the preceding rule, go out of the instrument to find the persons, because
it is better that the exception should fail for its uncertainty, than that resort should be
had to exterior evidence for the purpose of subjecting men to slavery.
[I.] Ninth Rule
A ninth rule of interpretation is, to be guided, in doubtful cases, by the preamble.
The authority of the preamble, as a guide to the meaning of an instrument, where
the language is ambiguous, is established. In fact, the whole object of the preamble
is to indicate the objects had in view in the enacting clauses; and of necessity those
objects will indicate the construction to be given to the words used in those clauses.
Any other supposition would either make the preamble worthless, or, worse than
that, deceitful.
If we are guided by the preamble in fixing the meaning of those clauses that have
been claimed for slavery, it is plain that no sanction or recognition of slavery will be
found in them; for the preamble declares the objects of the constitution to be, among
other things, "justice" and "liberty." 27
27. Story says, "The importance of examining the preamble, for the purpose of expounding the language
of a statute, has been long felt, and universally conceded in all juridical discussions. It is an admitted maxim in the
ordinary course of the administration of justice, that the preamble of a statute is a key to open the mind of the
makers, as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and the objects which are to be accomplished by the
provisions of the statute. We find it laid down in some of our earliest authorities in the common law, and civilians
are accustomed to a similar expression, cessante legis proemlo, cessat et ipsa lex ('1'he preamble of the law
ceasing, the law itself also ceases.) Probably it has a foundation in the exposition of every code of written law, from
the universal principle of interpretation, that the will and intention of the legislature is to be regarded and followed.
It is properly resorted to where doubts or ambiguities arise upon the words of the enacting part; for if they are clear
and unambiguous, there seems little room for interpretation, except in cases leading to an absurdity, or to a direct
overthrow of the intention expressed in the preamble.
"There does not seem any reason why, in a fundamental law or constitution of government, an equal attention
should not be given to the intention of the framers, as expressed in the preamble. And accordingly we find that it
1065
1997 / The Unconstitutionality of Slavery
[J.] Tenth Rule
A tenth rule of interpretation is, that one part of an instrument must not be
allowed to contradict another, unless the language be so explicit as to make the
contradiction inevitable.
Now the constitution would be full of contradictions, if it tolerated slavery,
unless it be shown that the constitution itself has established an exception to all its
general provisions, limiting their operation and benefits to persons not slaves. Such
an exception or limitation would not, legally speaking, be a contradiction. But I take
it for granted that it has already been shown that no such exception can be made out
from its words. If no such exception be made out from its words, such a construction
must, if possible, be given to each clause of the instrument, as will not amount to a
contradiction of any other clause. There is no difficulty in making such a
construction; but when made it will exclude slavery.
[K.] Eleventh Rule
An eleventh rule is one laid down by the supreme court of the United States, as
follows:
"An act of congress" (and the rule is equally applicable to the constitution)
"ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible
construction remains."a
This rule is specially applicable to the clause relative to "the importation of
persons." If that clause were construed to sanction the kidnapping of the people of
foreign nations, and their importation into this country as slaves, it would be a
flagrant violation of that law.29
[L.] Twelfth Rule
A twelfth rule, universally applicable to questions both of fact and law, and
sufficient, of itself alone, to decide, against slavery, every possible question that can
be raised as to the meaning of the constitution, is this, "that all reasonable doubts
must be decided in favor of liberty. ,3
0
has been constantly referred to by statesmen and jurists to aid them in the exposition of its provisions." - 1 Story's
Comm. on Const., p 443-4....
"Though the preamble cannot control the enacting part of a statute which is expressed in clear and
unambiguous terms, yet, if any doubt arise on the words of the enacting part, the preamble may be resorted to, to
explain it." -7 Bacon's Abr.,435, note. 4 Term Rep.,793. 13 Vesey, 36. 15 Johnson, N.Y. Rep. ,116....
28. 2 Cranch, 64.
29. See infra at 1101-03, 1109.
30. The Supreme Court of Mississippi say, referring to the claim of freedom, set up before it, "Is it not an
unquestioned rule that, in matters of doubt, courts must lean infavorem vitae et libertatis?" (in favor of life and
liberty.)-Harvey vs. Decker, Walker's Mississippi Reports, 36.
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All the foregoing rules, it will be observed, are little other than varied and partial
expressions of the rule so accurately, tersely, comprehensively, and forcibly ex-
pressed by the supreme court of the United States, viz.:
"Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown,
where the general system of the laws is departed from, the legislative intention must
be expressed with irresistible clearness, to induce a court of justice to suppose a
design to effect such objects."
[M.] Thirteenth Rule
A thirteenth rule, and one of great importance, is, that instruments must be so
construed as to give no shelter or effect to fraud.
This rule is especially applicable for deciding what meaning we are to give to the
wordfree in the constitution; for if a sense correlative with slavery be given to that
word, it will be clearly the result of fraud.
We have abundant evidence that this fraud was intended by some of the framers
of the constitution. They knew that an instrument legalizing slavery could not gain
the assent of the north. They therefore agreed upon an instrument honest in its terms,
with the intent of misinterpreting it after it should be adopted.
The fraud of the framers, however, does not, of itself, implicate the people. But
when any portion of the people adopt this fraud in practice, they become implicated
in it, equally with its authors. And any one who claims that an ambiguous word shall
bear a sense inappropriate to the subject matter of the instrument, contrary to the
technical and common meaning of the word, inconsistent with any intentions that all
the parties could reasonably be presumed to agree to, inconsistent with natural right,
inconsistent with the preamble, and the declared purpose of the instrument,
inconsistent with "the general system of the laws" established by the instrument; any
one who claims such an interpretation, becomes a participator in the fraud. It is as
much fraudulent, in law, for the people of the present day to claim such a
construction of the wordfree, as it was for those who lived at the time the instrument
was adopted.
Vattel has laid down two very correct principles to be observed as preventives
of fraud. They are these:
1. That it is not permitted to interpret what has no need of interpretation.
2. That if a party have not spoken plainly, when he ought to have done so, that
which he has sufficiently declared, shall be taken for true against him.
Vattel's remarks in support of, and in connection with, these principles, are so
forcible and appropriate that they will be given somewhat at length. If he had had in
his mind this very fraud which the slaveholders and their accomplices intended to
I cite this authority from Mr. Chase's argument in the Van Zandt case.
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perpetrate by means of the wordfree in the constitution, he could hardly have said
anything better fitting the case.
He says, "That fraud seeks to take advantage even of the imperfection of
language; that men designedly throw obscurity and ambiguity into their treaties, to
obtain a pretence for eluding them upon occasion. It is then necessary to establish
rules founded on reason, and authorized by the law of nature, capable of frustrating
the attempts of a contracting power void of good faith. Let us begin with those that
tend particularly to this end; with those maxims of justice and equity destined to
repress fraud and prevent the effect of its artifices.
"The first general maxim of interpretation is, that it is not permitted to interpret
what has no need of interpretation.3' When an act is conceived in clear and precise
terms, when the sense is manifest and leads to nothing absurd, there can be no reason
to refuse the sense which this treaty naturally presents. To go elsewhere in search of
conjectures in order to restrain or extinguish it, is to endeavor to elude it. If this
dangerous method be once admitted, there will be no act which it will not render
useless. Let the brightest light shine on all the parts of the piece, let it be expressed
in terms the most clear and determinate; all this shall be of no use, if it be allowed to
search for foreign reasons in order to maintain what cannot be found in the sense it
naturally presents.
"The cavillers who dispute the sense of a clear and determinate article, are
accustomed to draw their vain subterfuges from the pretended intention and views
of the author of that article. It would often be very dangerous to enter with them into
the discussion of these supposed views, that are not pointed out in the piece itself.
This rule is more proper to repel them, and which cuts off all chicanery; if he who
can and ought to have explained himself clearly and plainly, has not done it, it is the
worse for him; he cannot be allowed to introduce subsequent restrictions which he
has not expressed. This is the maxim of the Roman law; Pactionem obscuram iis
nocere, in quorumfuit potestate legem apertius conscribere. (The harm of an obscure
compact shall fall upon those in whose power it was to write the rule plainly.) The
equity of this rule is extremely visible, and its necessity is not less evident. There can
be no secure conventions, no firm and solid concession, if these may be rendered
vain by subsequent limitations that ought to have been mentioned in the piece, if they
31. This rule is fairly applicable to the wordfree. The sense correlative with aliens is a sense appropriate
to the subject matter of the instrument; it accurately and properly describes a class of persons, which the constitution
presumes would exist under it; it was, at the time, the received and technical sense of the word in all instruments
of a similar character, and therefore its presumptive sense in the constitution; it is consistent with intentions
reasonably attributable to all the parties to the constitution; it is consistent with natural right, with the preamble,
the declared purpose of the constitution, and with the general system of the laws established by the constitution.
Its legal meaning, in the constitution, was therefore plain, manifest, palpable, and, at the time of its adoption, had
no need of interpretation. It needs interpretation now, only to expose the fraudulent interpretation of the past; and
because, in pursuance of that fraudulent interpretation, usage has now somewhat changed the received meaning of
the word.
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were included in the intentions of the contracting powers."--Vattel, b. 2, ch. 17, secs.
262, 263, 264.
"On every occasion when a person has, and ought to have shown his intention,
we take for true against him what he has SuFFICIENTLY declared. This is an incon-
testable principle applied to treaties; for if they are not a vain play of words, the
contracting parties ought to express themselves with truth, and according to their real
intentions. If the intention sufficiently declared, was not taken for the true intention
of him who speaks and binds himself, it would be of no use to contract and form
treaties."-- Same, sec. 266.
Is it necessary, in an enlightened age, to say that mental reservations cannot be
admitted in treaties? This is manifest, since by nature even of the treaty, the parties
ought to declare the manner in which they would be reciprocally understood. There
is scarcely a person at present, who would not be ashamed of building upon a mental
reservation. What can be the use of such an artifice, if it was not to lull to sleep some
other person under the vain appearance of a contract? It is, then, a real piece of
knavery."-Same, sec. 275....
[N.] Fourteenth Rule
In addition to the foregoing particular rules of interpretation, this general and
sweeping one may be given, to wit, that we are never unnecessarily to impute to an
instrument any intention whatever which it would be unnaturalfor either reasonable
or honest men to entertain. Such intention can be admitted only when the language
will admit of no other construction.
Law is "a rule of conduct." The very idea of law, therefore, necessarily implies
the ideas of reason and right. Consequently, every instrument, and every man, or
body of men, that profess to establish a law, impliedly assert that the law they would
establish is reasonable and right. The law, therefore, must, if possible, be construed
consistently with that implied assertion.
[I1. THE LEGAL MEANING OF THE ALLEGEDLY PRO-SLAVERY PASSAGES OF THE
CONSTITUTION]
[In the light of these principles, then, let us examine those clauses of the consti-
tution, that are relied on as recognizing and sanctioning slavery. They are but three
in number.
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[A. The Fugitive Servant Clause 32]
The one most frequently quoted is the third clause of Art. 4, Sec. 2, in these
words:
"No person, held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be dis-
charged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party
to whom such service or labor may he due." There are several reasons why this
clause renders no sanction to slavery.
1. It must be construed, if possible, as sanctioning nothing contrary to natural right.
If there be any "service or labor" whatever, to which any "persons" whatever
may be "held," consistently with natural right, and which any person may, con-
sistently with natural right, "claim" as his "due" of another, such "service or labor,"
and only such, is recognized and sanctioned by this provision.
It needs no argument to determine whether the "service or labor," that is exacted
of a slave, is such as can be "claimed," consistently with natural right, as being
"due" from him to his master. And if it cannot be, some other "service or labor"
must, if possible, be found for this clause to apply to.
The proper definition of the word "service," in this case, obviously is, the labor
of a servant. And we find, that at and before the adoption of the constitution, the
persons recognized by the State laws as "servants," constituted a numerous class. The
statute books of the States abounded with statutes in regard to "servants." Many seem
to have been indented as servants by the public authorities, on account of their being
supposed incompetent, by reason of youth and poverty, to provide for themselves.
Many were doubtless indented as apprentices by their parents and guardians, as now.
The English laws recognized a class of servants-and many persons were brought
here from England, in that character, and retained that character afterward. Many
indented or contracted themselves as servants for the payment of their passage
money to this country. In these various ways, the class of persons, recognized by the
statute books of the States as "servants," was very numerous; and formed a
prominent subject of legislation. Indeed, no other evidence of their number is
necessary than the single fact, that "persons bound to service for a term of years,"
were specially noticed by the constitution of the United States, (Art. 1, Sec. 2,) which
requires that they be counted as units in making up the basis of representation. There
is, therefore, not the slightest apology for pretending that there was not a sufficient
32. [This section was added from an omitted portion of the text.-RB.]
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class for the words "service or labor" to refer to, without supposing the existence of
slaves.33
2. "Held to service or labor, " is no legal description of slavery.
Slavery is property in man. It is not necessarily attended with either "service or
labor." A very considerable portion of the slaves were either too young, too old, too
sick, or too refractory to render "service or labor." As a matter of fact, slaves, who
are able to labor, may, in general, be compelled by their masters to do so. Yet labor
is not an essential or necessary condition of slavery. The essence of slavery consists
in a person's being owned as property-without any reference to the circumstances
of his being compelled to labor, or of his being permitted to live in idleness, or of his
being too young, or too old, or too sick to labor.
If "service or labor" were either a test, or a necessary attendant of slavery, that
test would of itself abolish slavery; because all slaves, before they can render
"service or labor," must have passed through the period of infancy, when they could
render neither service nor labor, and when, therefore, according to this test, they were
free. And if they were free in infancy, they could not be subsequently enslaved.
3. "Held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof."
The "laws" take no note of the fact whether a slave "labors," or not. They recog-
nize no obligation, on his part, to labor. They will enforce no "claim" of a master,
upon his slave, for "service or labor." If the slave refuse to labor, the law will not
interfere to compel him. The law simply recognizes the master's right of property in
the slave-just as it recognizes his right of property in a horse. Having done that, it
leaves the master to compel the slave, if he please, and if he can-as he would com-
pel a horse-to labor. If the master do not please, or be not able, to compel the slave
to labor, the law takes no more cognizance of the case than it does of the conduct of
a refractory horse. In short, it recognizes no obligation, on the part of the slave, to
33. In the convention that framed the constitution, when this clause was under discussion, "servants" were
spoken of as a distinct class from "slaves." For instance, "Mr. Butler and Mr. Pickney moved to require 'fugitive
slaves and servants to be delivered up like criminals."' Mr. Sherman objected to delivering up either slaves or
servants. He said he "saw no more propriety in the public seizing and surrendering a slave or servant, than a
horse."- Madison Papers, p. 1447 - 8. The language finally adopted shows that they at last agreed to deliver up
"servants," but not "slaves"-for as the word "servant" does not mean "slave," the word "service" does not mean
slavery.
These remarks in the convention are quoted, not because the intentions of the convention are of the least legal
consequence whatever,'but to rebut the silly arguments of those who pretend that the convention, and not the
people, adopted the constitution- and that the convention did not understand the legal difference between the word
"servant" and "slave," and therefore used the word "service" in this clause, as meaning slavery.
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labor, if he can avoid doing so. It recognizes no "claim," on the part of the master,
upon his slave, for "services or labor," as "due" from the latter to the former.
4. Neither "service" nor "labor" is necessarily slavery; and not being necessarily
slavery, the words cannot, in this case, be strained beyond their necessary meaning,
to make them sanction a wrong. The law will not allow words to be strained a hair's
breadth beyond their necessary meaning, to make them authorize a wrong. The
stretching, if there be any, must always be towards the right. The words "service or
labor" do not necessarily, nor in their common acceptation, so much as suggest the
idea of slavery-that is, they do not suggest the idea of the laborer or servant being
the property of the person for whom he labors. An indented apprentice serves and
labors for another. He is "held' to do so, under a contract, and for a consideration,
that are recognized, by the laws, as legitimate, and consistent with natural right. Yet
he is not owned as property. A condemned criminal is "held to labor"--yet he is not
owned as property. The law allows no such straining of the meaning of words
towards the wrong, as that which would convert the words "service or labor" (of
men) into property in man-and thus make a man, who serves or labors for another,
the property of that other.
5. "No person held to service or labor, in one State, under the laws thereof."
The "laws," here mentioned, and impliedly sanctioned, are, of course, only
constitutional laws-laws, that are consistent, both with the constitution of the State,
and the constitution of the United States. None others are "laws," correctly speaking,
however they may attempt to "hold persons to service or labor," or however they
may have the forms of laws on the statute books.
This word "laws," therefore, being a material word, leaves the whole question
just where it found it-for it certainly does not, of itself-nor indeed does any other
part of the clause-say that an act of a legislature, declaring one man to be the pro-
perty of another, is a "law" within the meaning of the constitution. As far as the word
"laws" says anything on the subject, it says that such acts are not laws-for such acts
are clearly inconsistent with natural law-and it yet remains to be shown that they
are consistent with any constitution whatever, state or national.
The burden of proof, then, still rests upon the advocates of slavery, to show that
an act of a State legislature, declaring one man to be the property of another, is a
"law," within the meaning of this clause. To assert simply that it is, without proving
it to be so, is a mere begging of the question-for that is the very point in dispute.
The question, therefore, of the constitutionality of the slave acts must first be
determined, before it can be decided that they are "laws" within the meaning of the
constitution. That is, they must be shown to be consistent with the constitution,
before they can be said to be sanctioned as "laws" by the constitution. Can any
proposition be plainer than this? And yet the reverse must be assumed, in this case,
by the advocates of slavery.
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The simple fact, that an act purports to "hold persons to service or labor," clearly
cannot, of itself, make the act constitutional. If it could, any act, purporting to hold
"persons to service or labor," would necessarily be constitutional, without any regard
to the "persons" so held, or the conditions on which they were held. It would be con-
stitutional, solely because it purported to hold persons to service or labor. If this
were the true doctrine, any of us, without respect of persons, might be held to service
or labor, at the pleasure of the legislature. And then, if "service or labor" mean
slavery, it would follow that any of us, without discrimination, might be made slaves.
And thus the result would be, that the acts of a legislature would be constitutional,
solely because they made slaves of the people. Certainly this would be a new test of
the constitutionality of laws.
All the arguments in favor of slavery, that have heretofore been drawn from this
clause of the constitution, have been founded on the assumption, that if an act of a
legislature did but purport to "hold persons to service or labor"-no matter how, on
what conditions, or for what cause-that fact alone was sufficient to make the act
constitutional. The entire sum of the argument, in favor of slavery, is but this, viz.,
the constitution recognizes the constitutionality of "laws" that "hold persons to ser-
vice or labor,"-- slave acts "hold persons to service or labor,"- therefore slave acts
must be constitutional. This profound syllogism is the great pillar of slavery in this
country. It has, (if we are to judge by results,) withstood the scrutiny of all the legal
acumen of this nation for fifty years and more. If it should continue to withstand it
for as many years as it has already done, it will then be time to propound the
following, to wit: The State constitutions recognize the right of men to acquire
property; theft, robbery, and murder are among the modes in which property may be
acquired; therefore theft, robbery, and murder are recognized by these constitutions
as lawful.
No doubt the clause contemplates that there may be constitutional "laws," under
which persons may be "held to service or labor." But it does not follow, therefore,
that every act, that purports to hold "persons to service or labor," is constitutional.
We are obliged, then, to determine whether a statute be constitutional, before we
can determine whether the "service or labor", required by it, is sanctioned by the con-
stitution as being lawfully required. The simple fact, that the statute would "hold
persons to service or labor," is, of itself, no evidence, either for or against its
constitutionality. Whether it be or be not constitutional, may depend upon a variety
of contingencies-such as the kind of service or labor required, and the conditions
on which it requires it. Any service or labor, that is inconsistent with the duties which
the constitution requires of the people, is of course not sanctioned by this clause of
the constitution as being lawfully required. Neither, of course, is the requirement of
service or labor, on any conditions, that are inconsistent with any rights that are
secured to the people by the constitution, sanctioned by the constitution as lawful.
Slave laws, then, can obviously be held to be sanctioned by this clause of the con-
stitution, only by gratuitously assuming, 1st, that the constitution neither confers any
rights, nor imposes any duties upon the people of the United States, inconsistent with
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their being made slaves; and, 2d, that it sanctions the general principle of holding
"persons to service or labor" arbitrarily without contract, without compensation, and
without the charge of crime. If this be really the kind of constitution that has been in
force since 1789, it is somewhat wonderful that there are so few slaves in the
country. On the other hand, if the constitution be not of this kind, it is equally won-
derful that we have any slaves at all-for the instrument offers no ground for saying
that a colored man may be made a slave, and a white man not.
Again. Slave acts were not "laws" according to any State constitution that was
in existence at the time the constitution of the United States was adopted. And if they
were not "laws" at that time, they have not been made so since.
6. The constitution itself, (Art. 1. Sec. 2,) in fixing the basis of representation, has
plainly denied that those described in Art 4 as 'persons held to service or labor," are
slaves,-for it declares that "persons bound to service for a term of years" shall be
"included" in the "number of free persons." There is no legal difference between
being "bound to service," and being "held to service or labor." The addition, in the
one instance, of the words "for a term of years," does not alter the case, for it does
not appear that, in the other, they are "held to service or labor" beyond a fixed term
-and, in the absence of evidence from the constitution itself, the presumption must
be that they are not-because such a presumption saves the necessity of going out
of the constitution to find the persons intended, and it is also more consistent with the
prevalent municipal, and with natural law.
And it makes no difference to this result, whether the word "free," in the first
article, be used in the political sense common at that day, or as the correlative of
slavery. In either case, the persons described as "free," could not be made slaves.
7. The words "service or labor" cannot be made to include slavery, unless by
reversing the legal principle, that the greater includes the less, and holding that the
less includes the greater; that the innocent includes the criminal; that a sanction of
what is right, includes a sanction of what is wrong.]
[B. The Representation Clause.]
THE constitution (Art. 1, Sec. 2) requires that the popular basis of representation
and taxation be made up as follows, to wit:
"By adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to
service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other
persons."
[1.] Servants Counted as Units.
If the wordfree, in this clause, be used as the correlative of slaves, and the words
"all other persons" mean slaves, the words "including those bound to service for a
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term ofyears" are sheer surplusage, having no legal force or effect whatever; for the
persons described by them would of course have been counted with the free persons,
without the provision. If the word free were used as the correlative of slaves at all,
it was used as the correlative of slaves alone, and not also of servants for a term of
years, nor of prisoners, nor of minors under the control of their parents, nor of
persons under any other kind of restraint whatever, than the simple one of chattel
slavery.34
It was, therefore, wholly needless to say that "persons bound to service for a term
of years" should not be counted in the class with slaves, for nobody, who understood
the word free as the correlative of slaves, would have imagined that servants for a
term of years were to be included in the class with slaves. There would have been
nearly or quite as much reason in saying that minors under the control of their
parents, persons under guardianship, prisoners for debt, prisoners for crime, &c.,
should not be counted in the class with slaves, as there was in saying that servants
for a term of years should not be counted in that class. In fact, the whole effect of the
provision, if it have any, on the slave hypothesis, is to imply that all other persons
under restraint, except "those bound to service for a term of years," shall be counted
in the class with slaves; because an exception of particular persons strengthens the
rule against all persons not excepted. So that, on the slave hypothesis, the provision
would not only be unnecessary in favor of the persons it describes, but it would even
be dangerous in its implications against persons not included in it.
But we are not allowed to consider these words even as surplusage, if any rea-
sonable and legal effect can be given them. And under the alien hypothesis they have
such an effect.
Of the "persons bound to service for a term of years" in those days, large
numbers were aliens, who, but for this provision, would be counted in the three fifths
class. There was, nevertheless, a sound reason why they should be distinguished
from other aliens, and be counted as units, and that was, that they were bound to the
country for a term of years as laborers, and could not, like other aliens, be considered
either a transient, unproductive, or uncertain population. Their being bound to the
country for a term of years as laborers, was, to all practical purposes, equivalent to
naturalization; for there was little or no prospect that such persons would ever leave
the country afterwards, or that, during their service, they would recognize the obli-
gations of any foreign allegiance.
On the alien hypothesis, then, the words have an effect, and a reasonable one. On
the slave hypothesis, they either have no effect at all, or one adverse to all persons
whatsoever that are under any kind of restraint, except servants for a term of years.
34. If the wordfree were used as the correlative of any other kinds of restraint than slavery, it would not
have implied slavery as its correlative, and there would have been no ground for the argument for slavery. On the
other hand, if it were used as the correlative of slavery, there was no need of specially excepting from the
implication of slavery "those bound to service for a term of years," for they were known by everybody not to be
slaves.
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[2.] Slave Representation.
THE injustice to the North that, is involved in allowing slaves, who can have no
rights in the government, who can owe it no allegiance, who are necessarily its
enemies, and who therefore weaken, instead of supporting it- the injustice and
inequality of allowing such persons to be represented at all in competition with those
who alone have rights in the government, and who alone support it, is so palpable
and monstrous, as utterly to forbid any such construction being put upon language
that does not necessarily mean it. The absurdity, also, of such a representation, is, if
possible, equal to its injustice. We have no right- legal rules, that are universally
acknowledged, imperatively forbid us- unnecessarily to place upon the language
of an instrument a construction, that either stultifies the parties to it to such a degree
as the slave construction does the people of the North, or that makes them consent
to having such glaring and outrageous injustice practised upon them.
But it will be said in reply to these arguments, that, as a compensation to the
North for the injustice of slave representation, all direct taxes are to be based on
population; that slaves are to be counted as three fifths citizens, in the apportionment
of those taxes; and that the injustice of the representation being thus compensated for,
by a corresponding taxation, its absurdity is removed.
But this reply is a mere assumption of the fact that the constitution authorizes
slave taxation; a fact, that, instead of being assumed, stands only on the same evi-
dence as does the slave representation, and therefore as much requires to be proved
by additional evidence, as does the representation itself. The reply admits that the
slave representation is so groundless, absurd, unequal, and unjust, that it would not
be allowable to put that construction upon the clause, if it had provided only for
representation. Yet it attempts to support the construction by alleging, without any
additional evidence, that the direct taxation, (if there should ever be any direct
taxation,) was to be on the same absurd principle. But this is no answer to the
objection. It only fortifies it; for it accuses the constitution of two absurdities, instead
of one, and does it upon evidence that is admitted to be insufficient to sustain even
one. And the argument for slavery does, in reality, accuse the constitution of these
two absurdities, without bringing sufficient evidence to prove either of them. Not
having sufficient evidence to prove either of these absurdities, independently of the
other, it next attempts to make each absurdity prove the other. But two legal
absurdities, that are proved only by each other, are not proved at all. And thus this
whole fabric of slave representation and slave taxation falls to the ground.
Undoubtedly, if the clause authorizes slave representation, it also authorizes
slave taxation; or if it authorizes slave taxation, it undoubtedly authorizes slave repre-
sentation. But the first question to be settled is, whether it authorizes either? And this
certainly is not to be answered in the affirmative, by simply saying that, if it
authorizes one, it authorizes the other.
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If any one wishes to prove that the clause authorizes slave representation, he
must first prove that point independently of the taxation, and then he may use the
representation to prove the taxation; or else he must first prove the slave taxation, and
then he may use the taxation to prove the representation. But he cannot use either to
prove the other, until he has first proved one independently of the other; a thing
which probably nobody will ever undertake to do. No one certainly will ever
undertake to prove the representation independently of the taxation; and it is doubtful
whether any one will ever undertake to prove the taxation, independently of the
representation. The absurdity and incongruity of reckoning one single kind of
property as persons, in a government and system of taxation founded on persons, are
as great as would be that of valuing one single class of persons as property, in a
government and system of taxation founded on property. The absurdity and in-
congruity in each case would be too great to be allowable, if the language would
admit, (as in this case it does admit,) of another and reasonable construction.
Nevertheless, if any one should think that this slave taxation is not a thing so
absurd or unjust as to forbid that construction, still, the fact that, if that construction
be established, the absurd and unjust representation will follow as a consequence
from it, is a sufficient reason why it cannot be adopted. For we are bound to make
the entire clause harmonious with itself, if possible; and, in doing so, we are bound
to make it reasonable throughout, if that be possible, rather than absurd throughout.
I have thus far admitted, for the sake of the argument, the common idea, that the
taxation, which the slave construction of this clause would provide for, would be
some compensation to the North, for the slave representation. But, in point of fact,
it would not necessarily be any compensation at all; for it is only direct taxes that are
to be apportioned in this manner, and the government is not required to lay direct
taxes at all. Indeed, this same unjust representation, which it is claimed that the
clause authorizes, may be used to defeat the very taxation which it is said was
allowed as an equivalent for it. So that, according to the slave argument, the unjust
representation is made certain, while the compensating taxation is made contingent;
and not only contingent, but very likely contingent upon the will of the unjust repre-
sentation itself. Here, then, are another manifest and gross absurdity and injustice,
which the slave construction is bound to overcome, before it can be adopted.
But suppose the taxation had been made certain, so as to correspond with, and
compensate for, the representation- what then? The purport of the clause would
then have been, that the North said to the South, "We will suffer you to govern us, (by
means of an unequal representation,) if you will pay such a portion, (about one
sixth,) of our taxes." Certainly no construction, unless an unavoidable one, is
allowable, that would fasten upon the people of the north the baseness and the infamy
of having thus bargained away their equal political power for money; of having sold
their freedom for a price. But when it is considered how paltry this price was, and
that its payment was not even guarantied, or likely ever to be made, such a con-
struction of the contract would make the people of the North as weak and foolish, as
infamous and despicable. Is there a man in the whole northern states, that would now
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consent to such a contract for himself and his children? No. What right, then, have
we to accuse all our fathers, (fathers too who had proved their appreciation of liberty
by risking life and fortune in its defence,) of doing what none of us would do? No
legal rules of interpretation, that were ever known to any decent tribunal, authorize
us to put such a construction upon their instrument as no reasonable and honorable
man would ever have agreed to. There never lived a man in the northern states, who
would have consented to such a contract, unless bribed or moved to it by some
motive beyond his proportionate share in such a price. Yet this price is all the motive
that can be legally assigned for such a contract; for the general benefits of the Union
must be presumed to have been equal to each party. If any difference were allowable
in this respect, it must have been in favor of the North, for the South were the weaker
party, and needed union much more than the north.
... The true mode of presenting the question, therefore, is this, viz., 1. Whether
the South, for the privilege of enslaving a portion of her people, of holding them in
slavery under the protection of the North, and of saving two fifths of her direct
taxation upon them, agreed to surrender two fifths of her representation on all she
should enslave? and, 2. Whether the North, in order to secure to herself a superiority
of representation, consented to the enslavement of a portion of the Southern people,
guarantied their subjection, and agreed to abate two fifths of the direct taxation on
every individual enslaved? This is the true mode of' presenting the subject; and the
slave construction of the clause answers these questions in the affirmative. It makes
the North to have purchased for herself a superior representation, and to have paid
a bounty on slavery, by remitting taxes to which the South would have been
otherwise liable; and it makes the South to have bartered away her equal repre-
sentation, her equal political power-makes her, in fact, to have sold her own
liberties to the North, for a pitiful amount of taxation, and the privilege of enslaving
a part of her own people.
Such is the contract-infamous on the part of both North and South, and base,
suicidal, and servile on the part of the South-which the slave construction would
make out of this provision of the constitution. Such a contract cannot be charged
upon political communities, unless it be "expressed with irresistible clearness." Much
less can it be done on the evidence of language, which equally well admits of a
construction that is rational, honorable, and innocent, on the part of both.
The construction which legal rules require, to wit, that "free persons" mean the
citizens, and "all other persons" the aliens, avoids all these obstacles in the way of
making this clause an honorable, equal, and reasonable contract.
[3.] Why Aliens Are Counted as "Three Fifths."
There are both justice and reason in a partial representation, and a partial
taxation, of aliens. They are protected by our laws, and should pay for that pro-
tection. But as they are not allowed the full privileges of citizens, they should not pay
an equal tax with the citizens. They contribute to the strength and resources of the
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government, and therefore they should be represented. But as they are not suf-
ficiently acquainted with our system of government, and as their allegiance is not
made sufficiently sure, they are not entitled to an equal voice with the citizens,
especially if they are not equally taxed.
But it has been argued35 that aliens were likely to be in about equal numbers in
all the States, in proportion to the citizens; and that therefore no great inequality
would have occurred, if no separate account had been taken of them. But it is not true
that aliens were likely to be in equal numbers in the several States in proportion to
the citizens. Those States whose lands were already occupied, like Connecticut,
Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, (exclusive of Maine,) and who could not expect
to retain even so much as their natural increase of population, could not expect to
receive the same additions to it by the immigration of foreigners as New York,
Pennsylvania, and other States, that still had immense bodies of unoccupied lands.
And none of the old thirteen States could expect long to have the same proportion of
aliens as the new States that were to be opened in the west. And even those new
States, that were then about to be opened, would soon become old, and filled with
citizens, compared with other States that were to be successively opened still further
west.
This inequality in the proportion of aliens in the respective States, was then, and
still is, likely to be for centuries an important political element; and it would have
been weak, imprudent, shortsighted, and inconsistent with the prevailing notions of
that time, of all previous time, and of the present time, for the constitution to have
made no provision in regard to it. And yet, on the slave hypothesis, the constitution
is to be accused of all this weakness, imprudence, short-sightedness, and incon-
sistency; and, what is equally inadmissible, is to be denied all the credit of the inten-
tions, which, on the alien hypothesis, the clause expresses; intentions, the wisdom,
justice, and liberality of which are probably more conspicuous, and more har-
moniously blended, than in any other provision in regard to aliens, that any nation
on earth ever established, before or since.
It is as unnatural and absurd, in the interpretation of an instrument, to withhold
the credit of wise and good intentions, where the language indicates them, as it is to
attribute bad or foolish ones, where the language does not indicate them. And hence
the positive merits of this clause, on the alien hypothesis, are entitled to the highest
consideration; and are moreover to be contrasted with its infamous demerits, on the
slave hypothesis.
The preceding view of this clause is strongly confirmed by other parts of the
constitution. For example: The constitution allows aliens, equally with the citizens,
to vote directly in the choice of representatives to congress, and indirectly for
35. By Wendell Phillips.
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senators and president, if such be the pleasure of the State governments." Yet they
are not themselves eligible to these three offices, although they are eligible to all
other offices whatsoever under the constitution? 7 All that is required of them is
simply the official oath to support the constitution; the same oath that is required of
citizens.
Again. The constitution of the United States lays no restraint upon their holding,
devising, and inheriting real estate, if such should be the pleasure of the State govern-
ments. And in many, if not all, the States, they are allowed to hold, devise, and
inherit it.
Now the facts, that they are not restrained by the constitution from holding,
devising, and inheriting real estate; that they have the permission of the constitution
to vote, (if the State governments shall please to allow them to do so;) and that they
are eligible to a part of the offices, but not to all, show that the constitution regards
them not as aliens, in the'technical sense of that term,38 but as partial citizens. They
indicate that the constitution intended to be consistent with itself throughout, and to
consider them, in reality, what this argument claims that it considers them in respect
of representation and taxation, viz., as threefifths citizens.
The same reason that would induce the constitution to make aliens eligible to all
offices, except the three named, (to wit, those of representative, senator, and
president,) and to allow them the right of voting, would also induce it to allow them
some right of being counted in making up the basis of representation. On the other
hand, the same reasons which would forbid their eligibility, as representatives,
senators, and presidents, would forbid their being reckoned equal to citizens, in
making up the basis of representation; and would also forbid their votes for those
officers being counted as equal to the votes of citizens. Yet a single vote could not
be divided so as to enable each alien to give three fifths, or any other fraction, of a
vote. Here then was a difficulty. To have allowed the separate States full repre-
sentation for their aliens, as citizens, while it denied the aliens themselves the full
rights of citizenship, (as, for instance, eligibility to the legislative and highest exe-
cutive offices of the government,) would have been inconsistent and unreasonable.
How, then, was this matter to be arranged? The answer is, just as this argument
claims that it was arranged, viz., by allowing the aliens full liberty of voting, at the
discretion of the State governments, yet at the same time so apportioning the repre-
36. And in some of the States, as Illinois and Michigan, for example, they are allowed to vote.
The provision in the constitution of the United States, in regard to electors, is this: (art. 1, sec. 2.)
"The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year, by the people of
the several States," (not by the Citizens of the United States in each State, but by "the people of the several States,")
"and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of
the State legislature."
37. They may be judges, ambassadors, secretaries of the departments, commanders in the army and navy,
collectors of revenue, postmasters, &c., equally with the citizens.
38. For the term alien technically implies exclusion from office, exclusion from the right of suffrage and
inability to hold real estate.
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sentation among the States, that each State would acquire no more weight in the
national government, than if her aliens had each given but three fifths of a vote,
instead of a full vote.
In this manner all the inconsistency of principle, which, it has been shown,
would have otherwise existed between the different provisions of the constitution,
relative to aliens, as compared with citizens, was obviated. At the same time justice
was done to the States, as States; also to the citizens, as citizens; while justice,
liberality, and consistency were displayed towards the aliens themselves. The device
was as ingenious, almost, as the policy was wise, liberal, and just.
Compare now the consistency and reason of this arrangement with the incon-
sistency and absurdity of the one resulting from the slave hypothesis. According to
the latter, the States are allowed thefill weight of their aliens, as citizens, in filling
those departments of the government, (the legislative and highest executive,) which
aliens themselves are not allowed to fill. 2. Aliens are allowed full votes with the
citizens in filling offices, to which, (solely by reason of not being citizens,) they are
not eligible. 3. And what is still more inconsistent, absurd, and atrocious even, half
the States are allowed a three fifths representation for a class of persons, whom such
States have made enemies to the nation, and who are allowed to fill no office, are
allowed no vote, enjoy no protection, and have no rights in, or responsibility to, the
government.
If legal rules require us to make an instrument consistent, rather than incon-
sistent, with itself, and to give it all a meaning that is reasonable and just, rather than
one that is unjust and absurd, what meaning do they require us to give to the consti-
tution, on the point under consideration?
The only imperfection in the constitution on this point seems to be, that it does
not secure the elective franchise to aliens. But this omission implies no disfavor of
aliens, and no inconsistency with the actual provisions of the constitution; nor is it
any argument against the theory here maintained; for neither does the constitution
secure this franchise to the citizens, individually, as it really ought to have done. It
leaves the franchise of both citizens and aliens at the disposal of the State govern-
ments separately, as being the best arrangement that could then be agreed upon,
trusting, doubtless, that the large number of aliens in each State would compel a
liberal policy towards them.
From this whole view of the subject, it will be seen that the constitution does not,
in reality, consider unnaturalized persons as aliens, in the technical sense of that
term.39 It considers them as partial citizens, that is, as three fifths citizens, and two
fifths aliens, The constitution could find no single term by which to describe them,
and was therefore obliged to use the phrase, "all other persons" than "the free," that
is, "all other persons" than those entitled to full representation, full rights of
eligibility to office, and full rights of citizenship generally. The term "alien" would
39. They are called aliens in this argument, for the want of any other word that will describe them.
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have been a repulsive, unfriendly, and wholly inappropriate one, by which to de-
signate persons who were in fact members of the government, and allowed to
participate in its administration on a footing so near to an equality with the citizens.
As the word had acquired a technical meaning, indicative of exclusion from office,
from suffrage, from the basis of representation, and from the right of holding real
estate, its use in the constitution would have served to keep alive prejudices against
them, and would have been made a pretext for great illiberality and injustice towards
them. Hence the constitution nowhere uses the word.
How much more reasonable in itself, and how much more creditable to the
constitution and the people, is this mode of accounting for the use of the words "all
other persons," than the one given by the advocates of slavery, viz., that the people
had not yet become sufficiently shameless to avow their treason to all the principles
of liberty for which they had been distinguished, and, therefore, instead of daring to
use the word "slaves," they attempted to hide their crime and infamy under such a
fig-leaf covering as that of the words "all other persons." But the law knows nothing
of any such motives for using unnatural and inappropriate term. It presumes that the
term appropriate for describing the thing is used when that term is known- as in this
case it was known, if the things intended to be described were slaves.
[4.] Why the Words "Free Persons" Were Used.
THE words "free persons" were, I think, of themselves- that is, independently
of any desire that we may suppose a part of the people to have had to pervert their
true meaning- the most appropriate words that could have been used to describe the
native and naturalized citizens- that is, thefull citizens, as distinguished from those
partial citizens, (not technically aliens, though commonly called aliens,)- whom I
have supposed the words "all other persons" were intended to describe.
The real distinction between these two classes was, that the first class werefree
of the government-that is, they wereffull members of the State, and could claim the
full liberty, enjoyment and protection of the laws, as a matter of right, as being
parties to the compact; while the latter class were not thus free; they could claim
hardly anything as a right, (perhaps nothing, unless it were the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus,) and were only allowed, as a matter offavor and discretion, such
protection and privileges as the general and State governments should see fit to
accord to ihem.
It was important that the first of these classes should be described by some
technical term; because technical terms are more definite, precise, and certain, in
their meaning, than others. And in this case, where representation and taxation were
concerned, the greatest precision that language admitted of was requisite. Now, I
think, there was no other word in the language that would have described so
accurately, as does the word "free," (when used in its technical sense,) the class
which I have supposed it was intended to describe.
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The technical term, in the English law, for describing a member of the state, is
"free subject." "Free subjects" are the whole body of the people, men, women, and
children, who were either born within the dominions and allegiance of the crown,
41
or have been naturalized by act of parliament. Individually, they are members of the
state; collectively, they constitute the state. As members of the state, they are
individually entitled, of right, to all the essential liberties and rights which the laws
secure to the people at large.
"Free subjects" are distinguishable from aliens, or persons born out of the
country, but residing in the country, and allowed, as matter of privilege, such pro-
tection as the government sees fit to accord to them.
"Free subjects" are also distinguishable from denizens, who, in the English law,
are persons born out of the country, and not naturalized by act of parliament, but
have certain privileges conferred upon them by the king's letters patent.
2
This term, "free subject," had been universally used in this country, up to the
time of the revolution, to describe members of the state, as distinguished from aliens.
The colonial charters guarantied to the subjects of the British crown, settling in the
colonies, that they and their children should "have and enjoy all the liberties and
immunities of free and natural subjects, to all intents, constructions, and purposes
whatsoever, as if they and every of them were born within the realm of England."
And up to the revolution, the colonists, as everybody knows, all claimed the rights
and the title of '"ree British subjects." They did not call themselves citizens of
Massachusetts and citizens of Virginia. They did not call themselves citizens at all.
The word citizen was never, I think, used in the English law, except to describe
persons residing, or having franchises, in a city; as, for example, citizens of London.
But as members of the state, they were all called "free subjects," or "free British
subjects."
Up to the time of the revolution, then, the term "free subject" was the only term
in common use to describe members of the state, as distinguished from aliens. As
such it was universally known in the country, and universally used!
3
The term "free" was also naturally an appropriate one by which to describe a
member of afree state; one who was politically free, and entitled, of right, to the full
and free enjoyment of all the liberties and rights that are secured to the members of
40. SUBJECTS are members of the commonwealth, under the king their head." Jacob's, Williams, and
Cunningham's Law Dictionaries.
41. "All those are natural-born subjects, whose parents, at the time of their birth, were under the actual
obedience of our king, and whose place of birth was within his dominions." - 7 Coke's Rep., p. 18. Bacon's Abridg.,
title Alien. Cunningham's Law Dictionary, title Alien.
42. "A denizen is in a kind of middle state, between an alien and a natural-born subject, and partakes of both
of them."--I Blackstone, 373. Jacob's Law Dict.
43. The only other term, I think, that was ever used in the English law, in a similar sense, was "freeman;"
as, for instance, "freeman of the realm." But "free subject" was the common term. "Freeman" was more generally
used to denote members of incorporated trading companies, and persons possessing franchises in a city. Besides,
it did not, I think, so generally, if ever, include women and children, as did "free subjects."
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a government established for the security of men's personal freedom. What but a
"free subject,"" or "free person," could such a member of a free state be appro-
priately called?
And when it is considered in what estimation "the liberties of England," "of
Englishmen," and of English subjects everywhere, were held; that they were the
peculiar pride and boast of the nation; the title of "free" is seen to be a perfectly
natural and appropriate one, by which to designate the political rank of those who
were entitled, of right, to the possession and enjoyment of all those liberties, as dis-
tinguished from those not entitled to the same liberties.
After the Declaration of Independence, the word "subject" was no longer an
appropriate name for the people composing our republican States; for "subject"
implied a sovereign; but here the people had themselves become the sovereigns. The
term "subject" was, therefore, generally dropped. It seldom appears in the State con-
stitutions formed after the Declaration of Independence.
But although the term "subject" had been generally dropped, yet, up to the
adoption of the United States constitution, no other single term had been generally
adopted in the several State constitutions, as a substitute for "free subject," to
describe the members of the state, as distinguished from aliens.
The terms people, inhabitants, residents, which were used in most of the State
constitutions, did not mark the difference between native and naturalized members
of the state, and aliens.
The term "freeman" was used in some of the State constitutions; but its meaning
is sometimes indefinite, and sometimes different from what it appears to be in others.
For example. In the then existing Declaration of Rights of the State of Delaware,
(Sec. 6,) it would seem to be applied only to male adults. In the then existing
"constitution and form of government" of Maryland, (Sec. 42,) it would seem to
include only males, but males under as well as over twenty-one years of age. Again,
in the "Declaration of Rights" of the same State, (Sees. 17 and 21,) it would seem to
include men, women, and children. In the "Declaration of Rights" of North Carolina,
(Sees. 8, 9, 12, and 13,) it would seem to include men, women, and children. Again,
in the "constitution or form of government" of the same State, (Sees. 7 and 8,) it
would seem to mean only male persons
The result was, that the precise legal meaning of the word was not sufficiently
settled by usage in this country, nor had the word itself been so generally adopted in
the State constitutions, as to make it either a safe or proper one to be introduced into
the representative clause in the United States constitution. It would also have been
equally objectionable with the words 'free persons," in its liability to be interpreted
as the correlative of slavery.
What term, then, should the United States constitution have adopted to
distinguish the full members of the state from unnaturalized persons? "Free subjects"
was the only term, whose meaning was well settled, and with which the whole people
of the United States had ever been acquainted, as expressing that idea, and no other.
But the word "subject," we have already mentioned, was no longer appropriate. By
1084
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 28
retaining the word "free," which was the significant word, and substituting the word
"persons" for "subjects," the same body of people would be described as had before
been described by the term "free subjects," to wit, all the full members of the state,
the native and naturalized persons, men, women, and children, as distinguished from
persons of foreign birth, not naturalized. What term, then, other than "free persons,"
was there more appropriate to the description of this body of the people?
The word "free," it must be constantly borne in mind, if introduced into the
constitution, would have to be construed with reference to the rest of the instrument,
in which it was found, and of course with reference to the government established
by that instrument. In that connection, it could legally mean nothing else than the
members of the state, as distinguished from others, unless, (as was not the case,)
other things should be introduced into the instrument to give the word a different
meaning.
The word "free," then, was an appropriate word, in itself, and, in its technical
sense, (which was its presumptive sense,) it was precisely the word, to be used in the
constitution, to describe with perfect accuracy all that body of the people, native and
naturalized, who were full members of the state, and entitled, of right, to the full
liberty, or political freedom, secured by the laws, as distinguished from aliens and
persons partially enfranchised. In short, it described, with perfect accuracy, those
who werefree of the government established by the constitution. This was its precise
legal meaning, when construed, as it was bound to be, with reference to the rest of
the instrument; and it was the only meaning that it could have, when thus construed.
A word of this kind was wanted- that is, a word of precisely the same meaning,
which the word free, in its technical sense, bears, with reference to the rest of the
instrument and the government established by it, was wanted-because repre-
sentation and taxation were to be based upon the persons described, and perfect
accuracy of description was therefore all important.
Now, those who object to the term "free persons" being taken in that sense, are
bound to show a better term that might have been used to describe the same class of
persons. I think there is not another word in the language, technical, or otherwise,
that would have described them so accurately, or so appropriately.
The term "freemen," we have seen, would not have been so appropriate, for it
was liable to be taken in a narrower signification, so as to include only male adults,
or persons entitled to the elective franchise. But "free persons" included men,
women, and children, voters and non-voters, who were entitled to protection under
the laws as of right.
"People," "residents," and "inhabitants" would not do, because they included all
persons living in the country, native, naturalized, and aliens.
The only other word, that could have been used, was "citizens. " Perhaps if that
word had been used, the courts, construing it with reference to the rest of the instru-
ment, would have been bound to put the same construction upon it that they were
bound to put upon the words "free persons." Nevertheless, there were decisive ob-
jections against the adoption of it in the representative clause. The word "citizens"
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was not, at that time certainly, (even if it be now,) a word that had acquired any such
definite meaning, either in England, or in this country, as describing the great body
of free and equal members of the state, men, women, and children, as had the word
"free." In fact, it had probably never been used in that sense at all in England; nor in
this country up to the time of the revolution. And it is probable, (as will hereafter be
seen,) that it had never been used in that sense in this country, up to the adoption of
the constitution of the United States, unless in the single constitution of Mas-
sachusetts. Its meaning, in this country, is, to this day, a matter of dispute. Lawyers,
as well as others, differ about it, as will presently be seen.
The word "citizen" is derived from the Latin civis; and its true signification is
to describe one's relations to a city, rather than to a state. It properly describes either
a freeman of a city, or a mere resident, as will be seen by the definitions given in the
note."
44. "CIVIS, a citizen; a freeman or woman; a denizen."-Ainsworth.
"CITIZEN, a freeman of a city; not a foreigner; not a slave,"--Johnson.
"CITIZEN, a freeman of a city."--Bailey.
"CITIZENS (cives) are either freemen, or such as reside and keep afamily in the city, &c., and some are
citizens and freemen, and some are not, who have not so great privileges as the others."--Williams' Law
Dictionary; Cunningham's do.
"CMZEN, a native or inhabitant of a city, vested with the freedom and rights
thereof."--Rees' Cyclopedia.
"Ihe civil government of the city of London is vested by charters and grants from the kings of England, in
its own corporation, or body of citizens."'-- Rees' Cyclopedia.
"CITOYEN, (Fr.) citizen, an inhabitant, or freeman of a city."--Boyer.
"CITIZEN, an inhabitant of a city; one who dwells or inhabits in a city; one who possesses or enjoys certain
privileges of a city; a freeman of a city; one who follows, pursues, or practices the trades or businesses of a city,
as opposed to those who do not."- Richardson.
"Though they are in the world, they are not of it, as a citizen of one city may live another, and yet not be free
of it, nor properly of it, but a mere stranger and a foreigner." Bishop Beveridge, cited by Richardson.
"CITIZEN. 1. The native of a city, or an inhabitant who enjoys the freedom and privileges of the city in which
he resides ; the freeman of a city, as distinguished from a foreigner, or one not entitled to its franchises. * * *
5. In the United States, a person, native or unnaturalized, who has the privilege of exercising the elective
franchise, or the qualifications which enable him to vote for rulers, and to purchase and hold real estate."-
Webster.
"CITIZENS, persons. One who, under the constitution and laws of the United States, has a right to vote for
representatives in congress, and other public officers, and who is qualified to fill offices in the gift of the
people. "--Bouviers(American) Law Dict.
Kent denies that citizenship depends on one's right of suffrage, and says that women and children are citizens.
-2 Kent, 258, note in third edition.
I am not aware that Story anywhere gives a definition of the word citizen, as it is used in the constitution. He
says, that "every citizen of a State is ipso facto a citizen of the United States;" and that "a person who is a
naturalized citizen of the United States, by a like residence in any State in the Union, becomes ipsofacto a citizen
of that State."-- (3 Cor. on Const., p. 565-6.) But this saying that a citizen of a State is a citizen of the United
States, and vice versa, gives us no information as to who is either a citizen of a State, or of the United States, other
than those "naturalized" by act of Congress.
These authorities show that the word citizen has had different meanings, and that its meaning was not, at the
adoption of the constitution, and even now is not, well settled, and therefore that it was not a proper word to be used
in a clause where certainty was so important.
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It will be seen also, by these definitions, that, taking the word in its best sense,
and also with reference to the state, it could, at most, only have been held
synonymous with the "free persons" or "freemen" of the state; and that we should
then have been obliged to employ these latter terms, in their technical senses, in
order to define it.
It would also have been even more liable than the term "free" to the objection of
impliedly excluding slaves; for in Rome, where the term was used, and whence it has
come down to us, they had slaves, who of course were not regarded as citizens; while
in England, whence the term "free" was borrowed, they had no slaves.
The term "free citizen" was also used in the then existing State constitutions of
Georgia and North Carolina, where they held slaves, (though not legally.) If, then,
the word had been employed in the United States constitution, there would have been
at least as much reason to say that it excluded slaves, as there would be for saying
that the word "free" excluded them.
The term "citizen" was objectionable in still another respect, viz., that it seems
to have been previously, as it has been since, employed to define those who enjoyed
the elective franchise. But it would be unreasonable that the constitution should base
representation and taxation upon a distinction between those enjoying the elective
franchise, and "all other persons"-it being left with the States to say who should
enjoy that franchise. Yet, if the constitution had used the word "citizen" in con-
nection with representation and taxation, it might have given some color to that idea.
But to prove how inappropriate would have been the use of the word "citizens,"
in the representative clause-where a word of a precise and universally known
meaning was required-the following facts are sufficient; for we are to look at the
word as people looked at it at that day, and not as we look at it now, when it has
grown into use, and we have become familiar with it.
Of all the State constitutions in existence in 1789, the word citizen was used in
but three, to wit, those of Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Georgia; and in those,
only in the following manner:
In the constitution of Massachusetts it was used some half dozen times, and in
such connections as would indicate that it was used synonymously with the members
of the state.
In the constitution of North Carolina it was used but once, (Sec. 40,) and then the
term 'free citizen," was used; thus indicating either that they had more than one kind
of citizens, or that the word citizen itself was so indefinite that its meaning would be
liable to be unknown to the people, unless the wordfree were used to define it.
In the constitution of Georgia it was used but once, (Art. 11,) and then in the
same manner as in the constitution of North Carolina, that is, with the word free
prefixed to it for the purpose of definition.
It is especially uncertain whether the word citizens would have included women and children, as do the words
"free persons."
1087
1997/The Unconstitutionality of Slavery
In the constitutions of the other ten States, (including the charters of Rhode
Island and Connecticut,) the word citizen was not used at all.
In the Articles of Confederation it was used but once, (Art. 4, Sec. 1,) and then
the term was, as in the constitutions of Georgia and North Carolina, "free citizens."
So that there was but one constitution, (that of Massachusetts,) out of the whole
fourteen then in the country, in which the word citizen could be said to be used with
any definite meaning attached to it. In the three other cases in which it was used, its
own indefiniteness was confessed by the addition of the wordfree, to define it.
A word so indefinite, and so little known to the people, as was the word citizen,
was of course entirely unsuitable to be used in the representative clause for the
purpose of describing the native and naturalized members of the state, men, women
and children, as distinguished from persons not naturalized.
For all these reasons the word citizens was objectionable; while in reference to
slavery, it would seem to have been not one whit better than the words "free
persons."
Finally, the term "free persons" was much more appropriate, in itself, to
designate the members of afree state, of a republican government, than was the word
citizen, which, of itself, implies no necessary relationship to a free state, any more
than to an aristocracy.
What objection was there, then, to the use of the words "free persons," in the
constitution, for describing the members of the state? None whatever, save this, viz.,
the liability of the words to be perverted from that meaning, if those who should
administer the government should be corrupt enough to pervert them. This was the
only objection. In every other view, the words chosen, (as well the words "free
persons" as the words "all other peisons,"45 ) were the best the English language
afforded. They were the most accurate, the most simple, the most appropriate, to
express the true idea on which a classification for purposes of representation and
taxation should be founded.
These words, then, being, in themselves, the best that could be used, could the
North have reasonably objected to their use? No. They could not say to the South,
"We fear you do not understand the legal meaning which the wordfree will bear in
this instrument." For everybody knew that such was the meaning of that word when
used to describe men's relation to the state; and everybody was bound to know, and
every lawyer and judge did actually know, that the word, if used in the manner it is
in the constitution, could legally be construed only with reference to the rest of the
instrument, and consequently could describe only one's relation to the government
established by the instrument; that it was only by violating all legal principles of
interpretation that it could be made to describe any merely personal relation between
man and man, illegal and criminal in itself, and nowhere else recognized by the
instrument, but really denied by its whole purport.
45. [See supra Part III.B.3 and infra Part III.B.5.]
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The legal meaning of the word, then, was undoubted; and that was all the North
could require. They could not require that other language should be introduced for
the special purpose of preventing a fraudulent construction of this word. If it had
been intended to form the constitution on the principle of making everything so plain
that no fraudulent construction could possibly be put upon it, a new language must
have been invented for the purpose; the English is wholly inadequate. Had that object
been attempted, the instrument must have been interminable in length, and vastly
more confused in meaning than it now is. The only practicable way was for the
instrument to declare its object in plain terms in the preamble, as it has done, viz., the
establishment of justice, and the security of liberty, for "the people of the United
States, and their posterity," and then to use the most concise, simple, and appropriate
language in all the specific provisions of the instrument, trusting that it would all be
honestly and legally interpreted, with reference to the ends declared to be in view.
And this rule could no more be departed from in reference to slavery, than in
reference to any other of the many crimes then prevalent.
It would have been only a mean and useless insult to the honest portion of the
South, (if there were any honest ones amongst them,) to have said to the whole
South, (as we virtually should have done if any specific reference to slavery had been
made,) "We fear you do not intend to live up to the legal meaning of this instrument.
We see that you do not even enforce the State constitutions, which you yourselves
establish; and we have suspicions that you will be equally false to this. We will,
therefore, insert a special provision in relation to slavery, which you cannot
misconstrue, if you should desire to do so."
The South would have answered, 'Whatever may be your suspicions of us, you
must treat with us, if at all, on the presumption that we are honorable men. It is an
insult to us for you to propose to treat with us on any other ground. If you dare not
trust us, why offer to unite with us on any terms? If you dare trust us, why ask the
insertion of specifications implying your distrust? We certainly can agree to no
instrument that contains any imputations upon our own integrity. We cannot rea-
sonably be asked to defame ourselves."
Such would have been the short and decisive answer of the South, as of any other
community. And the answer would have been as just, as it would be decisive.
All, then, that the North could ask of the South was to agree to an honest
instrument, that should "be the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution
or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding," and that all State, as well as
national officers, executive, legislative, and judicial, should swear to support it. This
the South were ready to do, some probably in good faith, others in bad faith. But no
compact could be formed except upon the presumption that all were acting in good
faith, whatever reason they may have had to suspect the contrary on the part of
particular portions of the country, or with reference to particular portions of the
instrument. And it would have been as foolish as useless to have suggested the idea
of especial guards against fraudulent constructions in particular cases.
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It was a great point gained for liberty, to get the consent of the whole country to
a constitution that was honest in itself, however little prospect there might be that it
would be speedily enforced in every particular. An instrument, honest in itself, saved
the character and conscience of the nation. It also gave into the hands of the true
friends of liberty a weapon sure to be sufficient for their purposes, whenever they
should acquire the numbers necessary to wield it to that end.
[5.] "All Other Persons."
IT has been already shown,4 that there was a sufficient, and even a necessary
reason for the use of the words "all other persons," in preference to the word
'aliens."
That reason was, that the word "alien" had a technical meaning, implying
exclusion from office, exclusion from suffrage, and exclusion from the right to hold
real estate; whereas, the constitution intended no exclusion whatever, except simply
from the three offices of president, senator, and representative. The word "aliens,"
then, would have been a false word of itself, and would also have furnished ground
for many mischievous and unfliendly implications and prejudices against the parties
concerned.
If, then, only this single class of persons had been intended, there was ample
reason for the use of the words, "all other persons;" while, on the slave hypothesis-
that is, on the hypothesis that the words include only slaves, as they are generally
supposed to do- no reason at all can be assigned for the use of these words, instead
of the word slave, except such a reason as we are not at liberty to attribute to a law
or constitution, if by any other reasonable construction it can be avoided.
But whether the words "all other persons" include slaves, or unnaturalized
persons, there was still another reason for the use of the words, "all other persons,"
in preference either to the word slaves, or the word aliens. That reason was, that the
three fifths class was to include more than one kind of persons, whether that one kind
were slaves or unnaturalized persons. "Indians not taxed" were to be included in the
same count, and, therefore, neither the word slaves, nor the word aliens, would have
correctly described all the persons intended.
So far as I am aware, all those who hold slavery to be constitutional, have
believed that "Indians not taxed" were excluded both from the count of units, and the
three fifths count; that the words "all other persons" refer solely to slaves; and that
those words were used solely to avoid the mention of slaves, of which the people
were ashamed. They have believed these facts just as firmly as they have believed
that slavery was constitutional.
I shall attempt to prove that "Indians not taxed," instead of being excluded from
both counts, were included in the three fifths class, and, consequently, that the words
46. [See supra Part m.B.3.]
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"all other persons" were perfectly legitimate to express the two kinds of persons, of
which that class were to be composed. If this proof be made, it will furnish another
instance in which those who hold slavery to be constitutional, have made false law,
by reason of their abandoning legal rules of interpretation, and construing everything
in the light of their assumed insight into certain knavish intentions that are nowhere
expressed.
The clause reads as follows:--
"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this union, according to their respective numbers,
which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, (including
those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed,) three
fifths of all other persons."
The question arising on this clause is, whether there be any class made by it,
except the class of units, and the threefifths class? Or whether there be three classes,
to wit, the class of units, the three fifths class, and another class, "Indians not taxed,"
who are not to be counted at all?
To state the question is nearly enough to answer it, for it is absurd to suppose
there is any class of "the people of the United States" who are not to be counted at
all. "Indians not taxed," (that is, not taxed directly, for all Indians are taxed
indirectly,) are as much citizens of the United States as any other persons, and they
certainly are not to be unnecessarily excluded from the basis of representation and
taxation.47
It would seem to be grammatically plain that the words "all other persons"
include all except those counted as units. And it would probably have always been
plain that such was their meaning, but for the desire of some persons to make them
include slaves, and their belief that, in order to make them include slaves, they must
make them include nobody but slaves.
47. In saying that Indians were "citizens of the United States," I of course mean those living under the actual
jurisdiction of the United States, and not those who, though living within the chartered limits of the States, had
never had the State or United States jurisdiction extended over them; but by treaty, as well as of right, retained their
independence, and were governed by their own usages and laws.
It may be necessary for the information of some persons to state that the jurisdictions of the several States
have not always been coextensive with their chartered limits. The latter were fixed by the charters granted by the
crown, and had reference only to the boundaries of the respective colonies, as against each other. But the rights
of the colonies, (and subsequently of the States,) within their chartered limits, were subject to the Indian right of
soil, or occupancy, except so far as that right should be extinguished by the consent of the Indians. So long as the
Indians should choose to retain their right of soil, or occupancy, and their independence, and separate government,
our governments had no jurisdiction over them, and they were not citizens of the United States. But when they
surrendered their right of soil, or occupancy, abandoned their separate government, and came within our
jurisdiction, or the States and the United States extended their jurisdiction over them, they became citizens of the
United States, equally with any other persons. At the adoption of the constitution, there were several independent
tribes within the chartered limits of the States. Others had surrendered their independent existence, and intermingled
with the whites.
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The words "including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding
Indians not taxed, " are parenthetical," and might have been left out, without altering
the sense of the main sentence, or diminishing the number of classes. They are
thrown in, not to increase the number of classes, but simply to define who may, and
who may not, be included in thefirst class, the class of units.
This is proved, not only by the fact, that the words are parenthetical, (which
would alone be ample proof,) but also by the fact that the two participles, "including"
and "excluding," are connected with each other by the conjunction "and," and are
both parsed in the same manner, both having relation to the "number" counted as
units, and to that alone.
The words, "excluding Indians not taxed, " exclude the Indians mentioned simply
from the count of the preceding "number," the number to which the word
"excluding" relates; that is, the count of units. They do nothing more. They do not
exclude them from any other count; they do not create, or at all purport to create, out
of them a distinct class. They do not at all imply that they are not to be counted at all.
They do not, of themselves, indicate whether these Indians, that are excluded from
the count of units, are, or are not, to be included in, or excluded from, any other
count. They simply exclude them from thefirst count, leaving them to be disposed of
as they may be, by the rest of the clause.
To make this point more evident, let us write the clause again, supplying two
words that are necessary to make the sense more clear.
"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this union, according to their respective numbers,
which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, (including
therein those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding therefrom Indians
not taxed,) three fifths of all other persons."
Such is plainly the true grammatical construction of the sentence; and the
phrases, "including therein," and "excluding therefrom," both plainly relate to one
and the same number or count, to wit, the number counted as units, and to that only.
Grammatically, one of these phrases has no more to do with the class of "all other
persons," than the other.
On grammatical grounds there would be just as much reason in saying that the
word "including" includes servants in the class of "all other persons," as there is in
saying that the word "excluding" excludes Indians from that class; for it is perfectly
apparent, thht the words including and excluding refer only to one and the same
number, and that number is the number counted as units.
To illustrate this point further, let us suppose these parenthetical sentences to
have been transposed, and the clause to have read thus:
48. I have inclosed them in parenthesis to show the sense more distinctly.
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"By adding to the whole number of free persons, (excluding therefrom Indians
not taxed, and including therein those bound to service for a term of years,) three
fifths of all other persons."
It is plain that the sense of the clause would not have been in the least altered by
this transposition. Yet would anybody then have supposed that Indians were excluded
from the class of "all other persons?" Or that "those bound to service for a term of
years" were included in the class of "all other persons?" Certainly not. Everybody
would then have seen that the words including and excluding both related only to the
preceding number-the number counted as units. Yet it is evident that this trans-
position has not at all altered the grammatical construction or the legal sense of the
clause.
The argument for slavery, while it claims that the word including includes
servants in the number of units only, claims that the word excluding excludes Indians
both from the number of units, and also from the number of "all other persons;" that
the word including includes servants in only one count, but that the word excluding
excludes Indians from both counts; whereas it is perfectly manifest that the two
words, including and excluding, relate to one and the same count, to wit, the count
of units, and to that alone.
There would be just as much reason, on grammatical grounds in saying that the
word including includes servants in both counts, as there is in saying that the word
excluding excludes Indians from both counts.
Inasmuch, then, as the words of the parenthesis, viz., the words "including those
bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed," refer only to
the count of units, and serve only to define those who may, and those who may not,
be included in that count, they do not, and cannot, create any new class, additional
to the two named exteriorly to the parenthesis, to wit, the class of units, and the three
fifths class.
There being, then, but two classes made, and "Indians not taxed," being specially
excluded from the first, are necessarily included in the last.
Both the grammar and the law of the clause, (though perhaps not its rhetoric,)
would therefore be adequately provided for, even if there were no other persons than
"Indians not taxed" to be reckoned in the class of "all other persons;" for "Indians
not taxed" are "other persons" than those counted as units. And we cannot, I think,
make these words, "all other persons," imply the existence of slaves, if we can find
any other persons than slaves for them to refer to.
Further. There being but two classes made, to wit, the class of units and the three
fifths class, and "Indians not taxed" being excluded from the first, and therefore
necessarily included in the last, it would follow,, if the constitution uses the word
"free" as the correlative of slaves, that it either considers these Indians as slaves, or
that, for purposes of representation and taxation, it counts them in the same class
with slaves-a thing that, so far as I know has never been done.
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But perhaps it will still be said by the advocates of slavery, (for this is all they
can say,) that "Indians not taxed" are not to be counted at all; that they are to be
excluded from both classes.
But this is, if possible, making their case still worse. It shows how, in order to
extricate themselves from one dilemma, they are obliged to involve themselves in
another-that of excluding entirely from the popular basis of representation and
taxation, a part of those who are not only not slaves, but are confessedly actual
citizens.
To say that "Indians not taxed" are not to be counted at all; that they are to be
excluded both from the class of units and the three fifths class, is not only violating
the grammar of the clause, (as has already been shown,) but it is violating all
common sense. Indians living under the governments of the States and the United
States-that is, within the territory over which the United States and one of the
several States have actually extended their civil jurisdiction- are as much citizens
of the United States as anybody else; and there is no more authority given in the
constitution for excluding them from the basis of representation and taxation, than
there is for excluding any other persons whatever. In fact, the language of the consti-
tution is express, that all persons shall be counted either in the class of units or in the
three fifths class; and there is no escape from the mandate. The only exclusion that
the constitution authorizes, is the exclusion of "Indians not taxed" from the count of
units.
But perhaps it will be claimed that Indians are not citizens, and therefore they are
excluded of course. But there is not the least authority for this assertion, unless it be
in regard to those tribes, or nations, who, living within the chartered limits of the
States, have, nevertheless, retained their separate independence, usages, and laws,
and over whom the States have not extended their civil jurisdiction. The assertion is
wholly groundless as to all those Indians who have abandoned their nationality,
intermingled with the whites, and over whom the States have extended their
jurisdiction. Such persons were as much a part of the people of the United States, and
were as much made citizens by the constitution, as any other portion of the people
of the country.
This exception of "Indians not taxed" from the count of units, of itself implies
that Indians are citizens; for it implies that, but for this express exception, they would
all have been counted as units.
Again. This exception cannot be extended beyond the letter of it. It therefore
applies only to those "not taxed;" and it excludes even those only from the count of
units; thus leaving all that are taxed to be counted as units; which of course implies
that they are citizens. And if those Indians, who are taxed, are citizens, those who are
"not taxed" are equally citizens. Citizenship does not depend at all upon taxation, in
the case of the Indian, any more than in the case of the white man; if it did, a man
would be a citizen this year, if he happened to be taxed this year, and yet lose his
citizenship next year, if he should happen not to be taxed next year.
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But it will be asked, If Indians are citizens, why are they not all counted as units?
The reason is obvious. The numbers of Indians in the different States were so
unequal, and they contributed so little to the resources of the States in which they
lived, that justice required that, in apportioning representation and taxation among
the separate States, some discrimination should be made on account of this class of
population. Being citizens, they must be represented; and being represented, their
State must be taxed for them. And no better arrangement could be agreed on, without
making too many classes, than that of ranking them, (so far as representation and
taxation were concerned,) on an equality with unnaturalized persons.
It being established that Indians are citizens, it follows that those "not taxed"
must be included in the basis of representation and taxation, unless expressly
excluded. But the express exclusion does no more than exclude them from the count
of units, and the exclusion cannot go beyond the letter. They are therefore necessarily
included in the three fifths class, the class which embraces "all other persons" than
those counted as units.
If "Indians not taxed" were also to be excluded from the three fifths class, the
constitution would have said so; and would also have told us expressly how they
should be counted, or that they should not be counted at all.
The clause has thus been explained on the ground of there being but two classes
made by it, to wit, the class counted as units, and the three fifths class; which are all
the classes that the grammar of the clause will allow to be made. It is to be remarked,
however, that if the grammar of the clause be disregarded, and three classes be made,
the clause will still be consistent with the alien hypothesis. Indeed, it is immaterial,
on the alien hypothesis, whether two or three classes be made. Whether the slave hy-
pothesis can be sustained without making more than two classes, I leave for the
advocates of slavery to determine.49 They will, at any rate, be obliged to admit that
"Indians not taxed" are included in the class described as "all other persons," and
thus lose the benefit of their stereotyped argument, that those words must mean
slaves, because they could mean nothing else. They will also be obliged to give up
their old surmise about the motive for using the words "all other persons"- a
surmise which has always, (in their opinion,) wonderfully strengthened their law,
although it seems to have contained not a particle of fact.50
49. I think it cannot be sustained without making three classes, for the reason before given, viz., that the
words "all other persons" must not be held to mean slaves, if there be any other persons that they can apply to.
50. The following illustration will make it perfectly apparent that the representative clause of the constitution
requires all the people of the country, ("Indians not taxed," as well as others), to be counted in making up the basis
of representation and taxation; that it requires and permits them to be divided into two classes only, viz., the class
of units, and the three-fifths class; and, finally, that it imperatively requires that "Indians not taxed" be included
in the three-fifths class, or class described as "all other persons."
The illustration is this. Suppose Congress were to order a census of the people, for the purpose of making a
constitutional apportionment of representation and taxation, and should require that the several classes of persons
be arranged in separate columns, each under its appropriate head, according to the terms used in the constitution.
The table would stand thus:
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[6.] Additional Arguments on the Word "Free."
[(a)] THE constitutional argument for slavery rests mainly, if not wholly, upon the
wordfree, in the representative clause; (Art. Sec. 2.)
Yet this clause does not, of itself, at all purport to fix, change or in any way
affect, the civil rights pr relations of any single individual. It takes it for granted that
those rights ahd relations are fixed, as they really are, by other parts of the
instrument. It purports only to prescribe the manner in which the population shall be
counted, in making up the basis of representation and taxation; and to prescribe that
representation and taxation shall be apportioned among the several States, according
to the basis so made up. This is the whole purport of the language of the clause, and
the whole of its apparent object; and it is a palpable violation of all legal rules to
strain its legal operation beyond this purpose. To use the clause for a purpose
nowhere avowed, either in itself or the rest of the instrument, viz., that of destroying
rights with which it does not at all purport to intermeddle, is carrying fraudulent and
illegal interpretation to its last extent.
Yet this provision for simply counting the population of the country, and
apportioning representation and taxation according to that count, has been trans-
muted, by unnecessary interpretation, into a provision denying all civil rights under
the constitution to a part of the very "people" who are declared by the constitution
itself to have "ordained and established" the instrument, and who, of course, are
equal parties to it with others, and have equal rights in it, and in all the privileges and
immunities it secures.
If parties, answering to the several descriptions given of them in this clause, can
be found, (so as simply to be counted,) without supposing any change or destruction
of individual rights, as established by other parts of the instrument, we are bound
thus to find and count them, without prejudice to any of their rights. This is a self-
evident proposition. That parties, answering to the several descriptions, can be found,
without supposing any change or destruction of individual rights, as contemplated
CLASS OF UNITS THREE-FIFrHS CLASS
'The whole number of free persons, including those "All other persons."
bound to service for a terms of years, and excluding
Indians not taxed."
This table follows the directions of the constitution, to the letter. And yet, it clearly makes but two classes;
and the two classes clearly include all the people of the United States. The word "excluding" clearly excludes
"Indians not taxed" only from the first class. The second class also clearly includes all that are excluded from the
first. It, therefore, clearly includes "Indians not taxed."
These facts entirely overthrow the argument that "all other persons" must mean slaves, because there were
no other persons whom they could mean.
It is of no importance to say that "Indians not taxed" have never been included in the three-fifths count. The
answer is, There is theplain letter of the constitution; and if Congress have not complied with it, it has been owing
either to their ignorance, or their corruption.
1096
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 28
by the other parts of the instrument to exist, has already been shown. And this fact
is enough to settle the question as to the legal effect of the clause.
The whole declared and apparent object of the clause, viz., the counting of the
population, and the apportionment of the representation and taxation according to
that count, can be effected without prejudice to the rights of a single individual, as
established by the rest of the instrument. This being the case, there is no epithet
strong enough to describe the true character of that fraud which would pervert the
clause to a purpose so entirely foreign to its declared and apparent object, as that of
licensing the denial and destruction of men's rights; rights everywhere implied
throughout the entire instrument.
[(b)] It would have been absurd to have used the word 'free" in a sense correlative
with slaves, because it is a self-evident truth that, taking the word in that sense, all
men are naturally and rightfully free. This truth, like all other natural truths, must be
presumed to be taken for granted by all people, in forming their constitutions, unless
they plainly deny it. Written constitutions of government could not be established at
all, unless they took for granted all natural truths that were not plainly denied;
because, the natural truths that must be acted upon in the administration of
government are so numerous, that it would be impossible to enumerate them. They
must, therefore, all be taken for granted unless particular ones be plainly denied.
Furthermore, this particular truth, that all men are naturally free, had but recently
been acknowledged, and proclaimed even, by the same people who now established
the constitution. For this people, under such circumstances, to describe themselves,
in their constitution, as "the whole number of free persons, and three fifths of all
other persons," (taking the word "free" in the sense correlative with slaves,) would
have been as absurd, in itself, (independently of things exterior to the constitution,
and which the constitution certainly cannot be presumed to sanction,) as it would
have been to have described themselves as "the whole number of males and females,
and three fifths of all other persons."
Such an absurdity is not to be charged upon a people, upon the strength of a
single word, which admits of a rational and appropriate construction.
[(c)] The constitution is to be construed in consistency with the Declaration of
Independence, if possible, because the two instruments are the two great enactments
of the same legislators- the people. They purport to have the same objects in view,
viz., the security of their liberties. The Declaration had never been repealed, and legal
rules require that an enactment later in time than another, more especially if the
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former one be not repealed, should be construed in consistency with the earlier one,
if it reasonably can be, unless the earlier one be opposed to reason or justice.5 '
[(d)] It is perfectly manifest, from all the evidence given in the preceding pages,
(including Part First of the argument,52) that the word "free," when used in laws and
constitutions, to describe one class of persons, as distinguished from another living
under the same laws or constitutions, is not sufficient, of itself, to imply slavery as
its correlative. The word itself is wholly indefinite, as to the kind of restraint implied
as its correlative." And as slavery is the worst, it is necessarily the last, kind of
restraint which the law will imply. There must be some other word, or provision, in
the instrument itself, to warrant such an implication against the other class. But the
constitution contains no such other word or provision. It contains nothing but the
simple word "free." While, on the other hand, it is full of words and provisions,
perfectly explicit, that imply the opposite of slavery.
Under such circumstances, there can be no question which construction we are
legally bound to put upon the word in the constitution. 4
[(e)] Even if the word "free" were taken in the sense correlative with slaves, and
if the words "importation of persons" were taken to authorize the importation of
slaves, slavery would, nevertheless,for the most part, be now unconstitutional. The
51. Lord Mansfield says, "Where there are different statutes in parimateria, (upon the same subject,) though
made at different times, or even expired, and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together,
as one system, and explanatory of each other."--] Burrows, 447.
It is an established rule of construction, that statutes in pari materia, or upon the same subject, must be
construed with reference to each other, that is, that what is clear in one statute, shall be called in aid to explain what
is obscure and ambiguous in another."'-l Blackstone, 60, note; I Kent, 462.
Rutherforth says, "In doubtful matters it is reasonable to presume that the same person is always in the same
mind, when nothing appears to the contrary that whatever was his design at one time, the same is likewise his
design at another time, where no sufficient reason can be produced to prove an alteration of it. If the words,
therefore, of any writing, will admit of two or more different senses, when they are considered separately, but must
necessarily be understood in one of these senses rather than the other, in order to make the writer's meaning agree
with what he has spoken or written upon some other occasion, the reasonable presumption is, that this must be the
sense in which he used them."-- Rutherforth, B. 2, ch. 7, p. 331-2.
52. [Omitted from this excerpt-RB.]
53. See page [10511.
54. 1 doubt if a single instance can be found, even in the statutes of the slaveholding States themselves, in
force in 1789, where the word free was used, (as the slave argument claims that it was used in the constitution,) to
describe either white persons, or the mass of the people other than slaves, (that is, the white and free colored,) as
distinguished from the slaves, unless the statute also contained the word slave, or some other evidence, beside the
wordfree itself, that that was the sense in which the word free was used. If there were no such statute, it proves that,
by the usage of legislation, in 1789, even in the slaveholding States themselves, the wordfree was insufficient, of
itself to imply slavery as its correlative.
I have not thought it necessary to verify this supposition, by an examination of the statute books of the States,
because the labor would be considerable, and the fact is not necessary to my case. But if the fact be as I have
supposed, it takes away the last shadow of pretence, founded on the usage of legislation at that day, that such was
the sense in which the wordfree was used in the constitution. I commend !o the advocates of slavery, (on whom
rests the burthen of proving the meaning of the word,) the task of verifying or disproving the supposition.
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constitution would then sanction the slavery of only those individuals who were
slaves at the adoption of the constitution, and those who were imported as slaves. It
would give no authority whatever for the enslavement of any born in the country,
after the adoption of the constitution.
The constitution is the supreme law of the land, and it operates "directly on the
people and for their benefit."55 No State laws or constitutions can stand between it
and the people, to ward off its benefits from them. Of course, it operates upon all the
people, except those, if any, whom it has itself specially excepted from its operation.
If it have excepted any from its operation, it has, at most, excepted only those
particular individuals who were slaves at the adoption of the constitution, and those
who should subsequently be imported as slaves. It has nowhere excepted any that
should thereafter be born in the country. It has nowhere authorized Congress to pass
laws excepting any who should be born in the country. It has nowhere authorized the
States, or recognized the right of the States, to except from its operation any persons
born in the country after its adoption. It has expressly prohibited the States from
making any such exception; for it has said that itself "shall be the supreme law of the
land," (operating "directly on the people, and for their benefit," the Supreme Court
say,) "anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwith-
standing." If the States can say, previous to any one person's being born under the
constitution, that, when born, the constitution shall not operate upon that person, or
for his benefit, they may say in advance that it shall not operate upon, or for the
benefit of, any person whatever who may be born under the constitution, and thus
compel the United States government to die out, or fall into the hands of the
naturalized citizens alone, for the want of any recruits from those born in the country.
If, then, the slavery of those who were slaves at the adoption of the constitution,
and of those who have since been imported as slaves, were constitutional, the slavery
of all born in the country since the adoption of the constitution, is, nevertheless,
unconstitutional. 6
[C. The Importation Clause.57]
The other clause relied on as a recognition and sanction, both of slavery and the
slave trade, is the following:
"The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year
one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such
importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person."--(Art. 1, Sec. 9.)
55. The Sup. Court United States say, of"the government of the Union," that "its powers are granted by the
people, and are to be exercised directly on them," (that is, upon them as individuals,) "andfor their benefit. ".- 4
Wheaton, 404,405.
56. See Chap. 13. [omitted from this excerpt].
57. [This section was moved here from an omitted portion of the text.-RB.]
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The slave argument, drawn from this clause, is, that the word "importation"
applies only to property, and that it therefore implies, in this clause, that the persons
to be imported are necessarily to be imported as property-that is, as slaves.
But the idea that the word "importation" applies only to property, is erroneous.
It applies correctly both to persons and things. The definition of the verb "import"
is simply "to bring from a foreign country, or jurisdiction, or from another State, into
one's own country, jurisdiction or State." When we speak of "importing" things, it
is true that we mentally associate with them the idea of property. But that is simply
because things are property, and not because the word "import" has any control, in
that particular, over the character of the things imported. When we speak of im-
porting "persons," we do not associate with them the idea of property, simply
because "persons" are not property.
We speak daily of the "importation of foreigners into the country;" but no one
infers therefrom that they are brought in as slaves, but as passengers. A vessel
imports, or brings in, five hundred passengers. Every vessel, or master of a vessel
that "brings in" passengers, "imports" them. But such passengers are not therefore
slaves. A man imports his wife and children-but they are not therefore his slaves,
or capable of being owned or sold as his property. A man imports a gang of laborers,
to clear lands, cut canals, or construct railroads; but not therefore to be held as slaves.
An innocent meaning must be given to the word, if it will bear one. Such is the legal
rule.
Even the popular understanding of the word "import," when applied to
"persons," does not convey the idea of property. It is only when it is applied
distinctly to "slaves," that any such idea is conveyed; and then it is the word "slaves,"
and not the word "import," that suggests the idea of property. Even slave traders and
slave holders attach no such meaning to the word "import," when it is connected with
the word "persons;" but only when it is connected with the word "slaves."
In the case of Ogden vs. Saunders, (12 Wheaton, 332,) Chief Justice Marshall
said, that in construing the constitution, "the intention of the instrument must prevail;
that this intention must be collected from its words; that its words are to be
understood in that sense in which they are generally used by those for whom the
instrument was intended." On this principle of construction, there is not the least
authority for saying that this provision for "the importation of persons," authorized
the importation of them as slaves. To give it this meaning, requires the same
stretching of words towards the wrong, that is applied, by the advocates of slavery,
to the words "service or labor," and the words "free" and "all other persons."
Another reason, which makes it necessary that this construction should be placed
upon the word "importation," is, that the clause contains no other word that des-
cribes the immigration of foreigners. Yet that the clause related to the immigration
of foreigners generally, and that it restrained Congress, (up to the year 1808,) from
prohibiting the immigration of foreigners generally, there can be no doubt.
The object, and the only legal object, of the clause was to restrain Congress from
so exercising their "power of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among
1100
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 28
the several States, and with the Indian tribes"--(which power has been decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States, to include a power over navigation and the
transportation of passengers in boats and vessels 5 )- as to obstruct the introduction
of new population into such of the States as were desirous of increasing their
population in that manner. The clause does not imply at all, that the population,
which the States were thus to "admit," was to be a slave population.
The word "importation," (I repeat,) is the only word in the clause, that applies
to persons that were to come into the country from foreign nations. The word
"migration" applies only to those who were to go out from one of our own States or
Territories into another. "Migration" is the act of going out from a state or country;
and differs from immigration in this, that immigration is the act of coming into a state
or country. It is obvious, therefore, that the "migration," which Congress are here
forbidden to prohibit, is simply the going out of persons from one of our own States
or Territories into another-(for that is the only "migration" that could come within
the jurisdiction of Congress)-and that it has no reference to persons coming in from
foreign countries to our own.
If, then, "migration," as here used, has reference only to persons going out from
one State into another, the word "importation" is the only one in the clause that is
applicable to foreigners coming into our country. This word "importation," then,
being the only word that can apply to persons coming into the country, it must be
considered as substantially synonymous with immigration, and must apply equally
to all "persons," that are "imported," or brought into the country as passengers. And
if it applies equally to all persons, that are brought in as passengers, it does not imply
that any of those persons are slaves; for no one will pretend that this clause ever
authorized the State governments to treat as slaves all persons that were brought into
the country as passengers. And if it did not authorize them to treat all such pas-
sengers as slaves, it did not authorize them to treat any of them as such; for it makes
no discrimination between the different "persons" that should be thus imported.
Again. The argument, that the allowance of the "importation" of "persons,"
implies the allowance of property in such persons, would imply a recognition of the
validity of the slave laws of other countries; for unless slaves were obtained by valid
purchase abroad-which purchase implies the existence and validity of foreign slave
laws-the importer certainly could not claim to import his slaves as property; but he
would appear at the custom-house as a mere pirate, claiming to have his captures
legalized. So that, according to the slave argument, the simple use of the word
"importation," in the constitution, as applied to "persons," bound our government,
not only to the sanction and toleration of slavery in our own country, but to the
recognition of the validity of the slave laws of other countries.
But further. The allowance of the "importation" of slaves, as such, under this
clause of the constitution, would imply that Congress must take actual, and even the
58. Gibbons vs. Ogden.-(9 Wheaton, 1.)
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most critical cognizance of the slave laws of other countries; and that they should
allow neither the mere word of the person calling himself the owner, nor anything
short of the fullest and clearest legal proof, according to the laws of those countries,
to be sufficient to enable him to enter his slaves, as property, at the custom-house;
otherwise any masters of vessels, from England or France, as well as from Africa,
might, on their arrival here, claim their passengers as slaves. Did the constitution, in
this clause, by simply using the word "importation," instead of immigration, intend
to throw upon the national government-at the hazard of making it a party to the
illegal enslavement of human beings-the responsibility of investigating and
deciding upon the legality and credibility of all the evidence that might be offered by
the piratical masters of slave ships, to prove their valid purchase of, and their right
of property in, their human cargoes, according to the slave laws of the countries from
which they should bring them? Such must have been the intention of the constitution,
if it intended (as it must, if it intended anything of this kind) that the fact of
"importation" under the commercial regulations of Congress, should be thereafter a
sufficient authority for holding in slavery the persons imported.
But perhaps it will be said that it was not the intention of the constitution, that
Congress should take any responsibility at all in the matter; that it was merely
intended that whoever came into the country with a cargo of men, whom he called
his slaves, should be permitted to bring them in on his own responsibility, and sell
them as slaves for life to our people; and that Congress were prohibited only from
interfering, or asking any questions as to how he obtained them, or how they became
his slaves. Suppose such were the intention of the constitution-what follows? Why,
that the national government, the only government that was to be known to foreign
nations, the only government that was to be permitted to regulate our commerce or
make treaties with foreign nations, the government on whom alone was to rest the
responsibility of war with foreign nations, was bound to permit (until 1808) all
masters, both of our own ships and of the ships of other nations, to turn pirates, and
make slaves of their passengers, whether Englishmen, Frenchmen, or any other
civilized people, (for the constitution makes no distinction of "persons" on this
point,) bring them into this country, sell them as slaves for life to our people, and
thus make our country a rendezvous and harbor for pirates, involve us inevitably in
war with every civilized nation in the world, cause ourselves to be outlawed as a
people, and bring certain and swift destruction upon the whole nation; and yet this
government, that had the sole responsibility of all our foreign relations, was
constitutionally prohibited from interfering in the matter, or from doing anything but
lifting its hands in prayer to God and these pirates, that the former would so far
depart, and the latter so far desist from their usual courses, as might be necessary to
save us until 1808, (after which time we would take the matter into our own hands,
and, by prohibiting the cause of the danger, save ourselves,) from the just vengeance,
which the rest of mankind were taking upon us.
This is the kind of constitution, under which (according to the slave argument)
we lived until 1808.
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But is such the real character of the constitution? By it, did we thus really avow
to the world that we were a nation of pirates ? that our territory should be a harbor
for pirates? that our people were constitutionally licensed to enslave the people of all
other nations, without discrimination, (for the instrument makes no discrimination,)
whom they could either kidnap in their own countries, or capture on the high seas?
and that we had even prohibited our only government that could make treaties with
foreign nations, from making any treaty, until 1808, with any particular nation, to
exempt the people of that nation from their liability to be enslaved by the people of
our own? The slave argument says that we did avow all this. If we really did, perhaps
all that can be said of it now is, that it is very fortunate for us that other nations did
not take us at our word. For if they had taken us at our word, we should, before 1808,
have been among the nations that were.
Suppose that, on the organization of our government, we had been charged by
foreign nations with having established a piratical government- how could we have
rebutted the charge otherwise than by denying that the words "importation of per-
sons" legally implied that the persons imported were slaves? Suppose that European
ambassadors had represented to' President Washington that their governments
considered our constitution as licensing our people to kidnap the people of other
nations, without discrimination, and bring them to the United States as slaves. Would
he not have denied that the legal meaning of the clause did anything more than secure
the free introduction of foreigners as passengers and freemen? Or would he-he, the
world-renowned champion of human rights-have indeed stooped to the acknow-
ledgment that in truth he was the head of a nation of pirates, whose constitution did
guaranty the freedom of kidnaping men abroad, and importing them as slaves? And
would he, in the event of this acknowledgment, have sought to avert the destruction,
which such an avowal would be likely to bring upon the nation, by pleading that,
although such was the legal meaning of the words of our constitution, we yet had an
understanding, (an honorable understanding!) among ourselves, that we would not
take advantage of the license to kidnap or make slaves of any of the citizens of those
civilized and powerful nations of Europe, that kept ships of war, and knew the use
of gunpowder and cannon; but only the people of poor, weak, barbarous and ignorant
nations, who were incapable of resistance and retaliation?
Again. Even the allowance of the simple importation of slaves-(and that is the
most that is literally provided for-and the word "importation" must be construed
to the letter,) would not, of itself, give any authority for the continuance of slavery
after "importation." If a man bring either property or persons into this country, he
brings them in to abide the constitutional laws of the country; and not to be held
according to the customs of the country from which they were brought. Were it not
so, the Turk might import a harem of Georgian slaves, and, at his option, either hold
them as his own property, or sell them as slaves to our own people, in defiance of
any principles of freedom that should prevail amongst us. To allow this kind of
"importation," would be to allow not merely the importation of foreign "persons,"
but also foreign laws to take precedence of our own.
1103
1997 /The Unconstitutionality of Slavery
Finally. The conclusion, that Congress were restrained, by this clause, only from
prohibiting the immigration of a foreign population, and not from prohibiting the
importation of slaves, to be held as slaves after their importation-is the more
inevitable from the fact that the power given to Congress of naturalizing foreigners,
is entirely unlimited-except that their laws must be uniform throughout the United
States. They have perfect power to pass laws that shall naturalize every foreigner
without distinction, the moment he sets foot on our soil. And they had this power as
perfectly prior to 1808, as since. And it is a power entirely inconsistent with the idea
that they were bound to admit, and forever after to acknowledge as slaves, all or any
who might be attempted to be brought into the country as such.59]
[V.] POWER OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT OVER SLAVERY
IT is a common assertion that the general government has no power over slavery
in the States. If by this be meant that the States may reduce to slavery the citizens of
the United States within their limits, and the general government cannot liberate
them, the doctrine is nullification, and goes to the destruction of the United States
government within the limits of each State, whenever such State shall choose to
destroy it.
The pith of the doctrine of nullification is this, viz., that a State has a right to
interpose between her people and the United States government, deprive them of its
benefits, protection, and laws, and annul their allegiance to it.
If a State have this power, she can of course abolish the government of the
United States at pleasure, so far as its operation within her own territory is
concerned; for the government of the United States is nothing, any further than, it
operates upon the persons, property, and rights of the people. If the States can
arbitrarily intercept this operation, can interpose between the people and the govern-
ment and laws of the United States, they can of course abolish that government. And
the United States constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, instead of
being "the supreme law of the land," "anything in the constitution or laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding," are dependent entirely upon the will of the
State governments for permission to be laws at all.
A State law reducing a man to slavery, would, if valid, interpose between him
and the constitution and laws of the United States annul their operation, (so far as he
is concerned,) and deprive him of their benefits. It would annul his allegiance to the
59. Since the publication of the first edition, it has been asked whether the "tax or duty" authorized by the
clause, does not imply that the persons imported are property? The answer is this. "A tax or duty" on persons is a
poll tax; and a poll tax is a tax or duty on persons-nothing more-nothing less. A poll tax conveys no implication
that the persons, on whom the tax is levied, are property- otherwise all of us, on whom a poll tax has ever been
levied, were deemed by the law to be property-and if property, slaves. A poll tax on immigrants no more implies
that they are slaves, than a poll tax on natives implies that the latter are slaves.
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United States; for a slave can owe no allegiance to a government that either will not,
or cannot protect him.
If a State can do this in the case of one man, she can do it in the case of any
number of men, and thus completely abolish the general government within her
limits.
But perhaps it will be said that a State has no right to reduce to slavery the people
generally within her limits, but only to hold in slavery those who were slaves at the
adoption of the constitution, and their posterity.
One answer to this argument is, that, at the adoption of the constitution of the
United States, there was no legal or constitutional slavery in the States. Not a single
State constitution then in existence, recognized, authorized, or sanctioned slavery.o
All the slaveholding then practised was merely a private crime committed by one
person against another, like theft, robbery, or murder. All the statutes which the
slaveholders, through their wealth and influence, procured to be passed, were uncon-
stitutional and void, for the want of any constitutional authority in the legislatures to
enact them.
But perhaps it will be said, as is often said of them now, that the State govern-
ments had all power that was not forbidden to them. But this is only one of those
bald and glaring falsehoods, under cover of which, even to this day, corrupt and
tyrannical legislators enact, and the servile and corrupt courts, who are made depen-
dent upon them, sustain, a vast mass of unconstitutional legislation, destructive of
men's natural rights. Probably half the State legislation under which we live is of this
character, and has no other authority than the pretence that the government has all
power except what is prohibited to it- The falsehood of the doctrine is apparent the
moment it is considered that our governments derive all their authority from the
grants of the people. Of necessity, therefore, instead of their having all authority
except what is forbidden, they can have none except what is granted.
Everybody admits that this is the true doctrine in regard to the United States
government; and it is equally true of the State governments, and for the same reason.
The United States constitution, (amendment 10,) does indeed specially provide that
the U.S. government shall have no powers except what are delegated to it. But this
amendment was inserted only as a special guard against usurpation. The government
would have had no additional powers if this amendment had been omitted. The
simple fact that all a government's powers are delegated to it by the people, proves
that it can have no powers except what are delegated. And this principle is as true of
the State governments, as it is of the national one; although it is one that is almost
wholly disregarded in practice.6O '
60. [As previously noted, Spooner supported this conclusion in a portion of the work omitted from this
excerpt.-RB.]
61. The doctrine that the government has all power except what is prohibited to it, is of despotic origin.
Despotic government is supposed to originate, and does in fact originate, with the despot, instead of the people; and
he claims all power over them except what they have from time to time wrested from him. It is a consistent doctrine
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The State governments in existence in 1789 purported to be established by the
people, and are either declared, or must be presumed, to have been established for the
maintenance of justice, the preservation of liberty, and the protection of their natural
rights. And those governments consequently had no constitutional authority whatever
inconsistent with these ends, unless some particular powers of that kind were
explicitly granted to them. No power to establish or sustain slavery was granted to
any of them. All the slave statutes, therefore, that were in existence in the States, at
the adoption of the United States constitution, were unconstitutional and void; and
the people who adopted the constitution of the United States must be presumed to
have known this fact, and acted upon it, because everybody is presumed to know the
law. The constitution of the United States, therefore, can be presumed to have made
no exceptions in favor of the slavery then existing in the States.62
But suppose, for the sake of the argument, that slavery had been authorized by
the State constitutions at the time the United States constitution was adopted, the
constitution of the United States would nevertheless have made it illegal; because the
United States constitution was made "the supreme law of the land," "anything in the
constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." It therefore
annulled everything inconsistent with it, then existing in the State constitutions, as
well as everything that should ever after be added to them, inconsistent with it. It of
course abolished slavery as a legal institution, (supposing slavery to have had any
legal existence to be abolished,) if slavery were inconsistent with anything expressed,
or legally implied, in the constitution.
Slavery is inconsistent with nearly everything that is either expressed or legally
implied in the constitution. All its express provisions are general, making no ex-
ception whatever for slavery. All its legal implications are that the constitution and
laws of the United States are for the benefit of the whole "people of the United
States," and their posterity.
The preamble expressly declares that "We the people of the United States"
establish the constitution for the purpose of securing justice, tranquillity, defence,
welfare, and liberty, to "ourselves and our posterity." This language certainly implies
that all "the people" who are parties to the constitution, or join in establishing it, are
to have the benefit of it, and of the laws made in pursuance of it. The only question,
then, is, who were "the people of the United States?"
We cannot go out of the constitution to find who are the parties to it. And there
is nothing in the constitution that can limit this word "people," so as to make it
that such governments have all power except what is prohibited to them. But where the government originates with
the people, precisely the opposite doctrine is true, viz., that the government has no power except what is granted
to it.
62. If, however, they had not known that the existing slavery was unconstitutional, and had proceeded upon
the mistaken belief that it was constitutional, and had intended to recognize it as being so, such intended recognition
would have availed nothing; for it is an established principle, recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States,
that "a legislative act, founded upon a mistaken opinion of what was law. does not change the actual state of the
law, as to pre-existing cases."-- Cranch, 1; Peter's Digest, 578.
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include a part, only, of "the people of the United States." The word, like all others,
must be taken in the sense most beneficial for liberty and justice. Besides, if it did not
include all the then "people of the United States," we have no legal evidence
whatever of a single individual whom it did include. There is no legal evidence
whatever in the constitution, by which it can be proved that any one man was one of
"the people," which will not also equally prove that the slaves were a part of the
people. There is nothing in the constitution that can prove the slaveholders to have
been a part of "the people," which will not equally prove the slaves to have been also
a part of them. And there is as much authority in the constitution for excluding slave-
holders from the description, "the people of the United States," as there is for ex-
cluding the slaves. The term "the people of the United States" must therefore be held
to have included all "the people of the United States," or it can legally be held to
have included none.
But this point has been so fully argued already, that it need not be dwelt upon
here.63
The United States government, then, being in theory formed by, and for the
benefit of, the whole "people of the United States," the question arises, whether it
have the power of securing to "the people" the benefits it intended for them? Or
whether it is dependent on the State governments for permission to confer these
benefits on "the people?" This is the whole question. And if it shall prove that the
general government has no power of securing to the people its intended benefits, it
is, in no legal or reasonable sense, a government.
But how is it to secure its benefits to the people? That is the question.
The first step, and an indispensable step, towards doing it, is to secure to the
people their personal liberty. Without personal liberty, none of the other benefits
intended by the constitution can be secured to an individual, because, without liberty,
no one can prosecute his other rights in the tribunals appointed to secure them to him.
If, therefore, the constitution had failed to secure the personal liberty of individuals,
all the rest of its provisions might have been defeated at the pleasure of the sub-
ordinate governments. But liberty being secured, all the other benefits of the
constitution are secured, because the individual can then carry the question of his
rights into the courts of the United States, in all cases where the laws or constitution
of the United States are involved.
This right of personal liberty, this sine qua non to the enjoyment of all other
rights, is secured by the writ of habeas corpus. This writ, as has before been shown,
necessarily denies the right of property in man, and therefore liberates all who are
restrained of their liberty on that pretence, as it does all others that are restrained on
63. See Part First, pages 90 to 94, sec. edition [omitted from this excerpt]. Also the argument under the
"Sixth Rule of Interpretation," [supra Part ll.F.], and under the "Second Rule cited for Slavery," p. 214 to 216.
[omitted from this excerpt].
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grounds inconsistent with the intended operation of the constitution and laws of the
United States.
Next after providing for the "public safety, in cases of rebellion and invasion,"
the maintenance of courts for dispensing the privileges of this writ is the duty first
in order, and first in importance, of all the duties devolved upon the general govern-
ment; because, next after life, liberty is the right most important in itself; it is also
indispensable to the enjoyment of all the other rights which the general government
is established to secure to the people. All the other operations of government, then,
are works of mere supererogation until liberty be first secured; they are nothing but
a useless provision of good things for those who cannot partake of them.
As the government is bound to dispense its benefits impartially to all, it is bound,
first of all, after securing "the public safety, in cases of rebellion and invasion," to
secure liberty to all. And the whole power of the government is bound to be exerted
for this purpose, to the postponement, ifneed be, of everything else save "the public
safety, in cases of rebellion and invasion." And it is the constitutional duty of the
government to establish as many courts as may be necessary, (no matter how great
the number,) and to adopt all other measures necessary and proper, for bringing the
means of liberation within the reach of every person who is restrained of his liberty
in violation of the principles of the constitution. 4
We have thus far, placed this question upon the ground that those held in slavery
are constitutionally a part of "the people of the United States," and parties to the
constitution. But, although this ground cannot be shaken, it is not necessary to be
maintained, in order to maintain the duty of Congress to provide courts, and all other
means necessary, for their liberation.
The constitution, by providing for the writ of habeas corpus, without making any
discrimination as to the persons entitled to it, has virtually declared, and thus
established it as a constitutional principle, that, in this country, there can be no
property in man; for the writ of habeas corpus, as has before been shown,6 necessa-
rily involves a denial of the right of property in man. By declaring that the privilege
of this writ "shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion
the public safety may require it," the constitution has imposed upon Congress the
duty of providing courts, and if need be, other aids, for the issuing of this writ in
behalf of all human beings within the United States, who may be restrained on claim
of being property. Congress are bound by the constitution to aid, if need be, a
foreigner, an alien, an enemy eyen, who may be restrained as property. And if the
people of any of the civilized nations were now to be seized as slaves, on their arrival
64. It is not necessary, as some imagine, for Congress to enact a law making slavery illegal. Congress have
no such power. Such a power would imply that slavery was now legal. Whereas it is now as much illegal as it is
possible to be made by all the legislation in the world. Congress, assuming that slavery is illegal, are
constitutionally bound to provide all necessary means for having that principle maintained in practice.
65. Part First, ch. 8,p. 101, 2d ed. [omitted from this excerpt].
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in this country, we can all imagine what an abundance of constitutional power would
be found, and put forth, too, for their liberation.
Without this power, the nation could not sustain its position as one of the family
of civilized nations; it could not fulfil the law of nations, and would therefore be
liable to be outlawed in consequence of the conduct of.the States. For example. If the
States can make slaves of anybody, they can certainly make slaves of foreigners. And
if they can make slaves of foreigners, they can violate the law of nations; because to
make slaves of foreigners, is to violate the law of nations. Now the general
government is the only government known to other nations; and if the States can
make slaves of foreigners, and there were no power in the general government to
liberate them, any one of the States could involve the whole nation in the
responsibility of having violated the law of nations, and the nation would have no
means of relieving itself from that responsibility by liberating the persons enslaved;
but would have to meet, and conquer or die in, a war brought upon it by the
criminality of the State.
This illustration is sufficient to prove that the power of the general government
to liberate men from slavery, by the use of the writ of habeas corpus, is of the
amplest character; that it is not confined to the cases of those who are a part of "the
people of the United States," and so parties to the constitution; that it is limited only
by the territory of the country; and that it exists utterly irrespective of "anything in
the constitution or laws of any State."
This power, which is bound to be exerted for the liberation of foreigners, is
bound to be exerted also for the liberation of persons born on the soil, even though
it could be proved, (which it cannot,) that they are not legally parties to the consti-
tution. The simple fact of their not being parties to the constitution, (if that fact were
proved,) would no more alter the power or duty of Congress in relation to securing
them the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, than the same fact does in the case
of foreigners, who confessedly are not parties to the constitution; unless, indeed, their
coming into the country under the guaranty afforded by the habeas corpus clause of
the constitution makes them, so far, parties to it. But this clause could operate as no
guaranty of liberty to foreigners, unless it guarantied liberty to all born on the soil;
for, there being no distinction of persons made, it certainly could not be claimed that
it guarantied greater privileges to foreigners than to the least favored of those born
on the soil. So that it will still result that, unless the constitution, (as it may be
executed by the general government alone,)guaranties personal liberty to all born in
the country, it does not guaranty it to foreigners coming into the country; and if it do
not guaranty it to foreigners coming into the country, any single State, by enslaving
foreigners, can involve the whole nation in a death struggle in support of such
slavery.
If these opinions are correct, it is the constitutional duty of Congress to establish
courts, if need be, in every county and township even, where there are slaves to be
liberated; to provide attorneys to bring the cases before the courts; and to keep a
standing military force, if need be, to sustain the proceedings.
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In addition to the use of the habeas corpus, Congress have power to prohibit the
slave trade between the States, which, of itself, would do much towards abolishing
slavery in the northern slaveholding States. They have power also to organize, arm,
and discipline the slaves as militia, thus enabling them to aid in obtaining and
securing their own liberty.
[Finally:]["The United States shall guaranty to every State in this Union a
republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and,
on application of the legislature, or of the executive, (when the legislature cannot be
convened,) against domestic violence."
Mark the strength and explicitness of the first clause of this section, to wit, "The
United States shall guaranty to every State in this Union a republican form of
government." Mark also especially that this guaranty is one of liberty, and not of
slavery.
We have all of us heretofore been compelled to hear, from individuals of
slaveholding principles, many arrogant and bombastic assertions, touching the con-
stitutional "guaranties" given to slavery; and persons, who are in the habit of taking
their constitutional law from other men's mouths, instead of looking at the consti-
tution for themselves, have probably been led to imagine that the constitution had
really given such guaranties in some explicit and tangible form. We have, never-
theless, seen that all those pretended guaranties are at most nothing but certain vague
hints, insinuations, ciphers and innuendoes, that are imagined to be covered up under
language which legally means nothing of the kind. But, in the clause now cited, we
do have an explicit and peremptory "guaranty," depending upon no implications,
inferences or conjectures, and couched in no uncertain or ambiguous terms. And
what is this guaranty? Is it a guaranty of slavery? No. It is a guaranty of something
flatly incompatible with slavery: a guaranty of "a republican form of government to
every State in this Union."
And what is "a republican form of government?" It is where the government is
a commonwealth-the property of the public, of the mass of the people, or of the
entire people. It is where the government is made up of, and controlled by the
combined will and power of the public, or mass of the people-and where, of natural
consequence, it will have, for its object, the protection of the rights of all. It is
indispensable to a republican form of government, that the public, the mass of the
people, if not the entire people, participate in the grant of powers to the government,
and in the protection afforded by the government. It is impossible, therefore, that a
government, under which any considerable number of the people (if indeed any
number of the people, are disfranchised and enslaved, can be a republic. A slave
government is an oligarchy; and one too of the most arbitrary and criminal character.
Strange that men, who have eyes capable of discovering in the constitution so
many covert, implied and insinuated guaranties of crime and slavery, should be blind
to the legal import of so open, explicit and peremptory a guaranty of freedom,
equality and right.
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Even if there had really been, in the constitution, two such contradictory
guaranties, as one of liberty or republicanism in every State of the Union, and
another of slavery in every State where one portion of the people might succeed in
enslaving the rest, one of these guaranties must have given way to the other-for,
being plainly inconsistent with each other, they could not have stood together. And
it might safely have been left either to legal or to moral rules to determine which of
the two should prevail-whether a provision to perpetuate slavery should triumph
over a guaranty.of freedom.
But it is constantly asserted, in substance, that there is "no propriety" in the
general government's interfering in the local governments of the States. Those who
make this assertion appear to regard a State as a single individual, capable of
managing his own affairs, and of course unwilling to tolerate the intermeddling of
others. But a State is not an individual. It is made up of large numbers of individuals,
each and all of whom, amid the intestine mutations and strifes to which States are
subject, are liable, at some time or other, to be trampled upon by the strongest party,
and may therefore reasonably choose to secure, in advance, some external protection
against such emergencies, by making reciprocal contracts with other people similarly
exposed in the neighboring States. Such contracts for mutual succor and protection,
are perfectly fit and proper for any people who are so situated as to be able to
contribute to each other's security. They are as fit and proper as any other political
contracts whatever, and are founded on precisely the same principle of combination
for mutual defence-for what are any of our political contracts and forms of
government, but contracts between man and man for mutual protection against those
who may conspire to injure either or all of them? But these contracts, fit and proper
between all men, are peculiarly appropriate to those, who, while they are members
of various local and subordinate associations, are, at the same time, united for
specific purposes under one general government. Such a mutual contract, between
the people of all the States, is contained in this clause of the constitution. And it gives
to them all an additional guaranty for their liberties.
Those who object to this guaranty, however, choose to overlook all these
considerations, and then appear to imagine that their notions of "propriety" on this
point, can effectually expunge the guaranty itself from the constitution. In indulging
this fancy, however, they undoubtedly overrate the legal, and perhaps also the moral
effect of such superlative fastidiousness; for even if there were "no propriety" in the
interference of the general government to maintain a republican form of government
in the States, still, the unequivocal pledge to that effect, given in the constitution,
would nevertheless remain an irresistible rebutter to the allegation that the consti-
tution intended to guaranty its opposite, slavery, an oligarchy, or a despotism. It
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would, therefore, entirely forbid all those inferences and implications, drawn by
slaveholders, from those other phrases, which they quote as guaranties of slavery."
.. The guaranty given by the national constitution, securing such a government
to each of the States, is therefore neither officious nor impertinent. On the contrary,
this guaranty was sine qua non to any rational contract of union; and the enforcement
of it is equally indispensable, if not to the continuance of the union at all, certainly
to its continuance on any terms that are either safe, honorable or equitable for the
north.
This guaranty, then, is not idle verbiage. It is full of meaning. And that meaning
is not only fatal to slavery itself, but it is fatal also to all those pretences, con-
structions, surmises and implications, by which it is claimed that the national
constitution sanctions, legalizes, or even tolerates slavery. 7]
[CONCLUSION 1]
THOSE who believe that slavery is unconstitutional, are the only persons who
propose to abolish it. They are the only ones who claim to have the power to abolish
it. Were the entire North to become abolitionists, they would still be unable to touch
the chain of a single slave, so long as they should concede that slavery was
constitutional. To say, as many abolitionists do, that they will do all they consti-
tutionally can towards abolishing slavery, is virtually saying that they will do
nothing, if they grant, at the same time, that the constitution supports slavery. To
suppress the slave trade between the States, as some propose, is certainly violating
the spirit, and probably the law, of the constitution, if slavery be constitutional. To
talk of amending the constitution, by the action of three fourths of the States, so as
to abolish slavery, is to put off the matter to some remote and unknown period.
While abolitionists are amusing themselves with these idle schemes for abolishing
slavery without the agency of any adequate means, slaves are doubling in numbers
every twenty-five years, and the slave power is rapidly increasing in numbers,
wealth, and territory. To concede that this power is entrenched behind the
constitution, is, in the minds of practical men, to concede the futility of all efforts to
destroy it. And its effect is to dissuade the great body of the North from joining in
66. From whom come these objections to the "propriety" of the general government's interfering to maintain
republicanism in the states? Do they not come from those who have ever hitherto claimed that the general
government was bound to interfere to put down republicanism? And that those who were republicans at the north,
might with perfect "propriety" and consistency, pledge their assistance to the despots of the south, to sustain the
worst, the meanest and most atrocious of tyrannies? Yes, from the very same. To interfere to assist one half of the
people of a state in the cowardly, cruel and fiendish.work of crushing the other half into the earth, corresponds
precisely with their chivalrous notions of "propriety;" but it is insufferable officiousness for them to form any
political compacts that will require them to interfere to protect the weak against the tyranny of the strong, or to
maintain justice, liberty, peace and freedom.
67. [This section is taken from a portion of the text that is omitted from this excerpt.-RB.]
68. [In the 1860 edition of the Unconstitutionality of Slavery, this section appears as the beginning of
Appendix B.]
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any efforts to that end. The mass of men will insist upon seeing that a thing can be
done, before they will leave the care of their other interests to assist in doing it.
Hence the slow progress of all political movements based on the admission that
slavery is constitutional. What sense would there be in placing the political power of
the country in the hands of men, who can show nothing that they can do with it
towards accomplishing the end for which they ask it? Abolitionists, therefore, who
ask political power, and yet concede slavery to be constitutional, stand in the attitude
of men asking for power for their own gratification, and not for any great practical
good that they can do with it.6 Let them but show that they can abolish slavery, and
they can then consistently ask that the government be intrusted to their hands. 0
The North, with no very important exceptions, although not enthusiastic in the
matter, are abolitionists at heart. It is a slander on human nature to assert that they are
not. To suppose that a people, themselves the freest in the world, having no
pecuniary interests that bind them to slavery, inheriting all the principles of English
liberty, and living for the last seventy years under the incessant teachings of the truth
that all men are born free and equal-to suppose that such a people, as a people, are
not opposed to slavery, is equivalent to supposing that they, are naturally incapable
of such a sentiment as the love of liberty, or the hatred of oppression. If the
supposition were correct, it would furnish an argument against all further effort of
any kind; for the task of radically changing human nature, for the purpose of
abolishing slavery, is one quite too chimerical for rational men to engage in.
If the North love slavery, why did they unite to abolish the slave trade? or to
exclude slavery from the north-western States? And why do they not have slaves
themselves?
The, people of the North want simply to know if they can do anything for the
abolition of slavery, without violating their constitutional faith. For this alternative
they are not prepared, (as I admit they ought to be, if they had ever pledged them-
selves to the support of slavery;) but they are prepared for almost anything short of
that. At any rate, they are prepared to stand by the constitution, if it supports liberty.
If it be said that they are not, the speediest process by which to bring them to that
state of preparation, is to prove to them that slavery is unconstitutional, and thus
present to them the alternative of overthrowing the constitution for the support of
slavery, or of standing by it in support of freedom....
69. No one, I trust, will suppose I am actually accusing abolitionists of seeking power for their own
gratification. I am only showing their political position, so long as they concede that slavery is constitutional.
70. If abolitionists think that the constitution supports slavery, they ought not to ask for power under it, nor
to vote for any one who will support it. Revolution should be their principle. And they should vote against all
constitutional parties, block the wheels of government and thus compel revolution.
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